E-Book, Englisch, 180 Seiten
Potrc / Strahovnik Practical Contexts
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032086-2
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
E-Book, Englisch, 180 Seiten
ISBN: 978-3-11-032086-2
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
The thought and the findings of moral particularism are extended to contextualism. Moral particularism asserts that reasons for moral actions are not governed by general principles, but by a mixture of situation bound deliberation and values. Particularism was established in the area of moral philosophy and its main results include delimitation with various forms of moral generalism. Many insights were accumulated along the way. The book claims that a serious contextualist approach needs to embrace particularist normativity. Thesis is then applied to the traditional areas of philosophy such as semantics, epistemology and ontology. This makes it possible to ask questions about the positive and not just negative story and about the wider impact of particularism. The book is an attempt of such a positive story. Foundations are laid for an exciting new field of research in the main systematic branches of philosophy, urging you to rethink the normative basis of semantics, epistemology and metaphysics, in their interweaving with moral thought. The importance of narration and of phenomenology is stressed for these areas.
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Weitere Infos & Material
1;Foreword;9
2;I.POSITIVE AND WIDE IMPACT OF PARTICULARISM;11
2.1;Delineating Moral Particularism;12
2.2;The Lessons and Morals of Moral Particularism;17
2.3;Wider Positive Project;19
2.4;Particularism and Metaphysics13;22
3;II.PRACTICAL CONTEXTS;25
3.1;Particularism and Context;26
3.2;Why Contexts would Figure as Reasons for Action?;29
3.3;Humeans: Beliefs and desires lead to action, desires dominating beliefs.;34
3.4;Dancy’s Pure Cognitivism Thesis: Belief dominate desires as reasonsfor action. Beliefs are more objective than desires.;35
3.5;Practical Reality;37
3.6;Practical Contexts: contexts have normative authority as reasons.;40
3.7;Objection Considered and Some Further Matters;42
4;III.PARTICULARISM AND PRODUCTIVITY ARGUMENT;47
4.1;Patterns;48
4.2;Systematizing of Lists: by General Principles?;52
4.3;Arbitrariness and the Weirdly Blinking Machine;55
4.4;Productivity Argument;57
4.5;Dynamical Cognition33 Based Judgments Assure Relevance upon anIntractable Basis;61
4.6;Some Further Remarks and Objections;61
5;IV.THE HEART OF KNOWLEDGE35;63
5.1;Reasons and Knowledge;64
5.2;Knowledge as Justified True Belief;69
5.3;Contextualism and the Elusiveness of Knowledge;77
5.4;No Justification and Rules of Relevance;83
5.5;Particularist Justification in Context;88
6;V.NARRATION;93
6.1;What is Narration?;93
6.2;The Role of Explanation;94
6.3;Narrative Explanation;98
6.4;Narration and Relevance;101
7;VI.PARTICULARIST COMPOSITIONALITY;103
7.1;Presuppositions of the Classicist View of Compositionality;103
7.2;Where Classicism Goes Wrong;105
7.3;The Possibility of the Particularist Non-Arbitrariness of Composition;108
7.4;More on FPCD;116
7.5;A Particularist Methodological Remark on HT Approach;121
8;VII.DYNAMICAL COGNITION;125
8.1;Classical Cognitive Science and Marr’s Three Levels of Cognitive System’sDescription;126
8.2;Connectionism;127
8.3;Dynamical Cognition and Morphological Content;130
8.4;The Case of Epistemic Normativity;134
8.5;Conclusion;135
9;VIII.PHENOMENOLOGY OF OBJECT CONSTITUTION;139
9.1;The Constitution of Ordinary Objects;140
9.2;How do Metaphysicians Usually Present the Constitution of Objects?;142
9.3;Generalist Problems with Ordinary Objects;144
9.4;Particularistic Object Constitution;149
10;IX.THE HEART OF EXISTENCE;153
10.1;Pascal’s Distinction, Ontology and Normativity;153
10.2;Monistic Metaphysics;159
10.3;Problems of Normative Conditions in Metaphysics;162
10.4;Ultimate and Regional Ontology;165
10.5;Holistic and Rich Regional Ontology;172
10.6;Conclusion;173
11;References;175