Milgrom Discovering Prices

Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints
1. Auflage 2017
ISBN: 978-0-231-54457-3
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 248 Seiten

Reihe: Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series

Paul Milgrom describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations. Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for solving complex resource allocation problems.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Milgrom, Paul

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftssysteme, Wirtschaftsstrukturen
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Wirtschaftsmathematik und -statistik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface
1. Introduction
2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability
3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution
4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes
5. Conclusion
Notes
References
Index

Über Autor(innen)

Paul Milgrom is the Shirley and Leonard Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. His books include Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004) and Economics, Organization, and Management (1992). He has also written dozens of articles on auction design, game theory, and macro- and microeconomics.