Schmidt Crimes of Business in International Law

Concepts of Individual and Corporate Responsibility for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
1. Auflage 2015
ISBN: 978-3-8452-7157-6
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 24, 401 Seiten

Reihe: Schriften zum Internationalen und Europäischen Strafrecht

Die Prävention von Wirtschaftstätigkeit, die zu schwersten Menschenrechtsverletzungen beiträgt, ist für die internationale Gemeinschaft von hoher Bedeutung.
Der Verfasser entwirft Wege zur Begründung individueller strafrechtlicher Verantwortlichkeit für das Bereitstellen von Infrastruktur-, Finanz- und sonstigen Mitteln zur Begehung von Verbrechen gemäß dem Römischen Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs. Das Werk macht dafür grundlegende Beiträge der deutschen Strafrechtswissenschaft fruchtbar und hinterfragt kritisch die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs zu Täterschaft und ziviler Vorgesetztenverantwortlichkeit.
Aus menschenrechtlicher Perspektive legt der Autor dar, in welchem Umfang sozial erwünschte wirtschaftliche Betätigung straffrei zu stellen ist. Ein interdisziplinärer Zugriff auf das rechtspolitische Vorhaben einer völkerrechtlichen Unternehmensstrafbarkeit legt den ungelösten Konflikt zwischen konträren Organisationswirklichkeiten als wichtiges Reformhindernis frei.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Schmidt, Thomas M.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2; 1. Introduction and scope of inquiry;26
2.1; 1.1. Motives;26
2.2; 1.2. An inter-disciplinary and multi-language approach;29
2.3; 1.3. The Corrie case example;30
2.4; 1.4. References;31
3; 2. The commission of crimes by business actors;34
3.1; 2.1. Preliminary remarks: Interpreting the Rome Statute;35
3.2; 2.2. Commission in Article 25 (3) RS in ICC jurisprudence and scholarship;40
3.2.1; 2.2.1. ICC jurisprudence on commission and Article 25 (3) RS;41
3.2.1.1; 2.2.1.1. The Lubanga judgment: Commission vs. commission;42
3.2.1.1.1; 2.2.1.1.1. The Majority’s decision by Trial Chamber I: Differentiation, a hierarchy, and collective control in co-perpetration;42
3.2.1.1.2; 2.2.1.1.2. Judge Fulford: Opposition by way of a plain(er) reading;43
3.2.1.2; 2.2.1.2. The Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui case: Horizontal and vertical perspectives on control;44
3.2.1.2.1; 2.2.1.2.1. The Majorities’ decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber I and Trial Chamber II: Control by means of a power apparatus in indirect perpetration;45
3.2.1.2.2; 2.2.1.2.2. Judge van den Wyngaert: Opposition in another plain reading;48
3.2.2; 2.2.2. Commission and Article 25 (3) RS in scholarly contributions;49
3.2.2.1; 2.2.2.1. Article 25 (3) RS constitutes a hierarchical ordering of degrees of responsibility; (principal) perpetrators are in control over the crime, (secondary) accomplices aren’t;50
3.2.2.2; 2.2.2.2. All participants are equal under Article 25 (3) RS; distinctions are made at the sentencing stage;53
3.2.3; 2.2.3. Results and outlook: Implications for the scope of individual business actors’ responsibility under the Rome Statute;55
3.3; 2.3. Review of perspectives on commission in ICC jurisprudence and scholarship;57
3.3.1; 2.3.1. The ambivalent text of the Rome Statute;57
3.3.1.1; 2.3.1.1. Textual perspectives in ICC jurisprudence;57
3.3.1.2; 2.3.1.2. Textual perspectives in scholarship;58
3.3.1.3; 2.3.1.3. Results: The Statute’s ambivalence from a textual perspective;60
3.3.2; 2.3.2. The legal certainty perspective: More ambivalence;63
3.3.3; 2.3.3. The punishment perspective: A superior expressive capacity of modes of participation as degrees of responsibility?;65
