van Eemeren / Garssen From Argument Schemes to Argumentative Relations in the Wild

A Variety of Contributions to Argumentation Theory
1. Auflage 2020
ISBN: 978-3-030-28367-4
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 35, 292 Seiten, eBook

Reihe: Argumentation Library

This volume comprises a selection of contributions to the theorizing about argumentation that have been presented at the 9th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), held in Amsterdam in July 2018. 

The  chapters included provide a general theoretical perspective on central topics in argumentation theory, such as argument schemes and the fallacies. Some contributions concentrate on the treatment of the concept of conductive argument. Other contributions are dedicated to specific issues such as the justification of questions, the occurrence of mining relations, the role of exclamatives, argumentative abduction, eudaimonistic argumentation and a typology of logical ways to counter an argument. In a number of cases the theoretical problems addressed are related to a specific type of context, such as the burden of proof in philosophical argumentation, the charge of committing a genetic fallacy in strategic manoeuvring in philosophy, the necessity of community argument, and connection adequacy for arguments with institutional warrants.

The volume offers a great deal of diversity in its breadth of coverage of argumentation theory and wide geographic representation from North and South America to Europe and China.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

van Eemeren, Frans H.

Garssen, Bart

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Contents;6
2;Contributors;8
3;1 A Variety of Contributions to Argumentation Theory;10
3.1;References;18
4;2 Argument Schemes: Extending the Pragma-Dialectical Approach;20
4.1;2.1 The Notion of Argument Scheme;20
4.2;2.2 Intersubjective Procedures for Evaluating Argumentation;22
4.3;2.3 The Pragma-Dialectical Typology of Argument Schemes;23
4.4;2.4 Critical Questions: Pragmatic Argumentation as a Case in Point;26
4.5;2.5 Subtypes and Variants of Argumentation;28
4.6;References;31
5;3 In Search of a Workable Auxiliary Condition for Authority Arguments;33
5.1;3.1 Corroboration;34
5.2;3.2 Trust;37
5.3;3.3 The Layperson’s Paradox;41
5.4;3.4 Goldberg Variations;43
5.5;3.5 Discussion;46
5.6;References;48
6;4 Give the Standard Treatment of Fallacies a Chance! Cognitive and Rhetorical Insights into Fallacy Processing;49
6.1;4.1 Introduction;49
6.2;4.2 The Standard Treatment of Fallacies: Problems and Opportunities;50
6.2.1;4.2.1 Normative Issues;50
6.2.2;4.2.2 Salvaging the Standard Treatment: Rhetorical Insights;51
6.3;4.3 Why and How Fallacies Are Rhetorically Successful;53
6.3.1;4.3.1 Cognitive Underpinnings of Argument Evaluation;53
6.3.2;4.3.2 Undetected Fallacies Are Arguments That Are Non-manifest Qua Fallacies;56
6.3.3;4.3.3 Pragma-Linguistic Constraints on Argumentation and Rhetorical Effectiveness;58
6.4;4.4 A Fallacious and Deceptive Erotetic Tour de Force;61
6.4.1;4.4.1 A Double Rhetorical Trick Question Realising a False Dilemma;62
6.4.2;4.4.2 More Rhetorical Questions to Strengthen the Context;64
6.4.3;4.4.3 The Straw Man Question;65
6.5;4.5 Conclusion;68
6.6;References;69
7;5 Argument Evaluation in Philosophy: Fallacies as Strategic Maneuvering;71
7.1;5.1 Introduction;71
7.2;5.2 Argumentation in Philosophy: The Problems of Evaluation Standars;73
7.3;5.3 The Controversy About the Genetic Fallacy;74
7.3.1;5.3.1 What Is the Genetic Fallacy?;74
7.3.2;5.3.2 The Genetic Fallacy in Question;77
7.4;5.4 The Charge of Committing a Fallacy as Strategic Maneuvering;78
7.5;5.5 Conclusion;82
7.6;References;83
8;6 Dialogical Sequences, Argumentative Moves and Interrogative Burden of Proof in Philosophical Argumentation;86
8.1;6.1 The Role of Questions in Argument;86
8.2;6.2 Burden of Proof;88
8.3;6.3 Typical Moves in Philosophical Argumentation;90
8.4;6.4 Revealing Irrelevant Distinctions;91
8.5;6.5 Analytic Dilemmas;97
8.6;6.6 Pragmatic Self-refutation;99
8.7;6.7 Conclusions;100
8.8;References;102
9;7 Eudaimonistic Argumentation;104
9.1;7.1 Virtue Theories of Argumentation;105
9.2;7.2 Intellectual Flourishing;108
9.3;7.3 Adversariality;110
9.4;7.4 Conclusion;112
9.5;References;112
10;8 Worries About the Prospects for Community Argument;114
10.1;8.1 Introduction;114
10.2;8.2 The Importance of Community Argument;115
10.3;8.3 Inherent Barriers to Community Argument;116
10.3.1;8.3.1 Evolved Sociality;117
10.3.2;8.3.2 Evolved Cognitive Modularity;120
10.4;8.4 Emerging Barriers to Community Argument;123
10.4.1;8.4.1 Distraction;123
10.4.2;8.4.2 Nudges;125
