Moral Skepticisms

Erscheinungsjahr 2007
ISBN: 978-0-19-534206-2
Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA

Buch, Englisch, 288 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 471 g

Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls "moderate moral skepticism," which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Angewandte Ethik & Soziale Verantwortung

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Part I: Issues

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- 2: Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt?

- 3: Are Any Moral Beliefs True?

- 4: Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?

- 5: In Contrast with What?

- 6: Classy Moral Pyrrhonism

- Part II: Theories

- 7: Naturalism

- 8: Normativism

- 9: Intuitionism

- 10: Coherentism

Über Autor(innen)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy, Dartmouth College