3.3.4; 2.3.4. Commission and attribution: A comparative perspective under Article 21 (1) (c) RS?;67
3.3.4.1; 2.3.4.1. Abstraction: Forms of attribution and the scope of commission;68
3.3.4.1.1; 2.3.4.1.1. Attribution of physical acts and (derivation) of criminality;70
3.3.4.1.2; 2.3.4.1.2. Implications for the sentencing stage;73
3.3.4.2; 2.3.4.2. Representativeness and consistency;75
3.3.4.3; 2.3.4.3. Results;75
3.3.5; 2.3.5. Results and outlook: Towards overcoming ambivalence;76
3.4; 2.4. Law and reality structures: Re-conceiving commission;76
3.4.1; 2.4.1. Commission and the law’s subject matter: A typological approach to perpetration;77
3.4.1.1; 2.4.1.1. Roxin’s Zentralgestalt: Indirect perpetration and the openness of control;78
3.4.1.2; 2.4.1.2. Schünemann’s «base type» of Täterschaft: Law and relevant reality structures;82
3.4.1.2.1; 2.4.1.2.1. Offense descriptions and the reality structure relevant to the protection of legal interests;83
3.4.1.2.2; 2.4.1.2.2. The «base type» of perpetration;85
3.4.1.2.3; 2.4.1.2.3. Perpetration and attribution;88
3.4.1.2.4; 2.4.1.2.4. Perpetration and criminality;89
3.4.1.3; 2.4.1.3. The law’s subject matter and the ICC: A region-specific account of the power apparatus in Katanga;90
3.4.1.4; 2.4.1.4. Results and outlook: A normative-empirical perspective on commission under the Rome Statute;94
3.4.2; 2.4.2. The type of commission under the Rome Statute;95
3.4.2.1; 2.4.2.1. Offense descriptions under the Rome Statute: Key figures in genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes;96
3.4.2.1.1; 2.4.2.1.1. Elements of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes;96
3.4.2.1.1.1; 2.4.2.1.1.1. Crimes against humanity;97
3.4.2.1.1.2; 2.4.2.1.1.2. Genocide;98
3.4.2.1.1.3; 2.4.2.1.1.3. War crimes;100
3.4.2.1.1.4; 2.4.2.1.1.4. Results and outlook: The reality of offenses under the Rome Statute as an organized effort;102
3.4.2.1.2; 2.4.2.1.2. An anatomy of human interaction and involvement in genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes;105
3.4.2.1.3; 2.4.2.1.3. Results and outlook: Designers and implementers of organized action as key figures;107
3.4.2.2; 2.4.2.2. The Statute’s fundamental means-end-relation and its reality structure;108
3.4.2.3; 2.4.2.3. The Statute’s commission type;109
3.4.2.3.1; 2.4.2.3.1. The resource dimension of commission;110
3.4.2.3.2; 2.4.2.3.2. The creative dimension of commission;112
3.4.2.3.2.1; 2.4.2.3.2.1. Empirical complexity;113
3.4.2.3.2.1.1; 2.4.2.3.2.1.1. Kelman and Hamilton on crimes of obedience;114
3.4.2.3.2.1.2; 2.4.2.3.2.1.2. Total institutional power relations;116
3.4.2.3.2.1.3; 2.4.2.3.2.1.3. Critical voices;117
3.4.2.3.2.2; 2.4.2.3.2.2. Fungibility re-visited: On the empirical substrate of the (corporate) power apparatus;120
3.4.2.3.3; 2.4.2.3.3. The commission type and prerequisite degrees of dimensional expression;123
3.4.2.4; 2.4.2.4. Results and outlook: The commission type and individual criminal responsibility;127
3.4.3; 2.4.3. The subject-matter’s influence on attribution, criminality, and individual degrees of responsibility;129
3.4.3.1; 2.4.3.1. ICC: A dysfunctional control approach to indirect co-perpetration;130
3.4.3.2; 2.4.3.2. Ambos and Vest: Multi-staged control;133
3.4.3.3; 2.4.3.3. Collective criminality and individual degrees of criminal responsibility at the sentencing stage;138
3.4.3.3.1; 2.4.3.3.1. Cooperative conduct, shared creatorship of the result and individual quotas of criminality;139
3.4.3.3.2; 2.4.3.3.2. Sentencing and degrees of criminal responsibility as labels;147
3.4.3.4; 2.4.3.4. Results and outlook;149
