Buch, Englisch, 376 Seiten, Format (B × H): 163 mm x 241 mm, Gewicht: 873 g
Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson
Buch, Englisch, 376 Seiten, Format (B × H): 163 mm x 241 mm, Gewicht: 873 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-926798-9
Verlag: Oxford University Press
An illustrious line-up of seventeen philosophers from the USA, the UK, and Australia present new essays on themes from the work of Frank Jackson, which bridges mind, language, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Central to Jackson's work is an approach to metaphysical issues built on the twin foundations of supervenience and conceptual analysis. In the first part of the book six essays examine this approach and its application to philosophy of mind and philosophy of colour. The second part focuses on Jackson's highly influential work on phenomenal consciousness. The third part is devoted to Jackson's work in ethics, both normative ethics and metaethics. The last three papers discuss Jackson's ground-breaking work on conditionals. The final section of the book comprises a substantial essay by Jackson in reply to his critics: this offers some of the clearest expressions of the ideas which Jackson has brought to the fore in philosophy.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
- Part 1: Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis
- 1: Simon Blackburn: Analysis, description and the a priori?
- 2: Jennifer Hornsby: Physicalism, conceptual analysis and acts of faith
- 3: William G. Lycan: Serious metaphysics: Frank Jackson's defense of conceptual analysis
- 4: Laura Schroeter and John Bigelow: Jackson's classical model of meaning
- 5: Huw Price: The semantic foundations of metaphysics
- 6: Peter Menzies: The folk theory of colours and the causes of colour experience
- Part 2: The Knowledge Argument
- 7: Philip Pettit: Consciousness and the frustrations of physicalism
- 8: Robert Van Gulick: Jackson's change of mind: representationalism, a priorism and the knowledge argument
- Part 3: Ethics
- 9: Terrence Horgan and Mark Timmons: Analytic moral functionalism meets moral twin earth
- 10: Michael Smith: Consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection
- 11: Julia Driver: The 'actual' in actualism
- Part 4: Conditionals and the Purposes of Arguing
- 12: Dorothy Edgington: Conditionals, truth and assertion
- 13: Graham Priest: Conditionals: A debate with Jackson
- 14: Martin Davies: Two purposes of arguing and two epistemic projects
- Replies to my critics
