Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Format (B × H): 162 mm x 251 mm, Gewicht: 622 g
Reihe: Holt Prize
Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Format (B × H): 162 mm x 251 mm, Gewicht: 622 g
Reihe: Holt Prize
ISBN: 978-1-76002-067-5
Verlag: Federation Press
The bills of rights adopted in the Commonwealth countries of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and, at the subnational level, Australia in recent decades, have prompted scholars and institutional actors involved in the process of constitutional design and reform to rethink how to evaluate and compare the different approaches to human rights protection. They have challenged a number of assumptions in the field, for example, that courts must have the power to invalidate laws that are found to violate rights (ie courts can now be given non-binding powers), that courts must have the ‘final word’ on rights issues (ie legislatures can now be given the power to override judicial decisions) and that bills of rights are enforced exclusively by courts (ie legislators can now be given new responsibilities to ensure that the laws they enact are compatible with rights).
This book addresses three questions arising from these developments. How do these new bills of rights differ from the traditional approaches to rights protection? Why, if at all, should we consider the Commonwealth’s approach over the traditional approaches? What compromises must be struck in the course of adopting a bill of rights of this variety? In answering these questions, the book sets out a new framework for comparison that focuses on the types of inter-institutional disagreement facilitated by and found in the different approaches to rights protection. It also identifies a previously unrecognised element of the Commonwealth’s approach – the normative trade-offs with other constitutional principles and values – that is pivotal to understanding its operation. Finally, it seeks to contribute to future debates about rights reform in Australia and elsewhere by setting out a number of lessons that emerge from the answers to these three questions.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
CONTENTSAbstract Acknowledgements
1. IntroductionI. Three questions II. The Commonwealth’s approach III. How is multi-stage rights review different? IV. Why multi-stage rights review? V. Which normative trade-offs must be made? VI. Structure of the book
2. The advent of multi-stage rights reviewI. Introduction II. Canada A. Prelude to the Charter: The Bill of Rights 1960 B. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 III. New Zealand IV. The United Kingdom V. AustraliaVI. Conclusion
3. Framework for comparisonI. Introduction II. Expounding inter-institutional disagreement A. Focusing on inter-institutional interaction B. Focusing on inter-institutional disagreement C. Why institutions? D. Why disagreement? III. Justifying inter-institutional disagreement A. Incorporating all three institutions of government B. Incorporating the nuances of the traditional paradigms C. Emphasising the negative dimensions of multi-stage rights review D. The case for inter-institutional disagreement IV. Conclusion
4. The problems with legislative supremacyI. Introduction II. Avenues and consequences of indirect inter-institutional disagreement III. Four sources of indirect inter-institutional disagreement A. Judicial review of administrative action B. Statutory interpretation C. Structural constitutional provisions D. Implied constitutional rights IV. Conclusion
5. The problems with judicial supremacyI. Introduction II. Direct inter-institutional disagreement III. The costs of indirect inter-institutional disagreement IV. Forms of indirect inter-institutional disagreement A. Context B. Types C. Legitimacy V. Conclusion
6. Facilitating direct inter-institutional disagreementI. Introduction II. The characteristics of direct disagreement A. Stage one: executive review B. Stage two: legislative committee review C. Stage three: rights-based judicial review D. Stage four: legislative override E. The cumulative effects of multi-stage rights review F. A culture of justification G. Reducing the tendency to defer III. The case for direct disagreement A. Multiple perspectives and multiple points of public participation B. Analogous ideas associated with the traditional paradigms C. Beyond disagreement? IV. Conclusion
7. Normative trade-offsI. Introduction II. Bureaucratic independence III. Responsible government IV. Separation of powers V. The rule of law VI. Comity VII. Conclusion
8. The United KingdomI. Introduction II. Executive rights review A. Practice B. Evaluation III. Legislative committee review A. Practice B. Evaluation IV. Rights-based judicial review A. Practice B. Evaluation V. Legislative override A. Practice B. Evaluation
9. CanadaI. Introduction II. Executive rights review A. Practice B. Evaluation III. Rights-based judicial review A. Practice B. Evaluation IV. Legislative override A. Practice B. Evaluation
10. New ZealandI. Introduction II. Executive rights review A. Practice B. Evaluation III. Rights-based judicial review A. Practice B. Evaluation IV. Legislative override A. Practice B. Evaluation
11. AustraliaI. Introduction II. Executive rights review and legislative committee review A. Practice B. Evaluation III. Rights-based judicial review and legislative override A. Practice B. Evaluation
12. ConclusionI. The relevance of context II. Responsible government III. The rule of law IV. The separation of powers V. The limits of direct disagreement VI. The next step