Zellentin Liberal Neutrality

Treating Citizens as Free and Equal
1. Auflage 2012
ISBN: 978-3-11-025519-5
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 192 Seiten

Reihe: ISSN

Liberal neutrality has two underlying intuitions and therefore two distinct elements. On the one hand it refers to the intuition that there are matters the state has no business getting involved in. On the other hand it is motivated by the idea that the state ought to treat citizens as equals and show equal respect for their different cenceptions of the good life. This book defends this two-fold understanding of neutrality with reference to Rawls’ conception of citizens as free and equal persons. Treating citizens as equals requires the state to grant its citizens equal political rights and also to ensure that these rights have “fair value”. Given the danger that cultural bias undermines the equal standing of citizens, the state has to ensure procedures of political decision making that are able to take citizens’ different conceptions into account.

Zielgruppe

Political and Religious Foundations and Think Tanks, Academics, Institutes, Libraries

Autoren/Hrsg.

Zellentin, Alexa

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Staats- und Regierungsformen, Staatslehre
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Staatsbürgerkunde, Staatsbürgerschaft, Zivilgesellschaft
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgements;9
2;1 Introduction;11
2.1;1.1 The challenges of diversity;11
2.2;1.2 Leitkultur;12
2.3;1.3 Liberal neutrality;20
3;2 Defining liberal neutrality;22
3.1;2.1 Neutrality is an ill-defined term;22
3.2;2.2 Conceptions of neutrality;25
3.2.1;2.2.1 Neutrality of impact;26
3.2.2;2.2.2 Neutrality as equality of opportunity;28
3.2.3;2.2.3 Justificatory neutrality;31
3.3;2.3 Contexts of neutrality;35
3.3.1;2.3.1 Constitutional essentials;36
3.3.2;2.3.2 Political decision-making;38
3.3.2.1;2.3.2.1 Neutrality as respectful non-identification;40
3.3.2.2;2.3.2.2 Relational neutrality;41
3.3.3;2.3.3 Neutral behaviour of state officials;43
3.4;2.4 Neutrality as a two-fold concept;49
4;3 The right and the good;52
4.1;3.1 Neutrality versus toleration;52
4.2;3.2 The right versus the good;54
4.3;3.3 Theories of rights;56
4.4;3.4 Thin versus thick conceptions of the good;59
4.4.1;3.4.1 Rawls’s thin theory of the good;63
4.4.2;3.4.2 Dworkin’s thin theory of the good;66
4.5;3.5 Another complication;68
4.6;3.6 Comprehensive versus political conceptions;69
4.7;3.7 The need for a thin political theory of the good;72
5;4 Grounding neutrality;74
5.1;4.1 Society as a fair system of cooperation over time;76
5.2;4.2 Citizens as equipped with two moral powers;77
5.3;4.3 Citizens as free and equal persons;79
5.3.1;4.3.1 Citizens as free;79
5.3.2;4.3.2 Citizens as equal;84
5.4;4.4 Citizens as free and equal as thin political conception;90
5.5;4.5 The limits of the project;92
6;5 Justifying the respect element;94
6.1;5.1 Coercive power and the state;95
6.1.1;5.1.1 All state action involves coercion;96
6.1.2;5.1.2 All state action needs to be justifiable to the citizens affected;97
6.1.3;5.1.3 The state has no right to do wrong;98
6.2;5.2 Justifying coercion;101
6.2.1;5.2.1 Reasonable agreement justifies coercion;101
6.2.1.1;5.2.1.1 The addressees of justification;102
6.2.1.2;5.2.1.2 The scope ofthe need for justification;103
6.2.1.3;5.2.1.3 The criteria for reasonable acceptability;105
6.2.1.4;5.2.1.4 What citizens can be reasonably expected to agree on;107
6.2.2;5.2.2 Protecting rights justifies coercion;109
6.2.2.1;5.2.2.1 Interest theories of rights;109
6.2.2.2;5.2.2.2 Choice theories of rights;110
6.2.2.3;5.2.2.3 Common ground;111
6.2.3;5.2.3 Protecting rights is the only justification for coercion;112
6.2.3.1;5.2.3.1 The right to be left alone;112
6.2.3.2;5.2.3.2 Reasons for state action have to outweigh the right to be left alone;118
6.3;5.3 The respect element of neutrality;121
7;6 Justifying the fairness element;122
7.1;6.1 Treating people as equals;122
7.2;6.2 Rawls’s conception of citizens as equal;124
7.3;6.3 Treating citizens as equals with regard to their two moral powers;126
7.4;6.4 Respecting the two moral powers equally;127
7.4.1;6.4.1 Respecting the capacity for the right;128
7.4.2;6.4.2 Respecting the capacity for the good;131
7.5;6.5 Formal versus fair political participation;133
7.5.1;6.5.1 Cultural differences;136
7.5.2;6.5.2 The implementation of neutrally justified rules;141
7.6;6.6 The need to be aware of differences;146
8;7 Implementing liberal neutrality;148
8.1;7.1 Justificatory neutrality;149
8.1.1;7.1.1 Citizens as free;150
8.1.2;7.1.2 Citizens as equal;152
8.1.3;7.1.3 Enabling cooperation;155
8.1.4;7.1.4 Fair cooperation;156
8.1.5;7.1.5 The scope and limits of justificatory neutrality;158
8.2;7.2 Procedural neutrality;159
8.2.1;7.2.1 Equal political rights and their fair value;159
8.2.2;7.2.2 Minority representation;161
8.2.3;7.2.3 Contestatory democracy;167
8.3;7.3 Liberal neutrality in the headscarf case;171
9;8 Conclusion;176
9.1;8.1 Summary of the argument;176
9.2;8.2 The three challenges of pluralism;178
9.3;8.3 The third challenge;179
10;9 Bibliography;182
11;Index;187

Über Autor(innen)

Alexa Zellentin, Universität Graz, Austria.