Tollefsen Bioethics with Liberty and Justice

Themes in the Work of Joseph M. Boyle
2011
ISBN: 978-90-481-9791-0
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 110, 261 Seiten

Reihe: Philosophy and Medicine

Joseph M. Boyle Jr. has been a major contributor to the development of Catholic bioethics over the past thirty five years. Boyle’s contribution has had an impact on philosophers, theologians, and medical practitioners, and his work has in many ways come to be synonymous with analytically rigorous philosophical bioethics done in the Catholic intellectual tradition. Four main themes stand out as central to Boyle’s contribution: the sanctity of life and bioethics: Boyle has elaborated a view of the ethics of killing at odds with central tenets of the euthanasia mentality, double effect and bioethics: Boyle is among the pre-eminent defenders of a role for double effect in medical decision making and morality, the right to health care: Boyle has moved beyond the rhetoric of social justice to provide a natural law grounding for a political right to health care; and the role of natural law and the natural law tradition in bioethics: Boyle’s arguments have been grounded in a particularly fruitful approach to natural law ethics, the so-called New Natural Law theory. The contributors to BIOETHICS WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: THEMES IN THE WORK OF JOSEPH M. BOYLE discuss, criticize, and in many cases extend the Boyle’s advances in these areas with rigor and sophistication. It will be of interest to Catholic and philosophical bioethicists alike.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Tollefsen, Christopher

