Buch, Englisch, 338 Seiten, Format (B × H): 170 mm x 244 mm, Gewicht: 615 g
Reihe: Microeconomic Studies
Buch, Englisch, 338 Seiten, Format (B × H): 170 mm x 244 mm, Gewicht: 615 g
Reihe: Microeconomic Studies
ISBN: 978-3-642-46767-7
Verlag: Springer
The use of environmental resources involves strategic be-
havior of self-interested agents, bargaining, cooperation
and other efforts to provokeor settle conflicts. In order
to model conflicts and cooperation in managingthese
resources most papers contained in the book make use of
advanced game theoretic concepts. The first six
contributions investigate conceptual issues of international
conflicts and cooperation while the other four address
conflicts and cooperation arising in the context of
monitoring and enforcing environmental controls. The
emphasis is on demonstrating how new developments in
economic (game) theory can fruitfully be applied to
important environmental issues. Descriptive as well as
normative approaches are presented. In the context of
international environmental problems attention is focused on
the consequences of non-cooperative behavior and on the
incentives for, and barrieres to, the emergence of
cooperation. Incomplete implementation of environmental
controls can be attributed, to some extent, to failures of
monitoring and enforcement which, in turn, raises the issue
of designing institutional arrangements allowing for (more)
effective enforcement. Students and researchers with a
working knowledge of economic theory can expect to learn
how complex issues of economic-environmental interaction are
successfully tackled by advanced (game) theoretic methods.
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
Editor’s Introduction.- Editor’s Introduction.- 1: International Dimensions.- 1 International Environmental Agreements as Games.- 2 Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions.- 3 Critical Loads and International Environmental Cooperation.- 4 Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitment.- 5 The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade.- 6 Economic Models of Optimal Energy Use under Global Environmental Constraints.- 2: Monitoring and Enforcement.- 7 Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the United States.- 8 The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality — An Application of Principal Agent Theory.- 9 Monitoring the Emission of Pollutants by Means of the Inspector Leadership Method.- 10 Illegal Pollution and Monitoring of Unknown Quality — A Signaling Game Approach —.
