Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

2. Auflage 2007
ISBN: 978-3-642-09203-9
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, 328 Seiten, Previously published in hardcover, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 534 g

Reihe: Theory and Decision Library C

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Sudhölter, Peter

Peleg, Bezalel

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Ökonometrie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Wirtschaftsmathematik und -statistik
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research Spieltheorie
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Numerik und Wissenschaftliches Rechnen Angewandte Mathematik, Mathematische Modelle

Inhaltsverzeichnis

TU Games.- Coalitional TU Games and Solutions.- The Core.- Bargaining Sets.- The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus.- The Prenucleolus.- Geometric Properties of the ?-Core, Kernel, and Prekernel.- The Shapley Value.- Continuity Properties of Solutions.- Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set.- NTU Games.- Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form.- The Core of NTU Games.- The Shapley NTU Value and the Harsanyi Solution.- The Consistent Shapley Value.- On the Classical Bargaining Set and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set for NTU Games.- Variants of the Davis-Maschler Bargaining Set for NTU Games.