Spoor Globalisation, Poverty and Conflict

A Critical 'Development' Reader
1. Auflage 2005
ISBN: 978-1-4020-2858-8
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 349 Seiten

This state-of-the-art critical 'development' reader examines the inter-relationships between globalisation, poverty and conflict. It complements current debates in the field of development studies and, in an era in which development fatigue seems to have become more profound than ever before, it brings the importance of development once again to the forefront.
The contributions represent current thinking on (and practice of) development policy, poverty reduction, the need for multi-level democratic institutions, and the containing and prevention of conflicts.

Max Spoor is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Centre for the Study of Transition and Development (CESTRAD), Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands, and Extraordinary Professor, Centre of International Relations and International Cooperation (CIDOB), Barcelona, Spain.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Spoor, Max

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;CONTENTS;7
2;ABBREVIATIONS;11
3;INTRODUCTION;13
3.1;GLOBALISATION, POVERTY AND CONFLICT MAX SPOOR;13
3.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;13
3.1.2;2. REVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS;15
3.1.3;3. THE CONFERENCE AND THIS READER;25
4;PART I GLOBALISATION, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY;26
4.1;1 FROM EXCLUSIVE TO INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT;28
4.2;2 COLLATERAL DAMAGE OR CALCULATED DEFAULT? THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBALISATION ;34
4.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;34
4.2.2;2. THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS;35
4.2.3;3. GLOBAL POVERTY;37
4.2.4;4. POLITICS: GAINING NEW INSIGHTS OR IGNORING THEM?;40
4.2.5;5. AID AND COOPERATION;42
4.2.6;6. ARE WE ON TRACK?;45
4.2.7;7. THE POLITICS OF GLOBALISATION;50
4.3;3 CAN IMPROVED HUMAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES BREAK THE CYCLE OF POVERTY? ;60
4.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;60
4.3.2;2. POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS;61
4.3.3;3. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT;63
4.3.4;4. THE QUALITY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES;64
4.3.5;5. ACCELERATING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT;68
4.3.6;6. CONCLUSION;69
4.4;4 INEQUALITY, POVERTY AND CONFLICT IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES;72
4.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;72
4.4.2;2. GROWTH WITH INEQUALITY: ACCESSION COUNTRIES AND EMERGING PERIPHERIES;75
4.4.3;3. INCREASED INCOME INEQUALITY AND HIGHER RURAL POVERTY RISKS;80
4.4.4;4. CONCLUSIONS;85
4.5;5 GLOBALISATION, MARGINALISATION AND CONFLICT ;92
4.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;92
4.5.2;2. GLOBALISATION AND MARGINALISATION;92
4.5.3;3. SUSPENSION OF THE DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT;98
4.5.4;4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIOLENT INTERNAL CONFLICT;101
4.5.5;5. CONCLUSION;103
4.6;6 THE SLOW PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORM;106
4.6.1;1. INTRODUCTION;106
4.6.2;2. WHAT PROGRESS TILL NOW?;108
4.6.3;3. CRISES PREVENTION: HAVE THE RIGHT MEASURES BEEN TAKEN?;110
4.6.4;4. POLITICAL ECONOMY;115
4.6.5;5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR ENCOURAGING PRIVATE FLOWS;118
4.7;7 THE DEBT CRISIS AND THE SOUTH IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION;122
4.7.1;1. INTRODUCTION;122
4.7.2;2. WAVES OF RESOURCE FLOWS AND CHANGES IN DEBT STRUCTURES;124
4.7.3;3. THE WAY OUT: GLOBALISING INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES;130
4.7.4;4. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE IMF MODEL;133
4.7.5;5. A FAIR AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS;135
4.7.6;6. CONCLUDING REMARKS;137
5;PART II GOVERNANCE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POVERTY;140
5.1;8 DISEMPOWERING NEW DEMOCRACIES AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY ;142
5.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;142
5.1.2;2. THE CENTRALITY OF GROWTH AND EQUITY;143
5.1.3;3. AN ELECTIVE AFFINITY?;145
5.1.4;4. SOME EVIDENCE AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES;147
5.1.5;5. THE PROBLEMATIQUE;156
5.1.6;6. SOME EXPLANATIONS;158
5.1.7;7. GLOBALISATION, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND “CHOICELESS DEMOCRACIES”;165
5.1.8;8. CONCLUSION;170
5.2;9 LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND RURAL POVERTY IN AFRICA;180
5.2.1;1. THE COMMON IDENTITY OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA;180
5.2.2;2. THE SEARCH FOR A GOVERNANCE PARADIGM CONDUCIVE TO DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA;183
5.2.3;3. GOVERNANCE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF RURAL POVERTY;186
5.2.4;4. DECENTRALISATION OF CONFLICT AND POVERTY;190
5.2.5;5. REGULATION AND RURAL POVERTY;192
5.2.6;6. CONCLUSION;194
5.3;10 LOCAL GOVERNANCE HYBRIDS: ENABLING POLICIES AND CITIZEN APPROACHES TO POVERTY REDUCTION;202
5.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;202
5.3.2;2. ENABLEMENT AND CITIZENSHIP;203
5.3.3;3. CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF NEW GOVERNANCE HYBRIDS FOR POVERTY REDUCTION;205
5.3.4;4. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS;219
5.4;11 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS;224
5.4.1;1. DEFINING CIVIC ENGAGEMENT;224
5.4.2;2. ASPECTS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT;224
5.4.3;3. THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS;230
5.4.4;4. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY;233
5.4.5;5. STRENGTHENING CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY;237
5.5;12 BLURRING THE STATE-PRIVATE DIVIDE: FLEX ORGANISATIONS AND THE DECLINE OF ACCOUNTABILITY;242
5.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;242
5.5.2;2. RETREAT OF THE STATE?;243
5.5.3;3. TWO DISCONNECTS;244
5.5.4;4. SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND NETWORKS OF GOVERNANCE;245
5.5.5;5. BOUNDARY CROSSING IN POST-SOCIALIST STATES;246
5.5.6;6. THE DEEP AND WIDESPREAD UNACCOUNTABLE STATE?;253
5.5.7;7. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY;255
6;PART III RESOURCE DEGRADATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CONFLICT;262
6.1;13 MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND RESILIENCE OF SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS;264
6.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;264
6.1.2;2. THE BELIEF IN THE EFFICACY OF TOP-DOWN SOLUTIONS;265
6.1.3;3. SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS;271
6.1.4;4. MULTI-SCALE ADAPTIVE PROCESSES IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT;276
6.1.5;5. CONCLUSION: COPING WITH COMPLEXITY;279
6.2;14 THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND KNOWLEDGE FRAMING;286
6.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;286
6.2.2;2. FRAMING ENVIRONMENTAL KNOWLEDGE;287
6.2.3;3. THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION CAUSES CONFLICT THESIS;290
6.2.4;4. INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTIONS: DEVELOPMENT AGENTS OR SOURCES OF CONFLICT?;295
6.2.5;5. CONCLUSION;301
6.3;15 BEYOND STATE-COMMUNITY POLARISATIONS AND BOGUS “JOINT”NESS: CRAFTING INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;308
6.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;308
6.3.2;2. INSTITUTIONS FOR NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: DEFINITIONS AND MORAL IMPERATIVES;309
6.3.3;3. THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONS IN THE CASE OF NATURAL RESOURCES/ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT;312
6.3.4;4. THE DESIGN OF MULTI-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS FOR NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE;316
6.3.5;5. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONS;322
7;IN CONCLUSION;330
7.1;16 KNOWLEDGE SHARING IN SUPPORT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT;332
7.1.1;1. BEYOND DEVELOPMENT?;332
7.1.2;2. KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION IN DEVELOPMENT;338
7.1.3;3. CONCLUSION: RECIPROCITY AND PARTNERSHIP;344
8;CONTRIBUTORS;348
9;INDEX;350

