Letiche International Economic Policies and Their Theoretical Foundations

A Sourcebook
2. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9704-0
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 988 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics

The literature on international economics has become excessively specialized. In selecting distinguished readings for this source book--including contributions by Nobel laureates such as Lawrence R. Klein, Arthur Lewis, James Meade, and Theodore W. Schultz--Professor Letiche breaks the mold. The essays concentrate on interrelation between theory and actual policy design, and this collection of classic pieces and recent economic contributions are a valued resource in universities and government offices.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Letiche, John M.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;International Economic Policies and their Theoretical Foundations: A Sourcebook;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of
Contents;6
5;Preface;12
6;Introduction;14
7;Part I: Evolution and Prospects of the International Economy;32
7.1;CHAPTER
1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER;34
7.1.1;INTRODUCTION;34
7.1.2;2. HE DIVISION OF THE WORLD;35
7.1.3;3.
THE FACTORAL TERMS OF TRADE;45
7.1.4;4.
CUMULATIVE FORCES;52
7.2;CHAPTER 2.
PORTUNITIES AND RISKS FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE OF INCREASING COMPLEXITY;57
7.2.1;Introduction;57
7.2.2;A Brief History;58
7.2.3;Forms of Economic Cooperation and Rationale;59
7.2.4;Current Problems;61
7.2.5;Impediments to Cooperation;62
7.2.6;A Glimpse into the Future;65
7.2.7;NOTES;67
7.2.8;REFERENCES;67
7.3;CHAPTER 3.
THE WORLD ECONOMY ENTERING THE 1990s;68
7.3.1;I. DEVELOPMENTS IN 1989;70
7.3.2;II. PROSPECTS FOR 1990 AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY CHALLENGES;77
8;Part II:
Terms of Trade and Gains from Trade in Goods and Services, Capital, and Assets;82
8.1;Chapter 4. Terms of Trade;84
8.2;CHAPTER 5.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GAINS FROM TRADE THEORY: CLASSICAL TO MODERN;110
8.2.1;THE EARLY WRITINGS;111
8.2.2;POST-WORLD WAR I LITERATURE;115
8.2.3;GAINS FROM TRADE: SOME RECENT MATHEMATICAL CONTRIBUTIONS;129
8.2.4;TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND UNCERTAINTY;130
8.2.5;CONCLUDING REMARKS;134
8.2.6;NOTES;134
8.3;JOHN M. LETICHE, ROBERT G. CHAMBERS, AND ANDREW SCHMITZ;141
8.3.1;FOOTNOTES;169
9;Part III: World Food, International Trade, and Agriculture;178
9.1;CHAPTER 6.
THE ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY OF TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE;180
9.1.1;THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS;180
9.1.2;PANAJACHEL, GUATEMALA:VERY POOR BUT EFFICIENT;185
9.1.3;SENAPUR, INDIA: POOR BUT EFFICIENT;188
9.1.4;INFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS;192
9.2;CHAPTER 7.
THE ECONOMICS OF THE VALUE OF HUMAN TIME1;197
9.3;CHAPTER 8.
THE WORLD FOOD SITUATION: DEVELOPMENTSAND PROSPEDCUTRSI NFOGR T THHEE 1 917908s0 s AND 1990s1;204
9.3.1;INTRODUCTION;204
9.3.2;FOOD SUPPLY AND DEMAND DURING THE 1970s;205
9.3.3;MALNUTRITION—HOW MUCH?;207
9.3.4;PRICE INSTABILITY;209
9.3.5;FOOD SECURITY, POVERTY, AND MALNUTRITION;210
9.3.6;PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980s;211
9.3.7;CONCLUDING COMMENTS;215
10;Part IV:
Common Markets;220
10.1;CHAPTER 9.
THE ECONOMICS OF CUSTOMS UNIONS;222
10.1.1;CUSTOMS UNION AS AN APPROACH TO FREE TRADE;222
10.1.2;CUSTOMS UNION AND THE "TERMS OF TRADE";223
10.2;CHAPTER 10.
THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS:A GENERAL SURVEY1;224
10.2.1;THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS;241
10.3;Chapter 11.
