Yang / Ng Specialization and Economic Organization

A New Classical Microeconomic Framework
1. Auflage 2015
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9682-1
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 215, 517 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Contributions to Economic Analysis

As the subtitle indicates, this book presents a new classical microeconomic framework. It develops a new unifying analytical framework that covers topics concerning international trade, development economics, growth theory, transaction costs economics, comparative economics, management economics, urban economics, industrial organization, and macroeconomics. The new classical microeconomic framework is used to bring the analysis of economies of specialization, the division of labor, and the structure of economic organization into the central place of economics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Yang, X.

Ng, Y. -K.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Specialization and Economic Organization: A New Classical Microeconomic Framework;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;12
5;Dedication;7
6;Preface;8
7;Introduction;18
7.1;0.1. Intrinsic Relationship Between the Evolution of the Division of Labor and Other Economic Phenomena;18
7.2;0.2. The ImpHcations of the Dichotomy Between Pure Consumers and Pure Producers for Economic Analysis;20
7.3;0.3. Why Economists Shifted Their Attention From the Economic Organization Problem to the Resource Allocation Problem;21
7.4;0.4. Diversifying the Frameworks of Economic Analysis;29
8;Part I: Economies and Diseconomies of Specialization;36
8.1;Chapter 1. Analytical Frameworks of Economics;37
8.1.1;1.1. What is a Framework of Economic Analysis;37
8.1.2;1.2. Assessment of Quality of a Framework;40
8.1.3;1.3. The Framework in This Book;48
8.2;Chapter 2. Economies of Specialization and Transaction Costs;58
8.2.1;2.1. A System of Production for a Consumer-producer;58
8.2.2;2.2. Preferences for Diverse Consumption and Transaction Costs;69
8.2.3;2.3. Individual Decision Problems;71
8.2.4;2.4. Equilibrium and Its Comparative Statics;78
8.2.5;2.5. Welfare Implications of Equilibrium;86
8.2.6;2.6. The Distinctive Features of Equilibrium in our Framework;88
8.3;Chapter 3. The Pricing Mechanism and ex post Transaction Costs;90
8.3.1;3.1. A Bilateral Bargaining Model;90
8.3.2;3.2. The Endogenization of the Choice of the First Mover;99
8.3.3;3.3. Why the Market Emerges from the Division of Labor;105
8.3.4;3.4. The Bargaining Equilibrium with Unemployment;109
8.3.5;3.5. The Endogenization of the Principal-agent Relationship;111
8.4;Chapter 4. Economies and Diseconomies of Information Asymmetry;113
8.4.1;4.1. Specialization and Economies of Information Asymmetry;113
8.4.2;4.2. Economies of Information Asymmetry;115
8.4.3;4.3. Dual Functions of the Price System: Coordinating the Division of Labor and Promoting Information Asymmetry;118
8.4.4;4.4. The Function of the Market in Exploiting Economies of Information Asymmetry;134
9;Part II: Rethinking Trade Theory and Development Economics;136
9.1;Chapter 5. Why and How International Trade Emerges from Domestic Trade;138
9.1.1;5.1. Rethinking Trade Theory;138
9.1.2;5.2. Conflict Between Preferences for Diverse Consumption and Economies of Specialization;139
9.1.3;5.3. The Equilibrium Level of Division of Labor;141
9.1.4;5.4. Comparative Statics;148
9.1.5;5.5. Evolution of the Division of Labor Generated by Exogenous Evolution of Transaction Efficiency;155
9.1.6;5.6. Organizational Efficiency and the Function of the Market Discovering in the Efficient Pattern of Organization;157
9.1.7;5.7. Emergence of International Trade from Domestic Trade;159
9.1.8;5.8. Why do we need the market?;163
