Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 575 g
New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion
Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 575 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-966002-5
Verlag: Oxford University Press(UK)
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organize the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate assertion? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on epistemic norms, the time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the interconnections among our three questions. That is precisely what this volume seeks to do.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Religionsphilosophie, Philosophische Theologie
- Geisteswissenschaften Religionswissenschaft Religionswissenschaft Allgemein Religionsphilosophie, Philosophische Theologie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
Weitere Infos & Material
- Introduction
- 1: Berit Brogaard: Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm
- 2: E. J. Coffman: Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability
- 3: Juan Comesaña and Matthew McGrath: Having False Reasons
- 4: Jonathan Dancy: On Knowing One's Reason
- 5: John Gibbons: Knowledge versus Truth
- 6: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Epistemic Normativity
- 7: Clayton Littlejohn: The Unity of Reason
- 8: Duncan Pritchard: Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion
- 9: Ernest Sosa: Epistemic Agency and Judgment
- 10: John Turri: You Gotta Believe
- 11: Matt Weiner: The Spectra of Epistemic Norms
- 12: Daniel Whiting: Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action
- 13: Sarah Wright: The Dual-Aspect Norms of Belief and Assertion: A Virtue Approach to Epistemic Norms
- Index




