Ploeg / de Zeeuw Dynamic Policy Games in Economics

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9485-8
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 181, 348 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Contributions to Economic Analysis

The aim of this volume is to consider intertemporal and strategic issues in the formulation of economic policy so that dynamic game methodology is appropriate. When changes in economic policy are evaluated the reactions and expectations of other economic agents cannot be ignored, and in a dynamic setting issues like time inconsistency, subgame perfectness, reputation and information become important.The papers contained in this volume are the revised versions of those presented at a conference held in 1988 at Tilburg University, The Netherlands. They include methodological contributions and strategic analyses of macroeconomic policy, resource economics, international policy coordination and the arms race.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Ploeg, F. van der

de Zeeuw, A. J.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Dynamic Policy Games in Economics: Essays in Honour of Piet Verheyen;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;14
5;Introduction to the series;6
6;Foreword;8
7;Preface;10
8;List of Participants;12
9;CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION;20
9.1;References;26
10;CHAPTER 2. TIME CONSISTENCY AND ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIA IN NON-COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAMES;28
10.1;Introduction;28
10.2;1. Time Consistency and Robustness In Single-agent Dynamic Optimisation;30
10.3;2. Non-cooperativeNash Equilibria in Dynamic Games;51
10.4;3. Stackelberg Equilibria in Dynamic Games;63
10.5;4. Time Consistency in Continuous-time Systems;65
10.6;5. Concluding Remarks;68
10.7;Acronyms;69
10.8;Notes;69
10.9;References;71
11;CHAPTER 3. SELF-ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS IN AN N-PLAYER DYNAMIC GAME;74
11.1;Introduction;74
11.2;1. Notation and Definitions;77
11.3;2. Coalition-proof Nash Equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston I987);77
11.4;3. The Communications Game;79
11.5;4. Acceptable Nash Equilibria;81
11.6;5. Time Consistency and Other Dynamic Aspects;84
11.7;6. Concluding Remark;89
11.8;Notes;89
11.9;References;90
12;CHAPTER 4. A DYNAMIC HEURISTIC GAME THEORY MODEL OF AN ARMS RACE;92
12.1;1. Arms Race Models versus Defence Decision-making;92
12.2;2. The Arms Race;94
12.3;3. Heuristic Decision Rules;95
12.4;4. Planning and Revisions in Plans;98
12.5;5. Sequence of Heuristic Games: the Case of Certainty;100
12.6;6. The Case of Uncertainty;102
12.7;7. Conclusions;104
12.8;Notes;105
12.9;References;107
13;CHAPTER 5. CONFLICT OVER ARMS ACCUMULATION IN MARKET AND COMMAND ECONOMIES;110
13.1;Introduction;110
13.2;1. Optimal Dynamic Taxation and the Provision of Arms in a Market-oriented Economy;113
13.3;2. The 'Guns versus Butter' Dilemma in a Command Economy;118
13.4;3. Cooperative Behaviour;120
13.5;4. Competitive Behaviour and the Arms Race;121
13.6;5. Consequences of Non-separable Preferences;129
13.7;6. Concluding Remarks;134
13.8;Note;136
13.9;References;137
14;CHAPTER 6. ON GAMES OF CAKE-EATING;140
14.1;Introduction;140
14.2;1. The Quality of Existence: Our Personal View;142
14.3;2. Model Description;149
14.4;3. Constant-elastic Utility and Linear Strategy;155
14.5;4. Share-preservation Strategies;164
14.6;5. On Robustness;167
14.7;6. Remarks on Information Structure;170
14.8;7. Conclusion;171
14.9;Note;171
14.10;References;171
15;CHAPTER 7. GAINS AND LOSSES FRON CARTELISATION IN MARKETS FOR EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES IN THE ABSENCE OF BINDING FUTURE CONTRACTS;176
15.1;Introduction;176
15.2;1. The Model and Equilibrium for Case 1 - Cartel Firms Cooperate and Binding Sales Contracts;179
15.3;2. The Equilibrium for Case 2 - Cartel Firms Cooperate and No Binding Sales Contracts;183
15.4;3. The Solution for Case 3 - Cartel Firms Non-cooperative and Binding Sales Contracts;187
15.5;4. The Solution for Case 4 - Cartel Firms Non-cooperative and No Binding Sales Contracts;191
15.6;5. Comparison of the Solutions in the Four Cases;196
15.7;6. Conclusions;199
15.8;Notes;201
15.9;References;202
15.10;Appendix: Proofs of Some Propositions;204
16;CHAPTER 8. STRATEGIC WAGES POLICY AND THE GAINS FROM COOPERATION;210
16.1;Introduction;210
16.2;1. The World Economy;211
16.3;2. Strategic Wage Indexation under Flexible Exchange Rates;215
16.4;3. Optimal Strategic Wage Indexation under Fixed Exchange Rates;226
16.5;4. Numerical Analysis;231
16.6;5. Monetary Policy as an Alternative;236
16.7;6. Conclusion;237
16.8;Notes;238
16.9;References;240
17;CHAPTER 9. OPTIMAL CHOICE OF MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN A SIMPLE TWO-COUNTRY GAME;242
17.1;Introduction;242
17.2;1. The Honey Supply versus the Interest Rate;244
17.3;2. The Great Multiplicity of Potential Nash Solutions and Its Consequences;251
17.4;3. Reducing the Multiplicity of Solutions;252
17.5;Notes;255
17.6;References;258
18;CHAPTER 10. SERVICING THE PUBLIC DEBT: THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS;260
18.1;Introduction;260
18.2;1. Debt Repudiation;263
18.3;2. Noney and Non-indexed Debt;269
18.4;3. International Debt: a Short Detour;277
18.5;4. Concluding Remarks;278
18.6;Notes;280
18.7;References;283
19;CHAPTER 11. MONETARY POLICY IN MODELS WITH CAPITAL;286
19.1;Introduction;286
19.2;1. Time Inconsistency and Monetary Policy;288
19.3;2. Industry Equilibrium with Tax Policy;292
19.4;3. Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium with Government Policy;296
19.5;4. Optimising Government;301
19.6;5. Conclusion;304
19.7;Notes;305
19.8;References;306
20;CHAPTER 12. MACROECONOMIC POLICY GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME EXTENSIONS;308
20.1;Introduction;308
20.2;1. Differing Tastes: Two Types, Many Strategies;312
20.3;2. Many Types;321
20.4;3. Exogenous Uncertainty;326
20.5;4. Conclusions;334
20.6;Note;337
20.7;References;337
20.8;Appendix;338
21;INDEX;342