Meixner Defending Husserl

In the Case of Wittgenstein & Company versus Phenomenology
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-3-11-034253-6
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 529 Seiten

Reihe: ISSN

The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and other authors, reconstructing their arguments, and pointing out where they fall short of their aim. In defending Husserl against his Wittgensteinian critics, the book also offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind. In particular, Husserl’s non-representationalist theory of intentionality is carefully described in its various aspects and elucidated also with respect to its development, taking into account writings from various periods of Husserl’s career. Last but not least, the book shows Wittgensteinianism to be one of the effective roots of the present-day hegemony of physicalism.

Zielgruppe

Academics, Libraries, Institutes

Autoren/Hrsg.

Meixner, Uwe

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Phänomenologie
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface: What is at Issue?;9
2;Remarks on the Method and the Manner of this Book;16
3;Chapter I: On Imagining;21
3.1;I.1 Ryle on imagining;22
3.2;I.2 Dennett (and Ryle) on imagining;31
3.3;I.3 Bennett&Hacker on imagining;40
3.4;I.4 Husserl on imagining;54
3.5;I.5 Wittgenstein (in contrast to Husserl) on imagining;79
3.6;Appendix to Chapter I: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter I, and remarks on matters of translation;110
4;Chapter II: On Knowing the Inward Mental Life;123
4.1;II.1 Against privatism and eliminativism;123
4.2;II.2 Subjective and intersubjective knowledge of the inward mental life;136
4.2.1;II.2.1 Ryle and Wittgenstein against introspection (reflexive experience);140
4.2.2;II.2.2 Wittgenstein’s argument against knowledge of the inward mental life;169
4.2.3;II.2.3 Wittgenstein and Gorgias;185
4.3;II.3 The true nature of consciousness, and its true epistemological consequences;192
4.3.1;II.3.1 The root of Wittgensteinianism;220
4.3.2;II.3.2 Knowing one’s own mind and the minds of others;229
4.4;II.4 Coda: the second-person point of view;239
4.5;Appendix to Chapter II: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter II, and remarks on matters of translation;246
5;Chapter III: On Intending;267
5.1;III.1 A prologue: epoché;267
5.2;III.2 Technical intentionality-predicates;268
5.3;III.3 The great divide in intentionality theory – first part: Ryle (and Wittgenstein) versus Husserl;271
5.3.1;III.3.1 Rylean Husserl and non-Rylean Husserl;286
5.3.2;III.3.2 Does Husserl’s theory of intentionality lead to idealism?;299
5.4;III.4 The great divide in intentionality theory – second part: Wittgenstein versus Husserl;310
5.4.1;III.4.1 In corroboration of the thesis that Wittgenstein is an intentionality nihilist;326
5.5;III.5 Dennett’s nihilism regarding intentionality;335
5.6;III.6 Bennett&Hacker’s nihilism regarding intentionality;345
5.7;III.7 The Wittgenstein-syndrome in the theory of intentionality;351
5.8;III.8 Wittgenstein’s profundity;367
5.9;Appendix to Chapter III: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter III, and remarks on matters of translation;371
6;Chapter IV: On the Literature;381
6.1;IV.1 Husserl without introspection?;381
6.2;IV.2 On the difficulty of saying the phenomenological truth in the best possible way;394
6.2.1;IV.2.1 Thompson on reflexive (or reflective) experience, inner experience, introspection;394
6.2.2;IV.2.2 Thompson on representationalism;405
6.2.3;IV.2.3 Thompson on imagining;409
6.3;IV.3 Was Husserl an externalist?;416
6.4;IV.4 Husserl’s theory of intentionality misinterpreted;439
6.4.1;IV.4.1 The Bell does not toll for Husserl’s theory of intentionality;454
6.5;IV.5 Four views of a Wittgensteinian;464
6.5.1;IV.5.1 The first view (concerning introspection);464
6.5.2;IV.5.2 The second view (concerning Anscombe’s mistranslation of “Vorstellung” and, allegedly, of “Bild”);467
6.5.3;IV.5.3 The third view (concerning the intentionality of imaginings;470
6.5.4;IV.5.4 The fourth view (concerning the ontological and epistemological status of imaginings);474
6.6;IV.6 Among the blind, the one-eyed is king;480
6.7;IV.7 Referentialism and anti-referentialism;486
6.8;IV.8 Husserl and the Clash of the Four Giants;490
6.9;Appendix to Chapter IV: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter IV, and remarks on matters of translation;503
7;Bibliography;513
8;Index of labelled quotations from Bennett&Hacker, Dennett, Husserl, Ryle, and Wittgenstein;520
9;Index of other quoted authors;527

Über Autor(innen)

Uwe Meixner, Universität Augsburg.

Uwe Meixner, Universität Augsburg.