9.1.9;5.9. Unequal Income Distribution and Dual Economy;165
9.1.10;Appendix 5.1: Proof of Lemma 2.1 for the Model in This Chapter;166
9.2;Chapter 6. Emergence of Professional Middlemen and Urbanization;168
9.2.1;6.1. A Model with Trading Activities and Heterogeneous Parameters;168
9.2.2;6.2. Decisions on Being a Professional Middleman;170
9.2.3;6.3. Market Structures and Corner Equilibria;172
9.2.4;6.4. The Pareto Optimal Pattern of Trade and Economic Organization;177
9.2.5;6.5. How Does the Market Sort out the Efficient Pattern of Economic Organization?;182
9.2.6;6.6. Equilibrium Trade Pattern, Level of Division of Labor, and Urbanization;186
9.2.7;6.7. Emergence of Professional Middlemen and a Hierarchical Structure of Economic Organization and a Dual Structure Between the Urban and Rural Sectors;189
9.2.8;Appendix 6.1: Proof of Lemma 6.2;193
9.2.9;Appendix 6.2: Proof of Proposition 6.7;194
9.3;Chapter 7 . Endogenous Evolution of the Division of Labor;197
9.3.1;7.1. Evolution of the Division of Labor, the Accumulation of Human Capital, and Development of Endogenous Comparative Advanta;197
9.3.2;7.2. A Dynamic Model with Learning by Doing;199
9.3.3;7.3. Optimum Speed of Learning by Doing and Evolution of Endogenous Comparative Advantage;202
9.3.4;7.4. The Evolution of the Extent of the Market, Trade Dependence, Endogenous Comparative Advantages, and Economic Structure;215
9.3.5;7.5. Rethinking Development Economics and Growth Theory;217
9.3.6;Appendix 7.1: Proof of Lemma 2.1 for the Dynamic Model;222
9.4;Chapter 8. Concurrent Increases in Specialization and Consumption Variety;223
9.4.1;8.1. Why the Variety of Available Goods and Specialization Increase Concurrently;223
9.4.2;8.2. Tradeoffs among Economies of Specialization, Economies of Complementarity, and Transaction Costs;225
9.4.3;8.3. The Function of the Market in Determining the Efficient Variety of Available Consumer Goods;227
9.4.4;8.4. Implications of the Endogenization of Aggregate Demand;229
10;Part III: Rethinking Theory of the Firm and Economics of Property Rights;236
10.1;Chapter 9. Why and How Firms Emerge from the Division of Labor;237
10.1.1;9.1. Why is the Institution of the Firm Needed?;237
10.1.2;9.2. Economies of Specialization in Roundabout Production;238
10.1.3;9.3. The Efficient Pattern of Economic Organization;239
10.1.4;9.4. The Institution of the Firm and the Structure of Residual Rights;241
10.1.5;9.5. Economies of Specialization, Economies of Division of Labor, and Economies of the Firm;246
10.1.6;9.6. Does the Structure of Residual Rights Make a Difference?;251
10.2;Chapter 10. Function of the Market in Searching for Efficient Contractual Arrangements;257
10.2.1;10.1. Formalizing the Economics of Property Rights;257
10.2.2;10.2. A Tradeoff Between Economies of Specialization and Coordination Rehability;259
10.2.3;10.3. Concurrent Increases in Productivity, the Level of Division of Labor, and a Risk of Coordination Failure;270
10.2.4;10.4. The Invisible Hand and "Market Failure";275
10.3;Chapter 11. The Extent of the Market and Rights Specified in a Contract vs. Rights to Contracting;280
10.3.1;11.1. Two Functions of the Market: Executing Exchanges and Keeping Pressure on the Incumbent Trader Partners;280
10.3.2;11.2. A Tradeoff Between Economies of Specialization and Coordination Reliabihty;282
10.3.3;11.3. Efficient Vagueness of Property Rights and Market Size;287
10.3.4;11.4. Possible Extensions and Applications;297
11;Part IV: Specialization and Hierarchical Structures of the Division of Labor;300
11.1;Chapter 12. Emergence of New Producer Goods and Related New Technology;302
11.1.1;12.1. A Tradeoff Between Economies of Specialization and Economies of Complementarity;303
11.1.2;12.2. The Efficient Number of Producer Goods and Level of Specialization;304