The Theory of Common Markets;244
10.3.1;INTEGRATION AND CAPITAL FLOWS;246
10.3.2;FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE COSTS ANDBENEFITS OF INTEGRATION;248
10.3.3;TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES ANDINTEGRATION;250
10.3.4;COMMON MARKETS, FACTOR SUPPLIES, DYNAMICEFFECTS AND CONVERGENCE;252
10.3.5;THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITYON THE STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE OFTRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES;254
10.3.6;COMPLETING THEEUROPEAN COMMON MARKET;261
10.3.7;CONCLUSION;267
10.4;Chapter 12. Europe 1992: Macroeconomic Implications;268
10.4.1;The Aggregate Effects;269
10.4.2;Increased Protection in Europe?;279
10.4.3;Financial Integration;282
10.4.4;Fiscal Convergence and Public Debt;284
10.4.5;International Financial Competition;288
10.4.6;References;289
10.5;CHAPTER 13.
THE THEORY OF COMMON MARKETS AS APPLIED TO REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTSAMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;295
10.5.1;I. INTRODUCTION;295
10.5.2;II. THE BALANCE BETWEEN TRADE-DIVERTING AND TRADE-CREATING EFFECTS;298
10.5.3;III. COMPLEMENTARY VERSUS COMPETITIVE PARTNERS AND THE PATTERN OF EXISTING TRADE;301
10.5.4;IV. PARTIAL VERSUS COMPLETE REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE;303
10.5.5;V. THE ECONOMIES OF SCALE;305
10.5.6;VI. THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION;307
10.5.7;VIL UNEQUAL WELFARE EFFECTS AND ECONOMIC DUALISM;311
10.5.8;VIII. THE PAYMENTS PROBLEM;314
10.5.9;IX. THE INDUCEMENT EFFECTS ON INVESTMENT FROM BROADENING THE MARKET AREA;316
10.5.10;X. CONCLUSION;318
10.6;Chapter 14.
The Latin American periphery in the global system of capitalism;322
10.6.1;I.
The dynamics of the centres;322
10.6.2;II. The internal dynamics of peripheral capitalism;323
10.6.3;III. Towards a theory of change;328
10.7;CHAPTER 15.
THE EMERGING PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY;330
10.7.1;I. Present issues in North-South relations;330
10.7.2;II. The dialogue in retrospect;336
10.7.3;III. Prospects for development and the world economy and somesuggestions with regard to the evolving role of UNCTAD;337
11;Part V: International Cartels, Commodity Agreements, and the Oil Problem;342
11.1;Chapter 16. International Cartels and Monopoliesin International Trade;344
11.1.1;I. CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS;344
11.1.2;II. POLICY TOWARD COMMERCIAL MONOPOLY;357
11.1.3;III. CONCLUSIONS;373
11.1.4;REFERENCES;374
11.1.5;Caves, "International Ctrttlt end Monopol i t» in International Trad·;378
11.2;Chapter 17.
Simple Theoretical Analysis of International Commodity Agreements;383
11.2.1;3.1 IMPLICATIONS OF PRICE STABILIZATION ATTEMPTS FOR VARIABILITY AND LEVEL OF PRODUCERS' REVENUES;383
11.2.2;3.2 WHO GAINS FROM PRICE STABILIZATION;390
11.2.3;3.3 NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF MARKET SOLUTIONS1 ';392
11.2.4;3.4 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH COLLUSIVE ACTION BY PRODUCERSALONE CAN RAISE MARKET PRICES;398
11.2.5;3.5 CONCLUSIONS;400
11.2.6;REFERENCES;400
11.3;Chapter 18.
