Schagaev / Kirk Active System Control

Design of System Resilience
1. Auflage 2017
ISBN: 978-3-319-46813-6
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 305 Seiten

This book introduces an approach to active system control design and development to improve the properties of our technological systems. It extends concepts of control and data accumulation by explaining how the system model should be organized to improve the properties of the system under consideration. The authors define these properties as reliability, performance and energy-efficiency, and self-adaption. They describe how they bridge the gap between data accumulation and analysis in terms of interpolation with the real physical models when data used for interpretation of the system conditions. The authors introduce a principle of active system control and safety - an approach that explains what a model of a system should have, making computer systems more efficient, a crucial new concern in application domains such as safety critical, embedded and low-power autonomous systems like transport, healthcare, and other dynamic systems with moving substances and elements. On a theoretical level, this book further extends the concept of fault tolerance, introducing a system level of design for improving overall efficiency. On a practical level it illustrates how active system approach might help our systems be self-evolving.

Professor Igor Schagaev is Director of IT-ACS Ltd Stevenage, UK. He received his PhD in Computer Science in 1983 from the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Problem of Control; Certificate in Business Organization of International Research Program Management, TACIS (EC) 1996; Certificate in Learning and teaching in High Education, University of North London 2001. He is a Fellow of the Institute of Analyst and Programmers (UK) since 1992 and Fellow of British Computer Society since 2013. Igor has previously worked as an Electromechanical Engineer at the Smolensk aviation factory, USSR, a Senior Programmer and Design Engineer at the Institute of Advanced Computations, Central Statistic Bureau of USSR, and as a Head of Fault Tolerant System Branch in Institute of Control Sciences. The latter was combined with work as Senior Design Engineer and System Programmer for Avionics at Sukhoy Design Bureau. Since 1992 Igor has been Director of ATLAB Ltd. Bristol (now converged into IT-ACS Ltd). Since 1983, Igor has published internationally 70+ papers in journals and conferences and seven books. Igor was keynote speaker at World Conferences in UK, China, USA, provided consultancy for Financial Times, Sunday Times, Boston Facultimedia, and Swedish government -- all on the subject of ICT, avionics, and aerospace domains. Igor has been honoured with several industry awards, achievements, and grants. He is author of the Springer titles: V Castano and I Schagaev, 'Resilient Computer System Design' and Schagaev I, Kaegi T 'Software Design for Resilient Computer Systems'. Since 2007, together with Dr Brian Kirk and Alex Schagaev, Igor holds a patent on Method and Apparatus for Active System Safety, GB 2448351.

Dr. Brian R. Kirk is the founder and Director of Robinson Systems Engineering Ltd. in the UK, which has specialized in designing and building safetyrelated computing and control systems for over 40 years. He received his PhD in Methods of Active System Safety in 2007, formerly attaining an MSc in Industrial Electronics from Imperial College and A BSc (Hons) in Electronics from Salford University in the 1960s. He worked on early graphics based CAD and simulators for microchip design with Marconi Research labs. In the 1970s, he worked as design manager for microprocessors and memories at General Instrument Corp. There, he worked on custom IC design and early 1,4,8,and 16 bit processors, including the PIC series, the Sinclair calculators, and early TV games (such as Pong). After