11.1.3;12.3. Concurrent Changes in the Level of Division of Labor, Productivity, and Input Diversity;310
11.1.4;12.4. Changes in Economic Structure;313
11.1.5;Appendix 12.1: Proof of Lemma 12.1;316
11.2;Chapter 13. Economies of Roundaboutness and Industrialization;318
11.2.1;13.1. The Division of Labor and Roundabout Production;318
11.2.2;13.2. A Model with a Variable Hierarchical Structure of Goods;320
11.2.3;13.3. Corner Equilibria in Ten Market Structures;323
11.2.4;13.4. Concurrent Evolution of Specialization and Roundaboutness;330
11.2.5;13.5. Concurrent Evolution of Specialization, Roundaboutness, and Firms and Disappearance of Traditional Goods;334
11.2.6;Appendix 13.1: The Structure with Goods z, y, v, x, and w;340
11.2.7;Appendix 13.2: The Structures without Good y;340
11.3;Chapter 14. Efficient Hierarchy and the Division of Labor;342
11.3.1;14.1. Why Can a Hierarchy Improve Efficiency?;342
11.3.2;14.2. A Centralized Hierarchy and the Division of Labor;344
11.3.3;14.3. A Decentralized Hierarchy and the Division of Labor;348
11.3.4;14.4. Evolution of the Hierarchical Structure of the Market;361
12;Part V: Complicated Dynamic Mechanisms Generating Endogenous Evohttion of the Division of Labor;366
12.1;Chapter 15. Entrepreneurship, Investment, and Experiments with Economic Organizations;367
12.1.1;15.1. The Efficient Pattern of the Division of Labor in a Walrasian Regime;368
12.1.2;15.2. Costs in Acquiring Information about the Efficient Pattern of the Division of Labor;369
12.1.3;15.3. Information Costs and Endogenous Evolution of the Division of Labor;373
12.1.4;15.4. Information Asymmetry, Entrepreneurship, and Investment;383
12.1.5;15.5. Investment and the Function of the Price System in Coordinating Experiments with Patterns of the Division of Labor;388
12.1.6;Appendix 15.1: Solution of the Dynamic Programming Problem;390
12.2;Chapter 16. Concurrently Endogenous Evolution of Specialization, Firms, and Product Diversity;393
12.2.1;16.1. A Dynamic Equilibrium Model with Learning by Doing and an Endogenous Number of Producer Goods;394
12.2.2;16.2. Dynamic Equilibrium Level of Specialization and Input Variety;397
12.2.3;16.3. Concurrent Evolution of Specialization, Variety of Producer Goods, and the Institution of the Firm;407
12.2.4;Appendix 16.1: Proof of Lemma 16.1;412
12.2.5;Appendix 16.2: Proof of Proposition 16.1;413
12.2.6;Appendix 16.3: Proof of Proposition 16.2;416
13;Part VI: Empirical Evidence and Rethinking Macroeconomics;418
13.1;Chapter 17. Why and How Money Emerges from the Division of Labor;420
13.1.1;17.1. Why Is Money Needed?;420
13.1.2;17.2. A Model Endogenizing the Monetary Regime;423
13.1.3;17.3. Efficient Level of Division of Labor and Monetary Regime;425
13.1.4;17.4. ImpHcations of the Institution of the Firm for Monetary Regime;434
13.1.5;Appendbc 17.1: Proof of Lemm a 17.1;437
13.2;Chapter 18. The Division of Labor, Business Cycles, and Unemployment;440
13.2.1;18.1. Market Failure or Market Miracle?;440
13.2.2;18.2. The Relationship Between the Business Cycle and the Division of Labor;443
13.2.3;18.3. Cyclical vs. non-cychcal Corner Equilibria;445
13.2.4;18.4. General Price Level, Business Cycles, and Unemployment Rate;457
13.2.5;18.5. Emergence of Firms and Fiat Money from the Division of Labor;461
13.3;Chapter 19. Testing the Theories in this Volume against Empirical Observations;463
13.3.1;19.1. Difficulties in Testing the Theories in this Volume;463
13.3.2;19.2. The Model and Underlying Theory;467
13.3.3;19.3. Measuring the Level of Division of Labor;470
13.3.4;19.4. Quantifying Efficiency in Specifying and Enforcing Property Rights;472
13.3.5;19.5. The Main Results;497
13.3.6;19.6 More Empirical Studies;498
14;Epilogue;500
15;References;511
16;Index;522