10.4.3;8.4.3 Narratives;126
10.4.4;8.4.4 Visual Persuasion;128
10.4.5;8.4.5 Some New Horizons;130
10.5;8.5 Community Argument? Concerns and Ambitions;131
10.6;References;134
11;9 Assessing Connection Adequacy for Arguments with Institutional Warrants;138
11.1;9.1 Warrants, Sources of Backing, and Rules;138
11.2;9.2 From Bodies of Law to Formally Backed Warrants;139
11.3;9.3 Reliably Understood Transcripts and Speech Acts;141
11.4;9.4 Reliable Institutional Warrants, Rebuttals, and Argument Cogency;144
11.5;9.5 Recognizing Rebuttals;145
11.6;9.6 Precedents, Conclusive Versus Defeasible Warrants, and Refining Warrants;147
11.7;9.7 Defeasible Warrants and Warrant Strength;149
11.8;9.8 Warrant Strength and Argument Cogency;151
11.9;9.9 Application to Institutional Warrants in General;152
11.10;References;155
12;10 On the Logical Ways to Counter an Argument: A Typology and Some Theoretical Consequences;156
12.1;10.1 Introduction;156
12.2;10.2 Main Kinds of Counterarguments;157
12.3;10.3 Dismissal;157
12.4;10.4 Objection;158
12.5;10.5 Rebuttal;159
12.6;10.6 Refutation;162
12.7;10.7 Weighing;164
12.8;10.8 Rebuttals, Refutations and Standards of Proof;165
12.9;10.9 Counterargument Structures;166
12.10;10.10 Other Classifications;168
12.11;10.11 The Order of Counterargumentation;170
12.12;10.12 Conclusions;171
12.13;References;172
13;11 Arguing for Questions;174
13.1;11.1 Introduction;174
13.2;11.2 Arguments for Questions?;175
13.3;11.3 The Formal Logic of Inferences to Questions;177
13.4;11.4 Inferences to Open-Ended Questions;180
13.4.1;11.4.1 Why Questions;180
13.4.2;11.4.2 How Questions;182
13.4.3;11.4.3 What Questions;183
13.5;11.5 Inferences from Questions to Questions;186
13.6;11.6 Summary;189
13.7;References;190
14;12 Expressives in Argumentation: The Case of Apprehensive Straks (‘Shortly’) in Dutch;192
14.1;12.1 Introduction;192
14.2;12.2 Form and Meaning of the Apprehensive Straks-Construction;194
14.2.1;12.2.1 Apprehensive Straks as a Construction;194
14.2.2;12.2.2 Argumentative Semantics;198
14.3;12.3 Apprehensive Straks in Argumentative Discourse;199
14.3.1;12.3.1 Pragmatic Argumentation: Warnings and Slippery Slope;200
14.3.2;12.3.2 Reductio ad Absurdum;202
14.4;12.4 Expressives Between Reasonableness and Effectiveness;203
14.4.1;12.4.1 The Expressive Dimension;204
14.4.2;12.4.2 Overt Unreasonableness;206
14.5;12.5 Conclusion;208
14.6;References;209
15;13 Argumentative Abduction in the Interpretation Process: A Pragma-Dialectical Study of an Ironic Utterance;212
15.1;13.1 Introduction;212
15.2;13.2 Abduction;213
15.3;13.3 Conversational Implicature and Irony;216
15.4;13.4 Irony from Extended Pragma-Dialectics;220
15.4.1;13.4.1 Irony: Standpoint or Conclusion?;220
15.4.2;13.4.2 Irony as Strategic Maneuvering;222
15.4.3;13.4.3 Interpreting Irony by Argumentative Abduction;223
15.5;13.5 Conclusion;226
15.6;References;227
16;14 Is “Conductive Argument” a Single Argument?;229
16.1;14.1 Introduction;229
16.2;14.2 The Current Consensus: Representing “Conductive Argument” as a Single Argument;232
16.3;14.3 My Proposal: Representing Pro/Con Argumentation as Deliberative Process;233
16.4;14.4 Conclusion;241
16.5;References;242
17;15 On the Logical Reconstruction of Conductive Arguments;244
17.1;15.1 Introduction;244
17.2;15.2 The Logical Reconstruction of Conductive Arguments;245
17.2.1;15.2.1 The Supplementation of On-balance Premise Approach;245
17.2.2;15.2.2 The Warrant-Reformulation Approach;247
17.3;15.3 The Linguistic Feature of Conductive Arguments;248
17.4;15.4 The Metaphor of Outweighing;251
17.5;15.5 The Role of Counter-Considerations in Conductive Arguments;253
17.6;15.6 Conclusion;257
17.7;References;258
18;16 The Legitimacy of Conductive Arguments: What Are the Logical Roles of Negative Considerations?;260
18.1;16.1 Introduction;260
18.2;16.2 “Adler’s Problem” and Its Variant;262
18.3;16.3 The Rhetorical Solution Versus the Logical Solution;265
18.4;16.4 The Perspective of Argument Evaluation;268
18.5;16.5 Conclusion;271
18.6;References;272
19;17 Deploying Machine Learning Classifiers for Argumentative Relations “in the Wild”;273
19.1;17.1 Introduction;273
19.2;17.2 Related Work;274
19.3;17.3 Training Classifiers for RbAM;275
19.3.1;17.3.1 Training Dataset;275
19.3.2;17.3.2 Argument Mining Experiments;276
19.4;17.4 First Experiment: Mining BAFs from a Dialogue Excerpt;276
19.4.1;17.4.1 Dialogue Excerpt;276
19.4.2;17.4.2 Annotation Results;278
19.4.3;17.4.3 Mining Argumentative Relations “in the wild”;281
19.5;17.5 Mining Argumentative Relations from a Short Text;282
19.5.1;17.5.1 Merged Arguments;282
19.5.2;17.5.2 Unmerged Arguments;285
19.6;17.6 Conclusion;285
19.7;References;288
20;Index;290