working for Mergenthaler Linotype on system designs during the phototypesetting revolution, he founded Robinson Systems Engineering Ltd. He has presented many papers linking theory to practical applications at conferences around the world and collaborated with Professors' Wirth and Gutknecht's group at ETH Zurich for over 20 years, co-authoring the Zonnon Language Report. As joint author of the book Programming Oberon in Windows, he released Robinson's Oberon compiler for Windows as part of the Programmers Oberon Workbench as freeware, inspired by the usability and ubiquity of Borland Pascal. More recently he has provided technical advice to US Legal teams on the causes of Sudden Unintended Acceleration in vehicles that contributed to a billion dollar settlement in a single case and contributed to Tom Murray's book Deadly by Design. He is currently working with the Institute of Engineering and Technology (UK) and IEEE on guidance for improving the Electromagnetic Resilience of Systems. He is a member the British Computer Society, Institute of Directors, and life member of the ACM (USA) and the International Society of Bassists, being an enthusiastic double bass player in various jazz bands.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Schagaev, Igor

Kirk, Brian Robinson

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;6
2;Acknowledgements;7
3;Contents;8
4;Author Biographies;13
5;1: Aviation: Landscape, Classification, Risk Data;15
5.1;Introduction;15
5.2;Survey of the Aviation Application Domain;18
5.2.1;Terminology;18
5.2.2;Classification of Aviation;19
5.2.2.1;Classification of Aircraft by Mission;20
5.2.2.2;Classification by Type of Aircraft or Method of Operation;24
5.2.2.3;Classification by Technical Specifications;25
5.2.2.4;Classification by State of Development;25
5.2.2.5;Conclusion;27
5.2.3;The Aircraft Market;27
5.2.3.1;Military;28
5.2.3.2;Commercial Aviation;30
5.2.3.3;General Aviation;32
5.2.3.4;Effect of Weather;33
5.2.3.5;Distribution of General Aviation;33
5.2.3.6;Features of General Aviation;34
5.2.3.7;Helicopters;35
5.2.3.8;Conclusion;37
5.3;Safety and Risk of Flight;38
5.3.1;Aviation Safety in Commercial Aviation;38
5.3.2;Main Risk Agents and Their Contribution;40
5.3.3;Risk Factors and Flight Phases;41
5.4;Risk and Safety in General Aviation;44
5.4.1;Accident Statistics;44
5.4.1.1;US GA Accidents;44
5.4.1.2;Australian GA Accidents;45
5.4.1.3;UK GA Accidents;46
5.5;Flight Risk Analysis;48
5.5.1;First Occurrences and Sequence of Events;49
5.5.2;Causes and Factors of Accidents;50
5.5.3;Conclusion;51
5.5.4;Safety Management Scheme;52
5.5.5;Insurance, Regulation and Aviation Safety;53
5.5.6;Flight Safety and Safety Control Cycles in Aviation;54
5.5.7;Constraints and Failures of Safety Management;55
5.5.8;Conclusions;56
5.6;References;58
6;2: Active System Control and Safety Approach, and Regulation in Other Application Domains;59
6.1;Approach to Safety in Critical Systems;59
6.2;Safety Approach in Industrial Systems and Machinery;60
6.2.1;Approach to Safety in Process Plants;60
6.2.1.1;The Importance of Human Factors;61
6.2.1.2;The Safety Lifecycle and Trends;61
6.2.2;Approach to Safety in Small Industrial Systems;61
6.2.2.1;The Trend to Design Standardisation;62
6.3;Safety Approach in the Automotive Industry;63
6.3.1;Current On-Board Safety Systems;63
6.3.2;Physical Safety Systems;63
6.3.3;Route Safety Systems;63
6.3.4;Driving Safety Systems;64
6.3.5;Driver Safety Assurance;64
6.3.6;Safety Improvement;64
6.3.7;Operational Safety Cycle;65
6.3.7.1;Maintenance;65
6.3.7.2;Checks at Start-Up of Vehicle;66
6.3.7.3;Checks During Operational Use;66
6.3.7.4;Checks at the End of Operational Use;66
6.3.8;Future Safety Systems in the Automotive Industry;67
6.4;Safety Approach in the Rail Industry;68
6.4.1;Current On-Board Safety Systems;68
6.4.2;Physical Safety Systems;69
6.4.3;Route Safety Systems;69
6.4.4;Driving Safety Systems;70
