Maaser Decision-Making in Committees

Game-Theoretic Analysis
2010
ISBN: 978-3-642-04153-2
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 635, 126 Seiten

Reihe: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Maaser, Nicola Friederike

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgments;5
2;Contents;6
3;Introduction;8
4;1 Games and Political Decisions;19
4.1;1.1 Basic Concepts;20
4.1.1;1.1.1 The Characteristic Function;21
4.1.2;1.1.2 Simple Games;24
4.1.3;1.1.3 Spatial Analysis;30
4.2;1.2 Voting Rules and Power;34
4.2.1;1.2.1 Power Indices;34
4.2.2;1.2.2 Bargaining Power;43
4.2.3;1.2.3 Power Measurement and Spatial Voting;47
4.3;1.3 Voting Rules and Payoffs;53
5;2 Committees as Representative Institutions;59
5.1;2.1 Criteria for Representative Committees;60
5.2;2.2 The Model;64
5.3;2.3 Analytic Arguments;68
5.4;2.4 Simulation Results;73
5.4.1;2.4.1 Randomly Generated Configurations;75
5.4.2;2.4.2 EU Council of Ministers;79
5.4.3;2.4.3 US Electoral College;82
5.5;2.5 Discussion;83
6;3 Robust Equal Representation;86
6.1;3.1 Simple and Sophisticated Square Root Rules;87
6.2;3.2 Quota Variation;91
6.2.1;3.2.1 The `Optimal' Quota;91
6.2.2;3.2.2 Supermajorities and Representation;93
6.2.2.1;3.2.2.1 Randomly Generated Configurations;94
6.2.2.2;3.2.2.2 EU Council of Ministers;97
6.3;3.3 Heterogeneity Across Constituencies;98
6.4;3.4 Discussion;107
7;4 Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation;111
7.1;4.1 Motivation;112
7.2;4.2 The Model;115
7.2.1;4.2.1 The Legislature;115
7.2.2;4.2.2 The Lobbyists' Game;117
7.3;4.3 Analysis of the Model;119
7.3.1;4.3.1 Legislative Decision-Making Without Lobbyists;119
7.3.2;4.3.2 Lobbyists' Contributions;120
7.3.3;4.3.3 Cartel Formation and Small Status Quo Bias;121
7.3.4;4.3.4 Cartel Formation and Large Status Quo Bias;124
7.4;4.4 Discussion;129
8;References;134