Buch, Englisch, 75 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 290 g
Buch, Englisch, 75 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 290 g
Reihe: Elements in Philosophy of Mind
ISBN: 978-1-009-46227-3
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Is consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. This Element will introduce the main non-physicalist theories of consciousness and explain the most important arguments for them, and consider how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
Introduction: 1. Consciousness and physicalism; 2. Dualism; 3. Subjective idealism and phenomenalism; 4. Dual-aspect monism (or panpsychism and panprotopsychism); Conclusion-with a word on mysterianism; References.
