E-Book, Englisch, Band 134, 280 Seiten
Reihe: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science
Washburn / Kress Combat Modeling
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-1-4419-0790-5
Verlag: Springer US
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
E-Book, Englisch, Band 134, 280 Seiten
Reihe: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science
ISBN: 978-1-4419-0790-5
Verlag: Springer US
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
'Combat Modeling' is a systematic learning resource and reference text for the quantitative analysis of combat. After a brief overview, authors Washburn and Kress present individual chapters on shooting without feedback; shooting with feedback; target defense; attrition models; game theory and wargames; search; unmanned aerial vehicles; and terror and insurgency. Three appendices provide a review of basic probability concepts, probability distributions, and Markov models; an introduction to optimization models; and a discussion of Monte-Carlo simulations. Drawing on their many years of experience at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, Washburn and Kress have created a reference that will provide the tools and techniques for analysts involved in the underpinnings of combat decisions. This is a book that can be used as a military manual, reference book, and textbook for military courses on this vital subject.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Preface;6
2;Contents;7
3;Chapter 1 Generalities and Terminology;9
3.1;1.1 Introduction;9
3.2;1.2 Classification of Combat Models;10
3.3;1.3 Modeling Shortcuts;12
3.4;1.3.1 Expected Value Analysis;13
3.5;1.3.2 Universal Independence;14
3.6;1.3.3 Tuning Parameters;15
3.7;1.3.4 The Ostrich Effect;16
3.8;1.3.5 Convenient Distributions;17
3.9;1.4 Notation and Conventions;18
3.10;1.5 Book Overview;19
3.11;Chapter 2: Shooting without Feedback;19
3.12;Chapter 3: Shooting with Feedback;19
3.13;Chapter 4: Target Defense;19
3.14;Chapter 5: Attrition Models;19
3.15;Chapter 6: Game Theory and Wargames;20
3.16;Chapter 7: Search;20
3.17;Chapter 8: Mine Warfare;20
3.18;Chapter 9: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles;20
3.19;Chapter 10: Terror and Insurgency;21
3.20;Appendices;21
4;Chapter 2 Shooting Without Feedback;22
4.1;2.1 Introduction;22
4.2;2.2 Single-Shot Kill Probability;23
4.3;2.2.1 Damage Functions and Lethal Area;23
4.4;2.2.2 Cookie-Cutter Damage Function;24
4.5;2.2.3 Diffuse Gaussian (DG) Damage Function;27
4.6;2.2.4 Other Damage Functions;28
4.7;2.3 Multiple-Shot Kill Probability;29
4.8;2.3.1 Simultaneous Independent Shots;29
4.9;2.3.2 Salvos of Dependent Shots;32
4.10;2.3.3 The Diffuse Gaussian Special Case;38
4.11;2.3.4 Area Targets and Multiple Error Sources;40
4.12;2.4 Multiple Shots, Multiple Targets, One Salvo;42
4.13;2.4.1 Identical Shots, Identical Targets, Optimal Shooting;42
4.14;2.4.2 Identical Shots, Diverse Targets, Optimal Shooting;43
4.15;2.4.3 Diverse Shots, Diverse Targets, Optimal Shooting;44
4.16;2.4.4 Identical Shots, Identical Targets, Random Shooting;45
4.17;2.5 Further Reading;47
5;Chapter 3 Shooting with Feedback;53
5.1;3.1 Introduction;53
5.2;3.2 Feedback on the Status of a Single Target;54
5.3;3.3 Feedback on Miss Distances;55
5.4;3.4 Shoot Look Shoot with Multiple Targets;58
5.5;3.4.1 Identical Shots and Identical Targets with a Time Constraint;58
5.6;3.4.2 Variety of Shots and Targets, No Time Constraint;61
5.7;3.4.3 Variety of Shots and Targets, Unreliable Feedback;62
5.8;3.5 Further Reading;65
6;Chapter 4 Target Defense;71
6.1;4.1 Introduction;71