6.4.5;Driver Safety Assurance;70
6.4.6;Safety Improvement;71
6.4.7;Operational Safety Cycle;71
6.4.7.1;Maintenance;72
6.4.7.2;Checks at Start-Up of Vehicle;72
6.4.7.3;Checks During Operational Use;72
6.4.7.4;Checks at the End of Operational Use;73
6.4.8;Future Safety Systems in the Rail Domain;73
6.5;Safety Approach in the Space Domain;74
6.6;Existing Standardisation;76
6.6.1;Standards in the Industrial Domain;76
6.6.2;Safety Definitions of IEC 61508;76
6.6.3;Functional Safety Analysis;77
6.7;Standards in the Rail Domain;78
6.7.1;The Safety Case;78
6.8;Development Life-Cycle for Safety-Related Systems;79
6.8.1;Safety Integrity Levels (SILs);79
6.9;Standards in the Space Domain;80
6.10;Conclusions;82
6.11;Functional Safety Standards Based Upon IEC 61508;83
6.12;References;84
6.13;Active Safety;84
7;3: Aircraft Flight Reliability and the Safety Landscape of Aircraft Use;86
7.1;Introduction;86
7.2;An Operational Reliability Model for Aircraft;87
7.3;Reliability Model of a Flight;88
7.4;Operational Reliability Model: Equations;89
7.4.1;Measures of System Reliability;91
7.4.1.1;Point Availability;91
7.4.1.2;Mission Availability;91
7.4.1.3;Joint Availability;92
7.5;The Safety Maintenance Landscape;93
7.5.1;Developments in Modern Aviation and Safety;93
7.5.2;Developments in Risk;95
7.5.3;Chain Mode Flights;96
7.5.4;Latency of Fault and Safety Monitoring;97
7.6;The Safety Maintenance Landscape: Commercial Aviation;99
7.6.1;On-Ground Management of Safety;100
7.6.2;Timing for Safety Management between Flights;102
7.6.3;Social, Political and Commercial Aspects of Aviation Safety;103
7.7;Flight Safety Versus Risk and Statistics: Flight Data Paradox;105
7.7.1;Risk and Statistics;107
7.7.2;External and Internal Aspects of Aircraft Safety;107
7.8;Conclusion;109
7.9;References;110
8;4: Active Safety Relative to Existing Devices;112
8.1;Active System Control and System Safety Versus Aircraft Management;112
8.2;Safety Tools and Supportive Devices;114
8.3;Safety Devices: Brief History and Evolution;114
8.4;Existing Flight Data Recording Devices;118
8.4.1;Military Flight Data Recording Devices and Testing Recorders;119
8.4.1.1;Honeywell AR Series;119
8.4.1.2;Allied Signal SSUFDR;119
8.4.1.3;Military Aviation Recorder;119
8.5;Requirements for New Flight Data Recording and Processing System;122
8.6;Flight Data Processing System Post-flight Analysis;123
8.7;Constraints;125
8.8;The Nature of Devices for Future Aircraft;127
8.9;Conclusion;130
8.10;References;131
9;5: Principle of Active System Control (Theory);133
9.1;Introduction;133
9.1.1;The Goals, Role and Structure of the Chapter;133
9.2;Active System Control Overview;135
9.3;Defining and Implementing the PASC;138
9.3.1;Structure of Research of Active System Control;140
9.4;Principle of Active System Control;141
9.4.1;Factors to Take into Account Making Active System Control Work;141
9.5;Definition of the PASC;143
9.5.1;PASC and Elements of Redundancy Theory;146
9.5.2;The PASC Algorithm in More Detail;149
9.5.3;PASC: Dependability and Fault Tolerance;151
9.5.4;Improving the Control and Safety of a System;152
9.5.5;A Generalised Information Model for Active System Control;155
9.5.6;On Coverage;158
9.6;Conclusion;159
9.7;References;160
10;6: Principle of Active System Control: Aspects of Implementation;161
10.1;Introduction;161
10.2;Implementation of PASC in-the-Medium;161
10.2.1;The PASC for General Aviation: The Cycle of Operational Management;162
10.2.2;Process-Oriented Informational Model;164
10.2.2.1;The Object;166
10.2.2.2;Flight Data;167
10.2.2.3;The PASC Flight Data for Trials;169
10.2.2.4;Flight Modes;171
10.2.2.4.1;Take-Off;173
10.2.2.4.2;Cruise;173
10.2.2.4.3;Landing;174
10.2.2.5;Models of Elements;174
10.2.2.5.1;Artificial Intelligence Models;176
10.2.2.5.1.1;Statistical Learning Model;176
10.2.2.5.1.2;Statistical Models;177
10.2.2.5.1.3;Functional Models;177
10.2.2.5.1.4;Threshold Functions;178
10.2.2.5.1.5;Element Models;179
