Buch, Englisch, 832 Seiten, Format (B × H): 170 mm x 244 mm, Gewicht: 1406 g
Buch, Englisch, 832 Seiten, Format (B × H): 170 mm x 244 mm, Gewicht: 1406 g
Reihe: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy
ISBN: 978-0-19-959631-7
Verlag: OUP Oxford
Guides the reader through the latest research on the mind
Brilliant essays from an eminent team of international contributors
Broad and deep coverage of the subject
Strong connections to scientific work on the mind
The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind.
An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: ist ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory, imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of one's own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind will be an invaluable resource for advanced students and scholars of philosophy, and also for researchers in neighbouring disciplines seeking a high-level survey of the state of the art in this flourishing field.
Zielgruppe
Students and scholars of philosophy
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
I. The Place of Mind in Nature
1: Jaegwon Kim: Mental Causation
2: David Papineau: The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
3: E. J. Lowe: Dualism
4: Sven Walters: Epiphenomenalism
5: Julie Yoo: Anomalous Monism
6: Lynne Rudder Baker: Nonreductive Materialsim
7: Robert Van Gulick: Functionalism
8: Ansgar Beckermann: What Is Property Physicalism?
9: Barbara Montero: What Is the Physical?
10: Howard Robinson: Idealism
11: William Seager: Panpsychism
II. The Nature of Consciousness and The Place of Consciousnes in Nature
12: John Perry: Subjectivity
13: David Rosenthal: Higher-order Theories of Consciousness
14: Michael Tye: Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
15: Alex Byrne: Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities
16: Joseph Levine: The Explanatory Gap
17: Kati Balog: Phenomenal Concepts
18: David Chalmers: The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
III. Intentionality and Theories of Mental Content
19: Daniel Dennett: Intentional Systems Theory
20: Frances Egan: Wide Content
21: Gabriel Segal: Narrow Content
22: Fred Dretske: Information-theoretic Semantics
23: Ruth Millikan: Biosemantics
24: Robert Matthews: A Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes
25: Ralph Wedgwood: The Normativity of the Intentional
26: Christopher Peacocke: Concepts and Possession Conditions
27: Jose Bermudez: The Distinction between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
28: Tim Crane: Intentionalism
29: Michelle Montague: The Content of Perceptual Experience
30: George Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson: Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
IV. Self, Unity of Consciousness, and Personal Identity
31: Galen Strawson: Selves
32: Paul Raymont and Andy Brook: Unity of Consciousness
33: Tamar Gendler: Personal Identity and Metaphysics
V. Variety of Mental Abilities
34: Colin McGinn: Imagination
35: Louise Antony: Thinking
36: John Heil: Language and Thought
37: John Campbell: Consciousness and Reference
38: Krista Lawlor: Memory
39: Jesse Prinz: Emotions: Motivating Feelings
40: Alfred Mele: Intention and Intentional Action
VI. Epistemic Issues
41: Adam Morton: Folk Psychology
42: Anita Avramides: Other Minds
43: Cynthia Macdonald: Introspection
44: Jessica Brown: Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge
45: Kent Bach: Self-deception