Timpe / Griffith / Levy | The Routledge Companion to Free Will | Buch | 978-0-367-86997-7 | sack.de

Buch, Englisch, 732 Seiten, Format (B × H): 175 mm x 246 mm, Gewicht: 1248 g

Reihe: Routledge Philosophy Companions

Timpe / Griffith / Levy

The Routledge Companion to Free Will


1. Auflage 2019
ISBN: 978-0-367-86997-7
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)

Buch, Englisch, 732 Seiten, Format (B × H): 175 mm x 246 mm, Gewicht: 1248 g

Reihe: Routledge Philosophy Companions

ISBN: 978-0-367-86997-7
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)


Questions concerning free will are intertwined with issues in almost every area of philosophy, from metaphysics to philosophy of mind to moral philosophy, and are also informed by work in different areas of science (principally physics, neuroscience and social psychology). Free will is also a perennial concern of serious thinkers in theology and in non-western traditions. Because free will can be approached from so many different perspectives and has implications for so many debates, a comprehensive survey needs to encompass an enormous range of approaches. This book is the first to draw together leading experts on every aspect of free will, from those who are central to the current philosophical debates, to non-western perspectives, to scientific contributions and to those who know the rich history of the subject.

Chapter 37 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 license. https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tandfbis/rt-files/docs/Open+Access+Chapters/9781138795815_oachapter37.pdf

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Weitere Infos & Material


List of Contributors

Introduction

Section I: Major Positions in the Free Will Debate introduction

1 Semicompatibilism

John Martin Fischer

2 Identificationist Views

Agnieszka Jaworska

3 Reasons-Responsive Theories of Freedom

Michael McKenna

4 Classical Compatibilism

Bernard Berofsky

5 Dispositional Compatibilism

Kadri Vihvelin

6 Event-Causal Libertarianism

Laura W. Ekstrom

7 Agent Causation

Meghan Griffith

8 Non-Causal Libertarianism

Hugh J. McCann

9 Strawsonian Views

Paul Russell

10 Revisionism

Kelly McCormick

11 Skepticism about Free Will

Derk Pereboom

12 Nonstandard Views

Saul Smilansky

Section II: Major Arguments introduction

13 The Consequence Argument

Joe Campbell

15 The Manipulation Argument

Kristin Mickelson

16 Frankfurt-style Examples

Carolina Sartorio

17 Logical Fatalism

Alicia Finch

18 The Luck and Mind Arguments

Christopher Evan Franklin

19 Leeway vs. Sourcehood Conceptions of Free Will

Kevin Timpe

Section III: Historical Figures introduction

20 Aristotle

Karen Margrethe Nielsen

21 The Stoics on Fate and Freedom

Tim O’Keefe

22 Augustine of Hippo

Jesse Couenhoven

23 Anselm of Canterbury

Sandra Visser

24 Thomas Aquinas

Harm Goris

25 John Duns Scotus

Thomas Williams

26 Rene Descartes

C.P. Ragland

27 Got


Kevin Timpe holds the W. H. Jellema Chair in Christian Philosophy at Calvin College. He has published a number of books on free will, including Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives, Second Edition (2013, Free Will in Philosophical Theology (2013), and Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns (2016).

Meghan Griffith is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College. She is the author of Free Will: The Basics (Routledge, 2013) and a number of articles centering on human agency.

Neil Levy is professor of philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, and a senior researcher at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. He is the author of 7 books, including, most recently, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (2014). He has published very widely on free will, moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, applied ethics and other topics.



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