Über Autor(innen)

Frans H. van Eemeren is President of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) and the International Learned Institute of  Argumentation Studies (ILIAS), Emeritus Professor of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam, Distinguished Scholar of the National Communication Association (U.S.) and Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Lugano (Switzerland). He is a former Dean of the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Amsterdam and Guest Professor at Leiden University, Jiangsu University, Sun-yat Sen University and Zhejiang University. Van Eemeren is a Knight in the Order of the Dutch Lion. He is founder of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation and Editor-in-Chief of the journal Argumentation, the Journal of Argumentation in Context and the accompanying book series Library of Argumentation and Argumentation in Context. The monographs he (co)authored include Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984), Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies (1992), Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse (1993), A Systematic Theory of Argumentation (2004), Argumentative Indicators in Discourse (2007), Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness (2009), Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse (2010), Handbook of Argumentation Theory (2014), Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse (2015), Prototypical Argumentative Patterns in Discourse (2017) and Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective (2018).

Bart Garssen is lecturer in the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric in the University of Amsterdam. His research interests include argument schemes, fallacies and political argumentation. Next to his dissertation in Dutch about argument schemes in a pragma-dialectical perspective, he published book chapters and articles about theoretical problems relating to the use of argument schemes, strategic manoeuvring in plenary debates in the European Parliament and argumentative patterns in political argumentative discourse. He is editor of the journal Argumentation and the Journal of Argumentation in Context (Benjamins) and the  accompanying book series Argumentation Library and Argumentation in Context.