Redmill / Anderson The Safety of Systems

Proceedings of the Fifteenth Safety-critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK, 13-15 February 2007
1. Auflage 2008
ISBN: 978-1-84628-806-7
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 262 Seiten

The Safety of Systems contains the invited papers presented at the fifteenth annual Safety-critical Systems Symposium, held at Bristol, UK in February 2007. The papers included in this volume cover a broad spectrum of important safety issues. They provide a combination of industrial experience and recent developments, and are presented under a variety of headings.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Redmill, Felix

Anderson, Tom

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;PREFACE;6
2;THE SAFETY- CRITICAL SYSTEMS CLUB;8
2.1;Safety-critical Systems Symposium;8
3;CONTENTS LIST;10
4;Interdependence of Safety and Security;13
4.1;Achieving Safety through Security Management;14
4.1.1;1 Introduction;14
4.1.2;2 General Parallels;15
4.1.3;3 SPECIFIC CONTROLS;20
4.1.4;4 General Conclusions;30
4.2;Towards a Unified Approach to Safety and Security in Automotive Systems;32
4.2.1;1 Introduction;32
4.2.2;2. Description of the Two Approaches;34
4.2.3;3. Merging the Two Approaches;39
4.2.4;4. Conclusion;43
4.3;Dependability-by-Contract;46
4.3.1;1 Introduction;46
4.3.2;2 Dependability Goals;47
4.3.3;3 Dependability Lifecycle;48
4.3.4;4 Practical Examples;58
4.3.5;5 Conclusions;60
5;Demonstrating Safety;64
5.1;Achieving Integrated Process and Product Safety Arguments;66
5.1.1;1 Introduction;66
5.1.2;2 Role of Process Evidence in Safety Arguments;68
5.1.3;3 An Example Product Argument;70
5.1.4;4 An Example Process Argument;72
5.1.5;5 Discussion;76
5.1.6;6 Summary;78
5.2;The Benefits of Electronic Safety Cases;80
5.2.1;1 Introduction;80
5.2.2;2 Making the most of scarce resource;81
5.2.3;3 Knowing when to stop;85
5.2.4;4 Cost- effective exploitation of safety information;88
5.2.5;5 Conclusions;93
5.2.6;6 Acknowledgements;93
5.2.7;7 References;93
6;Safety Management;94
6.1;A Longitudinal Analysis of the Causal Factors in Major Maritime Accidents in the USA and Canada ( 1996- 2006);96
6.1.1;1 Introduction;96
6.1.2;2 Method;98
6.1.3;3 US National Transportation Safety Board Results;101
6.1.4;4 Canadian Transportation Safety Board Results;105
6.1.5;5 Conclusions;111
6.2;A Proactive Approach to Enhancing Safety Culture;116
6.2.1;1 Introduction;117
6.2.2;2 Organisation and Cultural Drivers;118
6.2.3;3 Safety Culture and the Nuclear Industry;118
6.2.4;4 Safety Culture Enhancement Plan;120
6.2.5;5 Nuclear Safety Culture Workshops;121
6.3;Comparing and Contrasting some of the Approaches in UK and USA Safety Assessment Processes.;128
6.3.1;1 Introduction;128
6.3.2;2 Common Definitions or not?;129
6.3.3;3 Comparison of Industry Data;131
6.3.4;4 Value of a Prevented Fatality (VPF);133
6.3.5;5 Safety Planning;135
6.3.6;6 Safety Reporting;137
6.3.7;7 Summary;139
6.3.8;8 References;139
7;Trends in Safety Case Development;142
7.1;Safety Case Composition Using Contracts - Refinements based on Feedback from an Industrial Case Study;144
7.1.1;1 Introduction;144
7.1.2;2 Modular GSN Definition;145
7.1.3;3 Issues of Using Modular GSN Notation;148
7.1.4;4 Issues of Using Safety Case Contract Tables;149
7.1.5;5 lAWG Proposed Implementation of Safety Case Contracts;151
7.1.6;6 Summary;156
7.1.7;7 Acknowledgements;157
7.1.8;8 References;157
7.2;THE SUM OF ITS PARTS;158
7.2.1;Introduction;158
7.2.2;The First Cut;159
7.2.3;Partition by Persistence & Purview;160
7.2.4;A Note on Review and Agreement;162
7.2.5;A Bit More Detail;163
7.2.6;Conclusion;168
8;Lessons in Safety Assessment;172
8.1;Independently Assessing Legacy Safety Systems;174
8.1.1;1 Introduction;174
8.1.2;2 Large-scale and Legacy Engineering Projects;175
8.1.3;3 The Role of the Independent Assessor;176
8.1.4;4 The Benefits of Legacy Systems;178
8.1.5;5 Assessment Challenges;178
8.1.6;6 Lessons;187
8.1.7;7 Conclusions;188
8.1.8;8 References;189
8.2;Safety Assessments of Air Traffic Systems;190
8.2.1;1 Introduction;190
8.2.2;2 Safety Management System Essentials;191
8.2.3;3 Safety Requirements;195
8.2.4;4 Safety Assurance;200
8.2.5;5 The European Interoperability Requirement;203
8.2.6;6 Conclusions;205
8.3;CARA: A Human Reliability Assessment Tool for Air Traffic Safety Management - Technical Basis and Preliminary Architecture;208
8.3.1;1 Introduction;208
8.3.2;2 Background to Human Reliability Assessment;209
8.3.3;3 Current Approaches in Use;215
8.3.4;4 Summary of Lessons from the Evolution of HRA;217
8.3.5;5 ATM HRA Requirements;217
8.3.6;6 Preliminary Outline of CARA;218
8.3.7;7 Conclusion;222
8.3.8;References;223
9;High Integrity from Specification to Code;226
9.1;AMBERS: Improving Requirements Specification Through Assertive Models and SCADE/ DOORS Integration;228
9.1.1;1 Introduction;229
9.1.2;2 AMBERS Methodology;235
9.1.3;3 Door Health Monitored and Control System ( DHMCS) - AMBERS Demonstrator Project;246
9.1.4;4 Conclusion;250
9.1.5;5 References;252
9.2;Formalising C and C++ for Use in High Integrity Systems;254
9.2.1;1 Introduction;254
9.2.2;2 Developing High Integrity Guidance for C++;255
9.2.3;3 Formalising C - the C ^ Subset;263
9.2.4;4 Summary;270
9.2.5;5 References;270