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;6
2;Contents;7
3;Contributors;9
4;Part I The Substantial Identity Thesis;10
4.1;1 Why Abortion is Seriously Wrong: Two Views;11
4.1.1;1.1 The Future of Value Account;11
4.1.2;1.2 The Substantial Identity Account;13
4.1.3;1.3 The Moral Significance of the Basic, Natural Capacity to Exhibit Rational Agency;20
4.1.4;1.4 Some Flies in the Ointment;22
4.1.5;1.5 The Minor Premise of BLG;22
4.1.6;1.6 A Possible Defense of the Substantial Identity View;24
4.1.7;1.7 Summary and Conclusion;27
4.1.8;Notes;29
4.1.9;References;29
4.2;2 Substantial Identity, Rational Nature, and the Right to Life;31
4.2.1;2.1 The Substantial Identity View;31
4.2.2;2.2 Contrast with Singers View;32
4.2.3;2.3 Properties, Continuity, and Arbitrariness in Selecting the Basis for Being a Subject of Rights;33
4.2.4;2.4 Equality and Threshold Properties;36
4.2.5;2.5 Biological Life and the Criterion for Basic Rights;39
4.2.6;2.6 Persons in Persistent Vegetative State, and Anencephalic Infants;42
4.2.7;Notes;43
4.2.8;References;47
5;Part II Moral and Legal Issues at the Beginning and Ending of Life;49
5.1;3 Embryo Ethics: Justice and Nascent Human Life;50
5.1.1;3.1 Introduction;50
5.1.2;3.2 Framework of the Discussion;51
5.1.3;3.3 What the Human Embryo Is;51
5.1.4;3.4 Are All Human Beings Owed Full Moral Respect?;52
5.1.5;3.5 Defining Capacities;53
5.1.6;3.6 Somatic Cells and Embryos;54
5.1.7;3.7 The Brain Death Argument;55
5.1.8;3.8 Acorns and Embryos;56
5.1.9;3.9 The Problem of Twinning;57
5.1.10;3.10 Conclusion;59
5.1.11;Notes;60
5.1.12;References;63
5.2;4 Compassion and the Personalism of American Jurisprudence: Bioethical Entailments;66
5.2.1;4.1 In Vitro Fertilization;67
5.2.2;4.2 The Bioethics of Euthanasia;71
5.2.3;4.3 Personalism and the Falsity of Instrumentalist Bioethics;72
5.2.4;Notes;76
5.2.5;References;80
5.3;5 The Significance of the Ultimate End for the Feeding ofINTtie;PVS Patients: A Reply to Kevin Ox2019;Rourke;82
5.3.1;5.1 O'Rourkes View of the Ultimate End and How It Should Shape Action;83
5.3.1.1;5.1.1 St. Thomas on Pursuit of the Ultimate End;83
5.3.1.2;5.1.2 St. Thomas on the Beatific Vision as the True Ultimate End;84
5.3.1.3;5.1.3 O'Rourke's View of How the Ultimate End Should Shape Action and Its Significance for the Feeding of PVS Patients;86
5.3.2;5.2 Critique of ORourkes View of the Ultimate End and How It Should Shape Action;87
5.3.2.1;5.2.1 Do We Necessarily Seek Absolutely Perfect Fulfillment?;87
5.3.2.2;5.2.2 Must the Acting Person Have a Single Ultimate End?;89
5.3.2.3;5.2.3 Is the Beatific Vision Alone the True Ultimate End?;90
5.3.2.4;5.2.4 Critique of O'Rourke's View of How the Ultimate End Should Shape Action and Its Significance for the Feeding of PVS Patients;91
5.3.3;5.3 An Alternative Understanding of the Ultimate End and How It Should Shape Action;94
5.3.4;5.4 Application of the Alternative View to the Problem of Feeding PVS Patients;95
5.3.5;Notes;98
5.3.6;References;99
6;Part III Double Effect and Bioethics;101
6.1;6 Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas and Issues in Bioethics;102
6.1.1;6.1 Both Ends and Means Intended?;103
6.1.2;6.2 Praeter Intentionem as Including Inevitably Foreseen Side-Effects?;108
6.1.3;Notes;113
6.1.4;References;115
6.2;7 The Action-Omission and Double Effect Distinctions;117
6.2.1;7.1 The Two Distinctions, and How to Argue for Them;117
6.2.2;7.2 Spelling Out the Simple Strategy: (14);118
6.2.3;7.3 Spelling Out the Simple Strategy: (5), (6), (9), and AOD;121
6.2.4;7.4 Spelling Out the Simple Strategy: (7), (8), (9), and PDE;131
6.2.5;7.5 Trolley, Transplant, and Demandingness;137
6.2.6;Notes;141
6.2.7;References;144
7;Part IV Bioethics and the Natural Law: Challenges;146
7.1;8 Global Bioethics and Natural Law;147
7.1.1;8.1 Natural Law as a Framework for Global Bioethics;147
7.1.2;8.2 The (Im)Plausibility of Natural Law as a Framework for Global Bioethics;150
7.1.2.1;8.2.1 Reason as the Source of Moral Knowledge;150
7.1.2.2;8.2.2 Evidence of Shared Rational Norms;155
7.1.2.3;8.2.3 The Significance of Vacuous Norms;157
7.1.2.4;8.2.4 Use of State Authority to Enforce a Universal Morality;160
7.1.3;8.3 Conclusion;161
7.1.4;Notes;162
7.1.5;References;162
7.2;9 Guided Autonomy and Good Friend Physicians;165
7.2.1;Notes;181
7.2.2;References;182
8;Part V The Right to Health Care;184
8.1;10 Social Justice, Charity and Tax Evasion: A Critical Inquiry;185
8.1.1;10.1 IntroductionThe Welfare Entitlement Claim;185
8.1.2;10.2 Initial Considerations;186
8.1.3;10.3 A Natural Law Argument for the Legitimacy of the Welfare State;187
8.1.3.1;10.3.1 Step 1: Individual Duties to Others and the Creation of Welfare Rights;187
8.1.3.2;10.3.2 Step 2: The Move from an Individual Obligation to a Social Obligation;188
8.1.3.3;10.3.3 Step 3: The Move from a Social Obligation to Coercive Political Authority;189
8.1.4;10.4 Analysis;190
8.1.4.1;10.4.1 Assumption 1: What Does it Mean to Have a Right?;190
8.1.4.2;10.4.2 Assumption 2: Do Welfare Needs Create Welfare Entitlement Rights?;192
8.1.4.3;10.4.3 Assumption 3: What is the Goal of Charity?;195
8.1.5;10.5 ConclusionCharity as Spiritual Therapy;198
8.1.6;Notes;200
8.1.7;References;202
8.2;11 Natural Law, Property, and Welfare Rights;205
8.2.1;11.1 Property Rights and the Common Good in Aquinas;207
8.2.2;11.2 Private Property and the Order of Charity;212
8.2.3;11.3 Assisting the Needy in the Modern World: Moral Duties and Political Rights;214
8.2.4;11.4 Public Provision and Private Virtue;216
8.2.5;Notes;217
8.2.6;References;218
8.3;12 Health Care Technology and Justice;220
8.3.1;12.1 The Need for Health Care;220
8.3.2;12.2 Schemes for Meeting the Need;223
8.3.3;12.3 The Shortcomings of Existing Schemes;225
8.3.4;12.4 Injustices Peculiar to the United States;228
8.3.5;12.5 Towards a Just Health Care Scheme;230
8.3.6;References;238
9;Part VI Boyle Responds;239
9.1;13 An Appreciative Response;240
9.1.1;13.1 The Substantial Identity Account and Its Implications;241
9.1.2;13.2 The Nature and Importance of Double Effect;243
9.1.3;13.3 Natural Law and Welfare Rights;247
9.1.4;13.4 Natural Law in Theory and Practice;250
9.1.5;Notes;254
9.1.6;References;254
10;Index;256