Soom From Psychology to Neuroscience

A New Reductive Account
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032262-0
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 21, 318 Seiten

Reihe: Epistemische Studien / Epistemic StudiesISSN

This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Soom, Patrice

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Biologische Psychologie, Neuropsychologie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Kognitionspsychologie
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften Interdisziplinär Neurowissenschaften, Kognitionswissenschaft
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;7
2;Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION;9
3;1.1 The mind-body problem in philosophy of mind;9
4;1.2 The metaphysical issue of mental causation;11
5;1.3 The epistemological reducibility of psychology;14
6;1.4 Outline;16
7;Chapter 2 THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION;19
8;2.1 Objects, events and properties: preliminary remarks;19
9;2.2 Premises of the problem of mental causation;23
10;2.3 Inconsistency of the premises;37
11;2.4 Typology of possible positions in philosophy of mind;38
12;2.5 Summary and transition;55
13;Chapter 3 ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM;57
14;3.1 Classical type-identity;58
15;3.2 Multiple realization in an ontological context;62
16;3.3 Supervenience;67
17;3.4 The causal completeness: psychology and physics;83
18;3.5 Non-reductive physicalism;87
19;3.6 The causal argument for the token-identity thesis;90
20;3.7 The token-identity thesis as ontological reductionism;94
21;3.8 Summary and transition;105
22;Chapter 4 PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE;107
23;4.1 General background;108
24;4.2 Folks psychology as a functional theory of the mind;112
25;4.3 Neuroscience;144
26;4.4 Summary and transition;171
27;Chapter 5 EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM;175
28;5.1 Why epistemological reductionism?;176
29;5.2 Classical reductionism and the requirements of reduction;180
30;5.3 Multiple realization in an epistemological context;186
31;5.4 Overcoming multiple realization;197
32;5.5 The general dilemma of multiple realization;216
33;5.6 Summary and transition;218
34;Chapter 6 REDUCTION BY MEANS OF FUNCTIONAL SUB-TYPES;221
35;6.1 What should be expected from any account of epistemological reductionism?;222
36;6.2 Starting point: an implication of multiple realization;224
37;6.3 Reduction by means of functionally defined subtypes;228
38;6.4 Summary and transition;251
39;Chapter 7 REDUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO NEUROSCIENCE:CASES STUDIES;255
40;7.1 How it works: guidelines to reducibility in principle;256
41;7.2 Finding critical conditions of manifestations;268
42;7.3 Down to neurobiology;281
43;7.4 Summary and transition;293
44;Chapter 8 FINAL REMARKS;295
45;8.1 Complete reductionism;295
46;8.2 Conservative reductionism;298
47;8.3 Back to the mind-body problem;301
48;BIBLIOGRAPHY;305
49;INDEX;317