3.4.4; 2.4.4. Commission and Article 25 (3) RS: Re-visiting the text from a typological perspective;151
3.4.4.1; 2.4.4.1. Commission as an individual?;152
3.4.4.2; 2.4.4.2. Prescriptive terminological elements in a descriptive provision;153
3.4.4.2.1; 2.4.4.2.1. The regardless- and commission-clauses;154
3.4.4.2.2; 2.4.4.2.2. (Additional) Intent prerequisites in sub-sections (c) and (d)?;155
3.4.4.3; 2.4.4.3. Results;157
3.4.5; 2.4.5. Commission and joint criminal enterprise: Lessons learned?;158
3.4.5.1; 2.4.5.1. JCE responsibility re-visited;159
3.4.5.1.1; 2.4.5.1.1. Central issues;160
3.4.5.1.2; 2.4.5.1.2. … and responses;163
3.4.5.2; 2.4.5.2. JCE, the genesis of Article 25 (3) (d) RS, and collective responsibility;165
3.4.6; 2.4.6. Results and outlook: Business actors’ individual criminal responsibility for commission;169
3.5; 2.5. Social value of conduct, Article 21 (3) RS and the ICC as a just global institution;172
3.5.1; 2.5.1. The notions of proximity and remoteness;173
3.5.2; 2.5.2. Focusing on intent: The Rome Statute’s alleged underinclusiveness vis-à-vis acts of business exchange;174
3.5.2.1; 2.5.2.1. Genesis: Purpose as desire intent à la Learned Hand?;176
3.5.2.1.1; 2.5.2.1.1. Methodological objection: Re-reading the MPC’s drafting history;179
3.5.2.1.2; 2.5.2.1.2. Substantive objection: The purpose prerequisite’s deep roots in common law;185
3.5.2.2; 2.5.2.2. Purpose and (the perception of) normalcy;188
3.5.2.2.1; 2.5.2.2.1. Two scenarios;188
3.5.2.2.2; 2.5.2.2.2. The issue of normalcy;191
3.5.2.3; 2.5.2.3. Context and ordinary meaning: Purpose as certainty intent?;192
3.5.2.3.1; 2.5.2.3.1. Vest: The context of Article 25 (3) (c) RS;193
3.5.2.3.2; 2.5.2.3.2. The ordinary meaning of Article 25 (3) (c) RS: Language differences and certainty intent;195
3.5.2.3.2.1; 2.5.2.3.2.1. Dictionary approach;195
3.5.2.3.2.2; 2.5.2.3.2.2. Conceptual approach;196
3.5.2.3.2.2.1; 2.5.2.3.2.2.1. Purpose as direct but not oblique intent;197
3.5.2.3.2.2.2; 2.5.2.3.2.2.2. En vue de as dol spécial;198
3.5.2.3.2.2.3; 2.5.2.3.2.2.3. Con el propósito;199
3.5.2.3.2.2.4; 2.5.2.3.2.2.4. Result: Difference of meaning;199
3.5.2.3.2.3; 2.5.2.3.2.3. Resolution pursuant to Article 33 VCLT;200
3.5.3; 2.5.3. The emergence of the risk standard;202
3.5.3.1; 2.5.3.1. Essential transactions;203
3.5.3.2; 2.5.3.2. «Substantial» assistance, «significant» contributions, and overbreadth in Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana;204
3.5.3.3; 2.5.3.3. Ambos and Vest: Limiting (secondary) participation to socially undesirable acts by recourse to a risk standard;207
3.5.3.4; 2.5.3.4. Heyer: Crime-specific risks and the securing of livelihood;208
3.5.3.4.1; 2.5.3.4.1. A utilitarian premise;209
3.5.3.4.2; 2.5.3.4.2. … and its implementation in a risk permission;211
3.5.3.5; 2.5.3.5. Results and outlook;212
3.5.4; 2.5.4. Risk permissions from a human rights perspective: Liberty vs. security and business activity;213
3.5.4.1; 2.5.4.1. Balancing liberty and security and the fate of the shopkeeper: Exemplary domestic perspectives on risk permissions;215
3.5.4.1.1; 2.5.4.1.1. Balancing interests and protecting trust;216
3.5.4.1.2; 2.5.4.1.2. The normative value of interests: Constitutionalization and social desirability;220
3.5.4.1.2.1; 2.5.4.1.2.1. Balancing as a method;221
3.5.4.1.2.2; 2.5.4.1.2.2. Criminal law and constitutional law;224
3.5.4.2; 2.5.4.2. Risk permissions and Article 21 (3) RS: The human rights perspective;225
3.5.4.2.1; 2.5.4.2.1. International law, the public law paradigm, and balancing of human rights under Article 21 (3) RS;227
3.5.4.2.1.1; 2.5.4.2.1.1. Global constitutionalism and international law as a coherent system;230
