Nomocratic Pluralism

Plural Values, Negative Liberty, and the Rule of Law
1. Auflage 2021
ISBN: 978-3-030-53389-2
Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Buch, Englisch, 214 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 216 mm, Gewicht: 413 g

Reihe: Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism

This book is a contribution to the ongoing conversation about value pluralism and its relation to political life. Its uniqueness lies in its insistence that the acceptance of value pluralism involves placing certain limitations on what is an acceptable form of government and what functions governments ought to be legitimately performing. In a new approach coined “nomocratic pluralism,” this volume argues that liberty under the rule of law, which is not merely liberty where the law is silent, is a key concept of liberty and cannot be subsumed by the other primary implications of the acceptance of value pluralism: that political communities must reject positive liberty as a political value, and place a high, but not absolute, priority on negative liberty as a political value. The concept of liberty under the rule of law is particularly suited to accommodate a great variety of individual and group conceptions of value and the moral good, and thus, along with negative liberty, should be a primary value for those who accept value pluralism.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Mcintyre, Kenneth B.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Staats- und Regierungsformen, Staatslehre
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1) Introduction (Chapter 1)
2) Pluralism (Section One)

a) Epistemological pluralism (Chapter 2)

i) Modality distinctions

ii) Logical category distinctions

b) Value pluralism

i) Critique of monism (Chapter 3)

ii) Incompatibility of values/value systems (Chapter 4)

iii) Incommensurability of values/value systems (Chapter 5)

iv) Practical Reason and Moral Choices (Chapter 6)

3) Liberalism and Pluralism (Section Two)

a) Pluralist liberalism—Berlin, Hampshire, et al. (Chapter 7)

(1) Negative liberty as one value among many

(2) Positive liberty not really liberty

b) Modus Vivendi liberalism—Gray, McCabe, et al. (Chapter 8)

(1) Negative liberty not necessarily important

(2) Positive liberty not necessarily important

c) Nomocratic liberalism—(Chapter 9)

(1) Negative liberty as primary value

(2) Positive liberty not really liberty; dangerous to negative liberty and to liberty under rule of law

(3) Liberty under rule of law as third concept of liberty

(4) Toleration as primary political virtue—toleration as putting up with something which find distasteful, not as approbation

d) Further implications—(Chapter 10)

i) The place and character of politics in a nomocratic state

ii) Dealing with monistic individuals and groups in a pluralist society

iii) Value pluralism, Nomocratic liberalism, and international relations

4) Conclusion (Chapter 11)

Über Autor(innen)

Kenneth B. McIntyre is Professor of Political Science at Sam Houston State University, USA. His other books include The Limits of Political Theory (2004), Herbert Butterfield (2011), and Critics of Enlightenment Rationalism (2020).