10.2.2.5.1.6;Predicates, Dependency and Recovery Matrix;180
10.2.2.5.1.7;Dependency Matrix;180
10.2.2.5.1.7.1;Probabilistic Matrix;183
10.2.2.5.1.8;The Recovery Matrix;184
10.2.2.5.1.8.1;Reverse Tracing;184
10.2.2.5.2;Matrix Data for the PASC Trial;184
10.2.2.5.2.1;Dependency Matrix;184
10.2.2.5.2.2;The Algorithm for PASC: APASC;185
10.2.2.5.2.3;Main APASC Functions;188
10.2.2.5.2.4;How the APASC Works;188
10.2.2.5.2.4.1;Termination Conditions for APASC On-Board;191
10.2.2.5.2.4.2;Probability Along the Path;191
10.2.2.5.2.4.3;Algorithm of Backward Tracing (Recovery);194
10.2.2.5.2.5;Implementation of the APASC During Flight;195
10.3;Conclusion;196
10.4;References;200
11;7: Active System Control: And Its Impact on Mission Reliability;201
11.1;Reasoning;201
11.2;Preventive and Conditional Maintenance Versus Active System Control: A Semantic Difference;203
11.3;Reliability Gains: Conditional Maintenance Versus Active System Control;205
11.3.1;Preventive Maintenance with Implementation of Active System Control;209
11.3.2;The Real-Time Reliability Corridor: Introduction and Definitions;212
11.3.2.1;Defining the Frequency of the Checking Process;213
11.3.2.2;Avoiding R0 Being Breached When a Delay Occurs;214
11.4;Conditional Maintenance Versus Active System Control;217
11.5;Summary and Conclusions;218
11.6;References;219
12;8: Flight Mode Concept and Realisation;221
12.1;Introduction;221
12.1.1;Goals and Objectives of the Chapter;222
12.1.2;The Objectives of Implementation;224
12.2;The Flight Mode Model;225
12.2.1;Flight Mode Definitions;225
12.2.2;The Flight Mode Detection Algorithms;229
12.3;Visualisation of Flight Mode;232
12.3.1;Presentation of Advice to the Flight Crew;232
12.4;Information Processing of Flight Data Including Flight Mode;233
12.4.1;Flight Mode Detector;235
12.4.2;Real-Time Diagnosis and Prognosis;235
12.4.3;Determination of Response;235
12.4.4;Configurability of the System;236
12.5;A Trial Architecture for Flight Mode Detection;236
12.5.1;The Avionics System: System Block Diagram;237
12.5.2;Flight Data Memory;238
12.5.3;Software Architecture and Partitioning;239
12.6;Using Flight Modes to Tune Flight Performance and Safety;241
12.7;Conclusions;243
12.8;Further Steps;243
12.9;Appendix: Flight Mode Model: XML Specification;244
12.10;References;251
13;9: Active System Control: Realisation;253
13.1;Introduction: The Safety Aspects of Active System Control;253
13.1.1;Objectives of the Chapter;254
13.2;The Active System Control for Safety: Theoretical Model;254
13.2.1;Fault Detection and Handling: Algorithms and Procedures;255
13.2.2;The Theory: Based on Applied Graph Logic;256
13.2.2.1;Graph Logic Model (GLM): Logic Operators;256
13.2.2.2;The Modelling of Fault and Fault Detection;259
13.2.2.3;The Localisation (Search) of Faults;261
13.2.2.4;Recovery Matrix;264
13.2.3;The Algorithms of Fault Localisation;265
13.2.4;The Application Example: Air Pressure System;268
13.2.4.1;Modelling and Handling of Faults: A More Realistic Example;272
13.2.4.2;Localisation Procedure;275
13.2.4.2.1;Localisation Procedure: A Simple Case;275
13.3;Summary and Conclusion;277
13.4;References;278
14;10: Active System Control: Future;280
14.1;Introduction;280
14.2;Classification of Aircraft: Reiterated;281
14.3;What Else Can Active System Control Do?;283
14.4;Active System Control: Life-Cycle of Design and Manufacturing;284
14.5;Active System Control: Life-Cycle of Aircraft Application;284
14.6;Active System Control: Risk Information Paradox: RIP?;287
14.7;Active System Control in Almost One Page, ``During´´ and ``After´´;289
14.8;Active System Control Dependency Matrixes: Who Is Doing What;290
14.9;The Impact of Prognostics on Active System Control;293
14.10;Embedding Active System Control into Aircraft;294
14.11;Software Organisation of Active System Control;295
14.12;Active System Control Essential Device: Active Black Box;297
14.13;Summary and Conclusion;298
14.14;References;299
15;Index;301