Merrill Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic

Course Book
ISBN: 978-1-4008-5950-4
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 912, 172 Seiten

Reihe: Princeton Legacy Library

No detailed description available for "Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic".

Autoren/Hrsg.

Merrill, Samuel

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Studien zu einzelnen Ländern und Gebieten
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Zentralregierung

Inhaltsverzeichnis

FrontMatter, pg. i
CONTENTS, pg. vii
LIST OF FIGURES, pg. xi
LIST OF TABLES, pg. xiii
PREFACE, pg. xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, pg. xix
CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner, pg. 1
CHAPTER 2. Condorcet Efficiency, pg. 15
CHAPTER 3. Social-Utility Efficiency, pg. 30
CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Alternative Spatial Models on Condorcet and Social-Utility Efficiency, pg. 38
CHAPTER 5. Strategic Voting under Plurality Electoral Systems: Decisions under Uncertainty and under Risk, pg. 47
CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency, pg. 64
CHAPTER 7. Strategic Voting for Approval Balloting under Alternative Decision Rules, pg. 79
CHAPTER 8. Empirical Estimates for Single-Vote Plurality and Approval Voting, pg. 89
CHAPTER 9. Other Criteria for Assessing Voting Systems, pg. 96
CHAPTER 10. Conclusions, pg. 104
APPENDIX A. A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency, pg. 109
APPENDIX B. Justification of the Shepsle Utility Function, pg. 114
APPENDIX C. Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, pg. 117
APPENDIX D. Simulation Results for Approval Balloting with Alternative Decision Rules, pg. 121
APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies, pg. 125
APPENDIX F. Derivation of the Standard-Score Voting System, pg. 130
GLOSSARY, pg. 133
BIBLIOGRAPHY, pg. 139
INDEX, pg. 145