Santarelli Entrepreneurship, Growth, and Innovation

The Dynamics of Firms and Industries
1. Auflage 2006
ISBN: 978-0-387-32314-5
Verlag: Springer US
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 12, 285 Seiten

Reihe: International Studies in Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship, Growth and Innovation provides comprehensive insight into the economics of entrepreneurship, claiming that this recently established discipline should establish a framework of analysis that integrates the understanding of the determinants and the effects of both entrepreneurship and innovation without neglecting the functioning of the inducement mechanisms. For this purpose, the book combines theoretical prescriptions and international empirical evidence. Contributions by some of the best known scholars in the field of the economics of entrepreneurship and innovation investigate whether the interrelationships between the forces that affect firm and industry dynamics and ultimately determine economic growth are subject to change across countries and over time. The analysis of different national cases puts forward that the relationship between entrepreneurship and growth via innovation is shaped by the context of country-specific institutions and industries, thereby providing hints for industrial and innovation policy.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Santarelli, Enrico

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;CONTENTS;6
2;LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS;8
3;INTRODUCTION;14
4;Chapter 1 A MARKET MODEL OF PERFECT COMPETITION UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND TECHNOLOGIES;22
4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;22
4.2;2. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING ENTRY AND INVESTMENTS ROUTINES;24
4.3;3. EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENCY CLASSES;30
4.4;4. EXISTENCE OF AN INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS CHARACTERIZATION;35
4.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;40
4.6;REFERENCES;41
5;Chapter 2 INDUSTRY DYNAMICS A LA STACKELBERG WITH STOCHASTIC CAPITAL ACCUMULATION;44
5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;44
5.2;2. THE SETUP;46
5.3;3. THE GAME;48
5.4;4. COMPARATIVE STATICS;57
5.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;58
5.6;NOTES;59
5.7;REFERENCES;59
6;Chapter 3 GIBRATSS LAW: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE;62
6.1;1. INTRODUCTION;62
6.2;2. THIS SURVEY;63
6.3;REFERENCES;91
7;Chapter 4 ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE OLD AND NEW EUROPE;96
7.1;1. INTRODUCTION;96
7.2;2. DETERMINANTS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP;99
7.3;3. DATA;105
7.4;4. ANALYSIS OF LATENT ENTREPRENEURSHIP;110
7.5;5. ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP;114
7.6;NOTES;117
8;Chapter 5 NEW FIRM FORMATION AND THE REGION: EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM THE UNITED STATES;126
8.1;1. INTRODUCTION;126
8.2;2. THE BUSINESS INFORMATION TRACKING SYSTEM ( BITS) ;127
8.3;3. USING CENSUS' BITS TO EXPLORE ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH;130
8.4;4. THE CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES FOR EMPIRICAL EXAMINATIONS;135
8.5;5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ;142
8.6;6. HUMAN CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP12;146
8.7;7. CONCLUSIONS;151
8.8;NOTES;151
8.9;REFERENCES;153
9;Chapter 6 R&D INTENSITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND GROWTH IN GERMANY;156
9.1;1. INTRODUCTION;156
9.2;2. GIBRAT'S LAW: WHY CONTEXT MATTERS;157
9.3;3. DATA AND MEASUREMENT;161
9.4;4. THE EMPIRICAL GROWTH MODELS AND REFUTABLE HYPOTHESES;162
9.5;5. RESULTS;163
9.6;6. CONCLUSIONS;166
9.7;NOTES;167
9.8;REFERENCES;167
10;Chapter 7 GIBRAT'S LAW IN A MEDIUM-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR ITALY;170
10.1;1. INTRODUCTION;170
10.2;2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY;172
10.3;3. RESULTS;175
10.4;4. CONCLUSIONS;182
10.5;NOTES;183
10.6;REFERENCES;183
11;Chapter 8 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS;186
11.1;1. Introduction;186
11.2;2. EVIDENCE FROM CASE STUDIES;187
11.3;3. EVIDENCE FROM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS;194
11.4;4. CONCLUSIONS;199
11.5;NOTES;200
11.6;REFERENCES;201
12;Chapter 9 INNOVATION PREMIUM AND THE SURVIVAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS IN THE NETHERLANDS;204
12.1;1. INTRODUCTION;204
12.2;2. THE DETERMINANTS OF FIRM SURVIVAL;205
12.3;3. DATA;208
12.4;4. METHODOLOGY;210
12.5;5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS;213
12.6;6. CONCLUSIONS;216
12.7;NOTES;217
12.8;REFERENCES;218
13;Chapter 10 FOREIGN PRESENCE, TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND FIRM SURVIVAL IN GREECE: A SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODEL WITH LATENT VARIABLES APPROACH;220
13.1;1. INTRODUCTION;220
13.2;2. SURVIVAL LITERATURE;221
13.3;3. FOREIGN FIRMS AND SPILLOVERS;224
13.4;4. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND HAZARD MODELS;225
13.5;5. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATIONS;231
13.6;6. CONCLUSIONS;238
13.7;NOTES;239
13.8;REFERENCES;239
14;Chapter 11 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN PORTUGAL;244
14.1;1. INTRODUCTION;244
14.2;2. THE RELATION BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND UNEMPLOYMENT;245
14.3;3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY;246
14.4;4. MEASURING THE RELATION BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT;248
14.5;5. ANALYZING THE RESIDUALS FOR PORTUGAL;251
14.6;6. CONCLUSIONS;258
14.7;NOTES;260
14.8;REFERENCES;261
15;Chapter 12 TRANSFERRING THE RISK OF FAILURE. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND FIRM DYNAMICS IN TURKISH MANUFACTURING;264
15.1;1. INTRODUCTION;264
15.2;2. MECHANISMS FOR RISK TRANSFER;266
15.3;3. THE DATA AND THE MODEL;270
15.4;4. DETERMINANTS OF SURVIVAL: ESTIMATION RESULTS;275
15.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;277
15.6;NOTES;278
15.7;REFERENCES;280
16;Chapter 13 WHAT IS THE BEST POLICY FOR INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP?;282
16.1;1. INTRODUCTION;282
16.2;2. INNOVATION;282
16.3;3. ENTREPRENEURSHIP;286
17;AUTHOR INDEX;296
18;SUBJECT INDEX;304