6.2;4.2 Defense of One Target Against Several Identical Attackers;72
6.3;4.2.1 Known Attack Size;72
6.4;4.2.2 Bayesian Defense;75
6.5;4.2.3 The Maximum Cost Defense Against a Shoot-Look-Shoot Attack;76
6.6;4.2.4 Prim–Read Defense;78
6.7;4.3 Defense of Multiple Targets Against ICBM Attack;79
7;Chapter 5 Attrition Models;85
7.1;5.1 Introduction;85
7.2;5.2 Deterministic Lanchester Models;85
7.3;5.3 Stochastic Lanchester Models;92
7.4;5.4 Data for Lanchester models;98
7.5;5.4.1 The Engineering Approach;98
7.6;5.4.2 The Statistical Approach;100
7.7;5.5 Aggregation and Valuation;104
7.8;5.6 The FAst THeater Model (FATHM);106
7.9;5.6.1 FATHM’s Ground Model;107
7.10;5.6.2 FATHM’s Air Model;109
7.11;5.6.3 Implementation and Usage;110
8;Chapter 6 Game Theory and Wargames;116
8.1;6.1 Introduction;116
8.2;6.2 Game Theory;117
8.3;6.2.1 Matrix Games and Decision Theory;118
8.4;6.2.2 Tree Games and Saddle Points;123
8.5;6.2.3 Solvable Games;125
8.6;6.2.4 Information and Its Effects on Combat;129
8.7;6.3 Wargames;133
9;Chapter 7 Search;138
9.1;7.1 Introduction;138
9.2;7.2 Sweep Width;140
9.3;7.3 Three “Laws” for Detection Probability;142
9.4;7.3.1 Exhaustive Search;143
9.5;7.3.2 Random Search;144
9.6;7.3.3 The Inverse Cube Law;147
9.7;7.4 Barrier Patrol;148
9.8;7.5 Optimal Distribution of Effort for Stationary Targets;150
9.9;7.5.1 Discrete Effort;151
9.10;7.5.2 Continuous Effort;154
9.11;7.5.3 Search of a Bivariate Normal Prior;154
9.12;7.6 Moving Targets;156
9.13;7.6.1 Dynamic Enhancement;156
9.14;7.6.2 Markov Motion;158
9.15;7.6.3 Evasive Targets;161
9.16;7.7 Further Reading;163
10;Chapter 8 Mine Warfare;166
10.1;8.1 Introduction;166
10.2;8.2 Simple Minefield Models;167
10.3;8.3 The Uncountered Minefield Planning Model (UMPM);168
10.4;8.4 Minefield Clearance;173
10.5;8.4.1 Are Clearance Forces Vulnerable?;175
10.6;8.4.2 Is Clearance Level a Sufficient Output?;176
10.7;8.4.3 Is Clearance a Sequential Process?;176
10.8;8.4.4 Are There Multiple Mine Types?;177
10.9;8.4.5 Are There Multiple Sweep Types?;177
10.10;8.4.6 Still More Questions;178
10.11;8.4.7 A Prototype Minesweeping Optimization Model:OptSweep;178
10.12;8.5 Mine Games;179
10.13;8.5.1 The Analytical Countered Minefield Planning Model (ACMPM);180
10.14;8.5.2 Triangular Sweeping;181
10.15;8.5.3 IED Warfare;184
11;Chapter 9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles;189
11.1;9.1 Introduction;189
11.2;9.2 Routing a UAV;190
11.3;9.2.1 Intelligence – Investigating an Object;191
11.4;9.2.2 Reconnaissance – Detecting a Mobile Target;197
11.5;A;198
11.6;9.3 Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles;202
11.7;9.3.1 Disposable UCAV;202
11.8;•;203
11.9;9.3.2 Retrievable Multiple-Weapon UCAV;208
11.10;9.4 Summary, Extensions and Further Reading;212
11.11;9.4.1 Optimizing the Employment of UAVs;212
11.12;9.4.2 Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles;213
12;Chapter 10 Terror and Insurgency;215
12.1;10.1 Introduction;215
12.2;10.2 The Effect of Suicide Bombing;216
12.3;10.2.1 Dispersion of Fragments;217
12.4;10.2.2 Modeling the Arena;219
12.5;k;220
12.6;10.2.3 The Effect of Crowd Blocking;221
12.7;10.2.4 Analysis;223
12.8;10.3 Response Policies for Bioterrorism – The Case of Smallpox;225
12.9;10.3.1 The Epidemic and Possible Interventions;226
12.10;10.3.2 A Model for Mass Vaccination;227
12.11;10.3.3 Numerical Example;229
12.12;10.4 Counterinsurgency;232
12.13;10.4.1 The Model;233
12.14;10.4.2 Numerical Example;235
13;Appendix A Probability – the Mathematics of Uncertainty;240
14;Appendix B Optimization;259
14.1;y =;261
14.2;x;261
14.3;x - v= 0;261
15;Appendix C Monte Carlo Simulation;265
15.1;Additional Reading;276




