What Makes Us Moral? On the capacities and conditions for being moral

2013
ISBN: 978-94-017-8293-7
Verlag: Springer Netherlands

Buch, Englisch, Band 31, 352 Seiten, Previously published in hardcover, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 5445 g

Reihe: Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy

This book addresses the question of what it means to be moral and which capacities one needs to be moral.
It questions whether empathy is a cognitive or an affective capacity, or perhaps both. As most moral beings behave immorally from time to time, the authors ask which factors cause or motivate people to translate their moral beliefs into action? Specially addressed is the question of what is the role of internal factors such as willpower, commitment, character, and what is the role of external, situational and structural factors? The questions are considered from various (disciplinary) perspectives.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Harskamp, Anton Van

Musschenga, Bert

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Differentielle Psychologie, Persönlichkeitspsychologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie: Allgemeines, Methoden

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface

 

Bert Musschenga: What makes us moral? An introduction

 

Part I: Morality, evolution and rationality

 

Alejandro Rosas: Rationality and deceit; Why rational egoism cannot make us moral

Katharine Browne: Two problems of cooperation

Catherine Herfeld and Katrien Schaubroeck: The importance of commitment; How Harry Frankfurt’s concept of care contributes to Rational Choice Theory

Markus Christen and Thomas Ott: Quantified coherence of moral beliefs as predictive factor for moral agency

 

Part II: Morality and the continuity between human and nonhuman primates

 

Bert Musschenga: Animal morality and human morality

Florian Cova: Two kinds of moral competence; Moral agent, moral judge

Andrés Luco: Humean moral motivation

Harry Wels: Whispering empathy; Transdisciplinary reflections on research methodology

 

Part III: Nativism and non-nativism

 

Jessy Giroux: The origin of moral norms and the role of innate dispositions

Carsten Fogh Nielsen: It’s complicated – Moral nativism, moral input, and moral development

Julia Hermann: Learning to be moral

Gerben Meynen: Why mental disorders can diminish responsibility; Proposing a theoretical framework

Darcia Narvaez: Natural morality, moral natures and human flourishing

 

Part IV: Religion and (im)morality

 

Stephen Maitzen: Atheism and the basis of morality

Anton van Harskamp: What makes the martyr (im)moral?

Bettine Siertsema: Moral lessons from monstrosity; The Kindly Ones and the reader

 

 

Part V:  Morality beyond naturalism

 

David Rose: Society and the origin of moral law: Giambattista Vico and non-reductive naturalism

Adam Seligman: Enacting the moral: concrete particularity and subjunctivespace

 

About the authors

 

Index of names and subjects