Tiberius | Moral Psychology | Buch | 978-0-415-52969-3 | sack.de

Buch, Englisch, 256 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 395 g

Reihe: Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy

Tiberius

Moral Psychology

A Contemporary Introduction
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-0-415-52969-3
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)

A Contemporary Introduction

Buch, Englisch, 256 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 395 g

Reihe: Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy

ISBN: 978-0-415-52969-3
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)


This is the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction presents research by philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and addresses the overarching question of how empirical research is (or is not) relevant to philosophical inquiry.

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Autoren/Hrsg.


Weitere Infos & Material


Preface

Part One: Moral Psychology and Moral Philosophy

- What Is Moral Psychology?

- What is moral psychology?

- Distinguishing the questions

- Distinguishing psychological states

- Structure and aims of the book:

- What Are Philosophers Doing Here?

- Moral Agents or Blobs of Flesh

- Moral Realism and the Challenge from Evolution

- Responses to the Challenge

- Moral Psychology and Moral Philosophy

Part Two: Motivation and Moral Motivation: The Basics

- Moral Motivation: what it is and what it isn’t

- Moral Theories and Moral Motivation

- The Challenge of Psychological Egoism

- Psychological Egoism and Empirical Research

- Taking Stock

- Desires and Reasons

- Some Background Distinctions

- Reasons internalism and externalism

- The Humean Theory of Motivation

- Taking Stock

Part Three: Moral Motivation

- Emotion & Moral Judgment

- What is an emotion?

- Emotions and Moral Judgment

- Amoralists, Psychopaths and the Debate Between Moral Judgment Internalism and Externalism

- Taking Stock

- Sentimentalism and Rationalism:

- Rationalism and Sophisticated Sentimentalism

- The Kantian Challenge to Sophisticated Sentimentalism

- The Empirical Threat to Rationalism

- Taking Stock

- Virtue

- What kind of state is a virtue?

- Are there any virtues?: The empirical challenge

- Defending Virtue

- Taking Stock

Part Four: Agency and Moral Responsibility

- The Psychology of the Responsible Agent

- Methodology

- Real Self Theories

- Normative Competence

- Are we Competent?: Challenges from Psychology

- Moral Responsibility, Free Will and Determinism

- Free Will and Determinism

- Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy

- Libertarianism and the Challenge from Neuroscience

- Can I Be Excused?

Part Five: Three Big Questions

- Should I be moral?: Well-being and the good life

- Prudential Reasons and ‘Good For’

- Theories of Well-Being

- Psychological Evidence for the Well-being – Morality Link

- Conclusion

- How do we know what is morally right?: Moral psychology and moral knowledge

- The Attack on Intuitions: Biases and Trolley-ology

- Intuitions, Intuitionism and Reflective Equilibrium

- Can you get an ought from an is?

- Is and Ought: A Complex Relationship

- Reducing Ought to Is

- Final Thoughts


Valerie Tiberius is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota



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