Leseproben

Chapter 2 INDUSTRY DYNAMICS A LA STACKELBERG WITH STOCHASTIC CAPITAL ACCUMULATION (P. 23)

Luca Lambertini

University of Bologna
1. INTRODUCTION
Firms' entry and growth in an industry have attracted a great deal of attention within both industrial and applied economics for several decades. Ever since Gibrat's seminal contribution (Gibrat, 1931), the established wisdom has maintained that expected firm growth rates are independent of firm size, a property known as Gibrat's Law. Both theoretical and empirical research have been extensively carried out along this line.' So far, the existing literature provides heterogeneous answers to the question as the way we shall expect market dynamics to unravel, given some degree of initial asymmetry among firms .

Two relevant contributions by Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Lucas (1978) investigate entry and exit decisions in long-run competitive equilibrium models where prices, outputs and investments are driven by stochastic processes. In a pioneering paper, Jovanovic (1982) proposes a theory of noisy selection where f m s enter over time and learn about their productive efficiency as they operate in the market. Those that are relatively more efficient grow and survive, while those who relatively less efficient decline and ultimately exit the industry. Hopenhayn (1992) analyzes the case of individual productivity shocks and their effects on entry, exit and market dynamics in the long-run.

He finds that the steady state equilibrium implies a size distribution of f m s by age cohorts, and proves that the size distribution is stochastically increasing in the age of the cohorts. Jovanovic's model is extended by Ericson and Pakes (1995) who consider two models of firm behaviour, allowing for heterogeneity among firms, idiosyncratic (or firm- specific) sources of uncertainty, and discrete outcomes (exit andlor entry). Broadly speaking, an overview of this literature leads one to think that 'older firms are bigger than younger firms'. An important question to this regard is the following: is moving first a prerequisite (i.e., a necessary condition) for a firm to become larger than its rivals, or is it a sufficient condition?

Here I propose a dynamic oligopoly model under uncertainty generalising some of the aspects treated in Lambertini (2005). Firms enter simultaneously and then compete hierarchically A la Stackelberg, at each instant over an infinite horizon. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, as in Solow's (1956) and Swan's (1956) growth model. At every instant, first the investment levels are chosen, then shocks realize and finally productive capacities are determined as a function of the shocks. Due to the formal properties of the model, the game possesses a unique and time consistent open-loop equilibrium.

The main results are as follows. The relative performance of firms depends on several factors, including the relative size of shocks as well as the relative number of leaders and followers. In particular, if investment costs are negligible, or the variance of the shock affecting the leaders is low, or again firms are subject to a common shock, then the expected profits of the representative leader exceed those of the representative follower.