Leseproben

WHAT PROGRESS TILL NOW? (p.83-84)

Almost six years after the Asian crisis and with new crises still unfolding, it is important to evaluate progress achieved in reforming the international financial system. Though some progress has been made, it is clearly insufficient. The mechanisms that existed previously and the adaptations of recent years still do not fully meet the demands created by financial globalisation.

The extensive debates in recent years, and the parallels from national systems, indicate that the international financial architecture must provide four services: (i) appropriate transparency and regulation of international financial loan and capital markets and private capital account flows, as well as mechanisms to encourage flows in times of drought; (ii) provision of sufficient international official liquidity during crises; (iii) mechanisms for standstill and orderly debt work-out at the international level; and (iv) appropriate levels and instruments of development finance. The first two mechanisms are essential for preventing crises, which have proven to be developmentally, socially and financially costly.

The third and fourth mechanisms would help manage crises to lessen their costs and also have preventive effects, since a system better suited to manage crises is less prone to destabilising capital flows. This has indeed been the experience of national financial systems in relation to the lending of last resort by central banks. Finally, it is essential to channel flows of development finance to countries, especially low-income ones, that have insufficient access to private flows. An adequate supply of funds must also be guaranteed to middle-income countries during periods of insufficient private capital flows.

Progress in reforming the international financial system has so far suffered four serious problems. Firstly, there has been no agreed international reform agenda. Furthermore, the process has responded to priorities set by a few industrialised countries. These priorities have not always been explicit and have varied through time. In this regard, the "Monterrey Consensus" of the International Conference on Financing for Development of the United Nations, held in March 2002 (see United Nations 2002), provided for the first time an agreed comprehensive and balanced international agenda. That agenda should be used to guide and evaluate reform efforts. Secondly, progress has been uneven and asymmetrical in several key aspects.

The focus of reforms has been largely on strengthening macroeconomic policies and financial regulation in developing countries – that is, on the national component of the architecture –, while far less progress has been made on the international components. This is a major weakness, since crises have been caused not only by country problems (though these have obviously been important) but also by imperfections in international capital markets, such as herding, leading to rapid surges and reversals of massive private flows and multiple equilibria, which may push countries into self-fulfilling or deeper crises.

Another set of asymmetries relates to the excessive focus of the reform effort on crisis prevention and management, mainly for middle-income countries. Important as this is, it may have led to the neglect of equally if not more important issues of appropriate liquidity and development finance for both low-income and middle-income countries. For several years, the problem has seemed to be one of insufficient private flows.