Persons, Moral Worth, and Embryos

A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments
2011
ISBN: 978-94-007-3659-7
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, 286 Seiten, Previously published in hardcover, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 458 g

Reihe: Philosophy and Medicine

“Bioethicists have achieved consensus on two ideas pertaining to beginning of life issues: (1) persons are those beings capable of higher-order cognition, or self-consciousness, and (2) it is impermissible to kill only persons. As a consequence, a consensus is reached regarding the permissibility of both destroying human embryos for research purposes and abortion. The present collection aims to interact critically with this consensus. Authors address various aspects of this ‘orthodoxy’. Issues discussed include: theories of personhood and in particular the role of thought experiments used in support of such theories; the notion of an intrinsic potential and the moral relevance of having one; new formulations of the virtue argument against abortion rights; four-dimensionalism and abortion; the notion of moral status and who (or what) has it; scientific accounts of what a human being is, as well as addressing empirical evidence of fetal consciousness; and analysis of the public policy implications given the epistemic status of pro-choice arguments. Given the issues discussed and that the arguments in critical focus are fairly new, the collection provides a novel, comprehensive, and rigorous analysis of contemporary pro-choice arguments.”

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Napier, Stephen

Fachgebiete

• Medizin | Veterinärmedizin Medizin | Public Health | Pharmazie | Zahnmedizin Medizin, Gesundheitswesen Medizinische Ethik
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Angewandte Ethik & Soziale Verantwortung Medizinische Ethik
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Angewandte Ethik & Soziale Verantwortung Bioethik, Tierethik
• Naturwissenschaften Biowissenschaften Biowissenschaften Bioethik, Tierethik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

 Introduction: What are Persons? What is Valuable?
     Stephen Napier

Part 1. Philosophical Considerations

 I was Once a Fetus: That is Why Abortion is Wrong   
Alexander Pruss

 Brain Life and the Argument from Potential: Affirming the Ontological Status of Human Embryos and Fetuses,
 Jason T. Eberl and Brandon P. Brown

The Human Being, a Person of Substance: A Response to Dean Stretton, Francis J. Beckwith

The Concept of Person in Bioethics, Anselm Winfried Müller

 Abortion and Virtue Ethics Mathew Lu

 Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism, and Moral Status, David Hershenov

 The Christian Hypothesis, David W. Fagerberg

 Fetal Interests, Fetal Persons, and Human Goods, Christopher Tollefsen

Part 2. Scientific Considerations

 Fetal Pains and Fetal Brains, A.A. Howsepian

 A Biological Definition of the Human Embryo,
 Maureen L. Condic

Part 3. Perspectives from Law and Political Philosophy

 Public Reason and Abortion Revisited, David Thunder

Sexual Markets and the Law, Helen M. Alvaré

Index