A Philosophical Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism

A Philosophical Perspective
1. Auflage 2022
ISBN: 978-0-367-53974-0
Verlag: Taylor & Francis

Buch, Englisch, 236 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 335 g

Reihe: Advances in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

Philosophers have long debated whether morality is objective. But how do lay people think about this matter? A Philosophical Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism discusses the philosophical aspects of this question in an accessible, integrated and coherent way.

The first part argues that many empirical studies have been unsuccessful in fully or exclusively measuring beliefs about moral objectivity. Still, there are a few lessons that can be drawn from them. Most importantly, lay people are not objectivists. They believe that moral statements only express desires or that their truth is relative to individuals or cultures. The book’s second part considers ways in which these empirical findings may help assess philosophical theories about moral objectivity. Overall, findings about people’s moral objectivity beliefs suggest that morality is not objective. The truth of the matter may even lie beyond the traditional objectivism/non-objectivism dichotomy.

This book develops a unique perspective on a thriving new area of research. It is a valuable resource for upper level undergraduates, postgraduates and researchers in moral psychology, theoretical psychology, experimental philosophy, metaethics and philosophy of the mind.

Zielgruppe

Postgraduate and Undergraduate Advanced

Autoren/Hrsg.

Pölzler, Thomas

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologie / Allgemeines & Theorie Psychologie: Allgemeines

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction Part I: Empirical Research 2. The Methodology of Research on Moral Objectivity Beliefs 3. The Content of Moral Objectivity Beliefs 4. The Correlates of Moral Objectivity Beliefs 5. The Causes and Consequences of Moral Objectivity Beliefs Part II: Philosophical Implications 6. The Presumptive Argument for Objectivism 7. The Debunking Argument for Non-Objectivism/Skepticism 8. The Conceptual Argument for Objectivism/Error Theory 9. Some Further Arguments 10. Conclusion

Über Autor(innen)

Thomas Pölzler is a researcher and lecturer at the Philosophy Department of the University of Graz, Austria. He mainly works on moral psychology and metaethics. Among his many publications are Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences (Routledge, 2018) as well as articles in journals such as Synthese, Inquiry and Review of Philosophy and Psychology.