3.5.4.2.1.2; 2.5.4.2.1.2. Human rights as principles: A rational account of balancing;231
3.5.4.2.1.2.1; 2.5.4.2.1.2.1. Principles as optimization requirements: The constitutional domestic perspective;232
3.5.4.2.1.2.2; 2.5.4.2.1.2.2. Principles as optimization requirements in the public law paradigm: The international constitutional perspective;236
3.5.4.2.1.2.3; 2.5.4.2.1.2.3. Human rights as principles in international law;237
3.5.4.2.1.3; 2.5.4.2.1.3. Results: Constitutionalization of international law, Article 21 (3) RS and risk permissions;238
3.5.4.2.2; 2.5.4.2.2. The scope of internationally recognized human rights in Article 21 (3) RS;239
3.5.4.2.2.1; 2.5.4.2.2.1. Honest unevenness in a «contextual» approach to «internationally recognized»?;240
3.5.4.2.2.2; 2.5.4.2.2.2. Implications: Uneven human rights protection of business actors before the ICC?;242
3.5.4.2.2.2.1; 2.5.4.2.2.2.1. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR: Protecting solidified interests in economic and professional liberty as a human right;243
3.5.4.2.2.2.2; 2.5.4.2.2.2.2. Interference by criminalization of acts of business exchange;245
3.5.4.2.2.2.3; 2.5.4.2.2.2.3. Uneven protection of human rights in a «contextual approach» before the ICC;247
3.5.4.2.2.3; 2.5.4.2.2.3. «Internationally recognized» and the ICC as a just global institution: A material perspective on global justice within the public law paradigm;248
3.5.4.2.2.3.1; 2.5.4.2.2.3.1. Rawls on domestic social justice;251
3.5.4.2.2.3.2; 2.5.4.2.2.3.2. Rawls on international justice;253
3.5.4.2.2.3.3; 2.5.4.2.2.3.3. Global cosmopolitan justice;257
3.5.4.2.2.3.4; 2.5.4.2.2.3.4. International justice and the ICC;260
3.5.4.2.2.3.5; 2.5.4.2.2.3.5. Global justice and the ICC as a just global institution;262
3.5.4.2.3; 2.5.4.2.3. Results and outlook: Re-visiting contextual vs. minimalist readings of «internationally recognized» and implications for acts of business exchange;266
3.5.4.3; 2.5.4.3. Risk permissions for acts of business exchange in a principled account of balancing;268
3.5.4.3.1; 2.5.4.3.1. The protective principle: Individual and collective?;269
3.5.4.3.2; 2.5.4.3.2. Individual relations of precedence;273
3.5.4.3.2.1; 2.5.4.3.2.1. The principle of possession and the ability to trust in business partners;275
3.5.4.3.2.1.1; 2.5.4.3.2.1.1. Intensity of non-satisfaction of the principle of possession;275
3.5.4.3.2.1.2; 2.5.4.3.2.1.2. Importance of satisfying the protective principle;278
3.5.4.3.2.1.3; 2.5.4.3.2.1.3. Realization to the factually greatest extent;279
3.5.4.3.2.1.4; 2.5.4.3.2.1.4. Abstract weight of the protective principle and of the principle of possession;280
3.5.4.3.2.1.5; 2.5.4.3.2.1.5. Application to case example;281
3.5.4.3.2.2; 2.5.4.3.2.2. The principle of adequate living conditions through work;283
3.5.4.4; 2.5.4.4. Results: Implementation of an individual risk permission is generally not required;285
3.5.4.5; 2.5.4.5. Revisiting Heyer’s utilitarian account of risk permissions for business actors;285
3.5.4.5.1; 2.5.4.5.1. Wresting the singularity of life from the calculus of social interests: The criteria of securing one’s livelihood and of organizational competence;286
3.5.4.5.2; 2.5.4.5.2. The criterion of risk specificity;293
3.5.4.5.3; 2.5.4.5.3. Neutralization and perpetration;296
3.5.5; 2.5.5. Results;297
3.5.6; 2.5.6. Excursus: A customary law perspective on risk permissions? Business activity post-Nuremberg under Article 21 (1) (b) RS;298
3.6; 2.6. Conclusion;300
3.7; 2.7. References;301
4; 3. Business actors as civilian superiors;327
4.1; 3.1. Civilian «effective authority and control» in scholarship and jurisprudence;327
4.1.1; 3.1.1. Scholarly views on business actors as civilian superiors;328
