Levin Games, Groups, and the Global Good

2009
ISBN: 978-3-540-85436-4
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 283 Seiten

Reihe: Springer Series in Game Theory

How do groups form, how do institutions come into being, and when do moral norms and practices emerge? This volume explores how game-theoretic approaches can be extended to consider broader questions that cross scales of organization, from individuals to cooperatives to societies. Game theory' strategic formulation of central problems in the analysis of social interactions is used to develop multi-level theories that examine the interplay between individuals and the collectives they form. The concept of cooperation is examined at a higher level than that usually addressed by game theory, especially focusing on the formation of groups and the role of social norms in maintaining their integrity, with positive and negative implications. The authors suggest that conventional analyses need to be broadened to explain how heuristics, like concepts of fairness, arise and become formalized into the ethical principles embraced by a society.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Levin, Simon A.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;5
2;Foreword;7
3;Contents;12
4;Contributors;14
5;Part I The Evolution of Cooperation at the Level of Individuals;16
5.1;Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion;17
5.1.1;1 Introduction;17
5.1.2;2 Scope;19
5.1.3;3 Evolutionary Dynamics;20
5.1.4;4 Biological History;30
5.1.5;5 Historical Analogy;48
5.1.6;6 Historical Consequence;50
5.1.7;References;52
5.2;How to Evolve Cooperation;55
5.2.1;1 Introduction;55
5.2.2;2 Evolutionary Game Dynamics;57
5.2.3;3 Direct Reciprocity;58
5.2.4;4 Indirect Reciprocity;59
5.2.5;5 Kin Selection;60
5.2.6;6 Group Selection;62
5.2.7;7 Graph Selection;64
5.2.8;8 Conclusion;65
5.2.9;References;67
5.3;Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest: Social Norms, Other-Regarding Preferences, and Cooperative Behavior;71
5.3.1;1 Introduction;71
5.3.2;2 Folk Theorems and Evolutionary Dynamics;73
5.3.3;3 Dynamically Irrelevant Equilibria;76
5.3.4;4 Social Norms in the Public Goods Game;77
5.3.5;5 Directed Punishment;80
5.3.6;6 Altruistic Punishing in the Public Goods Game;81
5.3.7;7 The Evolutionary Emergence and Stability of Altruistic Punishment;82
5.3.8;8 Conclusion: The Missing Choreographer;87
5.3.9;References;90
5.4;Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games;93
5.4.1;References;98
5.5;Public Good Games with Incentives: The Role of Reputation;99
5.5.1;1 A Philosophical Entente Cordiale;99
5.5.2;2 Public Goods and Private Incentives;100
5.5.3;3 The Mini-Trust Game;101
5.5.4;4 The Dynamics of Two-Role Games;102
5.5.5;5 Staying in the Saddle;103
5.5.6;6 Farewell to Trust;104
5.5.7;7 Ultimate Offers;105
5.5.8;8 Bifurcation Through Reputation;107
5.5.9;9 Public Goods with Punishment;108
5.5.10;10 Dynamics with Reputation;109
5.5.11;11 Revealing Errors;110
5.5.12;12 Public Goods with Rewards;111
5.5.13;13 Larger Groups;113
5.5.14;14 Discussion;114
5.5.15;References;116
5.6;Groups and Networks: Their Role in the Evolution of Cooperation;118
5.6.1;1 Groups and Networks;118
5.6.2;2 Partner Choice and Network Dynamics;119
5.6.3;3 Making Friends, Stag Hunt;120
5.6.4;4 Co-evolution of Structure and Strategy;122
5.6.5;5 Prisoner’s Dilemma;124
5.6.6;6 An Experiment;125
5.6.7;7 Beyond Reinforcement;126
5.6.8;References;126
6;Part II Cooperation and Group Formation;128
6.1;Evolution and Construction of Moral Systems;129
6.1.1;1 Introduction;129
6.1.2;2 WhatisaMoralSystem?;133
6.1.3;3 Major Components of Moral Systems;134
6.1.4;4 Constraints on Moral Systems;139
6.1.5;5 Architecture of Moral Systems;144
6.1.6;6 Construction Dynamics of Moral Systems;145
6.1.7;7 Summary;149
6.1.8;References;150
6.2;Games, Groups, Norms, and Societies;154
6.2.1;1 Introduction;154
6.2.2;2 Group Formation and Dynamics;156
6.2.3;3 Cooperation, from Bacteria to Bees;157
6.2.4;4 Animal Schooling and Swarming, and the Role of Leadership;159
6.2.5;5 Groups and Norms in Human Societies;160
6.2.6;6 Formalizing Rules and Codes of Conduct: The Evolution of Moral Systems;162
6.2.7;References;163
6.3;Evolutionary Theory and Cooperation in Everyday Life;165
6.3.1;1 Human Cooperation in Everyday Life;168
6.3.2;2 Toward the Integration of Academic Disciplines and a Positive Tradeoff Between Basic and Applied Research;176
6.3.3;References;177
6.4;The Error of God: Error Management Theory, Religion, and the Evolution of Cooperation;179
6.4.1;1 Error Management Theory (EMT);180
6.4.2;2 Application to Religious Beliefs;181
6.4.3;3 Towards a more Formal Model;185
6.4.4;4 Predictions and Evidence;187
6.4.5;5 Conclusion;188
6.4.6;References;188
6.5;Moral Motivation;191
6.5.1;References;202
6.6;Explaining Religion: Notes Toward a Research Agenda;204
6.6.1;References;212
7;Part III Cooperation and Problems of the Commons;213
7.1;Building Trust to Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action;214
7.1.1;1 A Theoretical Puzzle;216
7.1.2;2 The Challenges Ahead;218
7.1.3;3 The First Challenge;219
7.1.4;4 What areWe Learning about Norms and the Context of Social Dilemmas?;227
7.1.5;5 What is Next on the Agenda?;229
7.1.6;6 Conclusion;231
7.1.7;References;231
7.2;How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games;236
7.2.1;1 Introduction;236
7.2.2;2 Resolution by Voting in a 2-Person PD;237
7.2.3;3 Resolution by Voting in an n-Person PD;240
7.2.4;4 Example of an n-Person PD;241
7.2.5;5 A Biblical Tale;243
7.2.6;6 Other Difficult Games;244
7.2.7;7 Conclusions;246
7.2.8;References;247
7.3;Two Strategic Issues in Apologizing;249
7.3.1;1 The Duty to ApologizeWithin a Normative System;251
7.3.2;2 Why are Apologies All-or-Nothing?;258
7.3.3;3 Game Theory as a Tool for the Analysis of Norms;261
8;Appendix;262
8.1;Condition for the Apologize-and-Restitute Equilibrium;262
8.2;The Robustness of Apologize-and-Restitute;262
8.2.1;References;262
8.3;Neither Self-interest Nor Self-sacrifice: The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships;264
8.3.1;1 Trust as Gift Exchange;266
8.3.2;2 The Trust Game;269
8.3.3;3 Social-preference Explanations of Trust;270
8.3.4;4 Trustworthiness as a Character Virtue;277
8.3.5;5 Team Reasoning and Collective Intentions;279
8.3.6;6 The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships;284
9;References;287