4.1.2; 3.1.2. The Bemba case and ad hoc jurisprudence: A critical prognosis;331
4.1.2.1; 3.1.2.1. Ad hoc jurisprudence on civilian «effective control» as the ability to report;332
4.1.2.2; 3.1.2.2. Musema before the ICTR: «Legal and financial control» as business actors’ «effective control»?;336
4.1.2.3; 3.1.2.3. Nahimana et al. before the ICTR: Analyzing corporate structures;338
4.1.2.4; 3.1.2.4. Issues raised in ad hoc jurisprudence and by recourse to it;339
4.1.2.4.1; 3.1.2.4.1. Substantive issues: The nature and scope of civilian «effective control»;340
4.1.2.4.2; 3.1.2.4.2. Methodological issues: Sources of law under Article 21 (1) RS;341
4.1.3; 3.1.3. Results and outlook;343
4.2; 3.2. Omission as a type and business actors as civilian superiors;344
4.2.1; 3.2.1. Schünemann’s typological perspective on omission;344
4.2.2; 3.2.2. A typological perspective on omission under the Rome Statute: The genesis of Article 28 RS and the Rome Statute’s omission type;345
4.2.2.1; 3.2.2.1. The genesis of Article 28 RS;346
4.2.2.2; 3.2.2.2. The Statute’s omission type and its concretization with a view to conduct of civilian superiors;349
4.2.2.3; 3.2.2.3. Collective criminality and individual degrees of responsibility at the sentencing stage;354
4.2.2.3.1; 3.2.2.3.1. Attribution and criminality in scholarship;354
4.2.2.3.2; 3.2.2.3.2. An analogous proposal;356
4.2.3; 3.2.3. Results and outlook: Business leaders as civilian superiors and the question of social desirability;360
4.3; 3.3. A risk permission for civilian superiors?;361
4.3.1; 3.3.1. Scholarship on conscious disregard;362
4.3.2; 3.3.2. Balancing human rights as principles;363
4.3.3; 3.3.3. Result: No risk permission for business leaders as civilian superiors;364
4.4; 3.4. Conclusion;365
4.5; 3.5. References;365
5; 4. Corporate criminal responsibility de lege ferenda?;370
5.1; 4.1. The Rome Conference proposal and its discussion in scholarship;371
5.2; 4.2. Corporate criminal responsibility under the constraints of reality;373
5.2.1; 4.2.1. Criminal sanctions against corporate actors: A disjunction between burden and responsibility?;375
5.2.1.1; 4.2.1.1. Punishing the corporation;377
5.2.1.2; 4.2.1.2. An epistemological review;377
5.2.1.3; 4.2.1.3. Incompatible perspectives;380
5.2.2; 4.2.2. Non-criminal sanctions against corporate actors under the Rome Statute: The Rome Statute as criminal law?;382
5.3; 4.3. Excursus: The corporate organization as a black box?;385
5.3.1; 4.3.1. The «corporate veil»;386
5.3.2; 4.3.2. …and how to lift it;387
5.3.3; 4.3.3. Domestic experiences;388
5.3.4; 4.3.4. Result;388
5.4; 4.4. Conclusion;389
5.5; 4.5. References;390
6; 5. Closing remarks;397
7; 6. Annex: Abstract and Theses;398
7.1; Thesis 1: Interpretative efforts regarding Articles 25 (3) and 28 (b) RS by the ICC and in scholarship largely preclude the prosecution of business actors but are not persuasive.;398
7.2; Thesis 2: These shortcomings can be remedied by a typological approach to commission and omission.;399
7.3; Thesis 3: The Statute's commission (omission) type consists of the ability to take decisions significant for the violation of protected legal interests by (not preventing the) devising or implementing of an intellectual design.;399
7.4; Thesis 4: The commission and omission types are two-dimensional.;399
7.5; Thesis 5: The criminality of conduct is collective and qualitatively the same for all actors.;400
7.6; Thesis 6: The social value of business activity does not call for a risk permission under the Statute.;400
7.7; Thesis 7: A policy decision extending the ICC’s jurisdiction to business corporations would be premature.;401