The Ups and Downs of Oil;401
11.3.1;Summary;401
11.3.2;Historical Background;402
11.3.3;The First Oil Shock and Its Effects;404
11.3.4;OPEC Loses Control;408
11.3.5;The Cost and Supply of Oil;412
11.3.6;Competition and Futures Trading;414
11.3.7;The Outlook;416
11.3.8;The Role of Government;419
11.3.9;Alternative Trade Policies;420
11.3.10;Concluding Remarks;425
11.3.11;Notes;426
12;Part VI:
Multinational and International Investments;428
12.1;CHAPTER 19.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND MARKET PERFORMANCE;430
12.1.1;IV. SUMMARY: INTERNATIONAL FORCES
AND MARKET PERFORMANCE;439
12.1.2;REFERENCES;442
12.1.3;Caves, "Foreign Direct Investment and Market Performance";443
12.2;CHAPTER 20.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADEIN THE PRODUCT CYCLE;446
12.2.1;LOCATION OF NEW PRODUCTS;447
12.2.2;THE MATURING PRODUCT8;452
12.2.3;THE STANDARDIZED PRODUCT;458
12.2.4;FOOTNOTES;466
12.3;CHAPTER 21.
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE LAW OF UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT;467
12.3.1;Part I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION;469
12.3.2;The Corporate Economy;471
12.3.3;Part II. UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT;476
12.3.4;Part III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION;484
12.3.5;CONCLUSION;487
12.3.6;EPILOGUE;488
12.3.7;NOTES;490
13;Part VII:
Commercial Policies: Developing Market Economies;496
13.1;Chapter 22.
The Choice of a Development Strategy: Lessons and Prospects;498
13.2;CHAPTER 23.
THE "CLASSICAL THEORY" OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES1;507
13.2.1;II;509
13.2.2;Ill;512
13.3;Chapter 24.
Foreign Trade in Planned Economies;526
13.3.1;1. Institutions and policies of the CPEs;527
13.3.2;2· The efficiency of foreign trade and the exchange rate;536
13.3.3;3. The trade offer curve of a CPE;541
13.3.4;4. Foreign trade among planned economies;545
13.3.5;5. Internal and External Balance in Planned Economies;551
13.3.6;6. Economic reform and foreign trade;557
13.3.7;References;566
13.3.8;7. The Transition to the Market Economy;573
13.3.9;Bibliography;576
13.4;CHAPTER 25.
A NEW AGENDA FOR THE GATT;577
13.4.1;INTRODUCTION;577
13.4.2;GARDNER PATTERSON;577
13.4.3;THE GATT SYSTEM: SHOULD IT HAVE A FUTURE?;578
13.4.4;CONSTRAINTS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS;579
13.4.5;PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS;579
13.4.6;THE LIBERALISATION AGENDA;580
13.4.7;NORMS, RULES AND PROCEDURES: THE GATT ITSELF;583
13.4.8;CONCLUDING REMARKS;589
13.4.9;A NEW AGENDA FOR THE GATT;591
13.5;CHAPTER 26.
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE POLICIES;601
13.5.1;THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSISTANCE;601
13.5.2;POLICIES FOR RECIPIENT COUNTRIES;602
13.5.3;POLICIES FOR DONOR COUNTRIES;603
13.5.4;UPDATE;606
14;Part VIII:
The New International Economics;618
14.1;CHAPTER 27.
IMPERFECT COMPETITION, INCREASING RETURNS, AND DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE;620
14.1.1;ABSTRACT;620
14.1.2;THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION TRADE MODEL;622
14.1.3;PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC MARKET POWER;632
14.1.4;PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND DUMPING;648
14.1.5;STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY;658
14.1.6;A NEW CASE FOR PROTECTION?;669
14.1.7;QUANTIFICATION;676
14.1.8;CONCLUDING COMMENTS;683
14.1.9;References;685
14.2;Chapter 28.
The New Protectionism: A Response to Shifts in National Economic Power;692
14.2.1;Introduction;692
14.2.2;The Rise in U.S. Hegemony;693
14.2.3;Hegemonic Behavior;694
14.2.4;Shifts in International Economic Power;696
14.2.5;Trade Policy Responses to the Redistributionof National Economic Power;699
14.2.6;The Future of the International Trading Regime;702
14.2.7;Summary and Conclusion;707
14.2.8;References;708
14.3;Chapter 29.
Alternative Approaches and Solutions to the Debt of Developing Countries;710
14.3.1;1 INTRODUCTION;710
14.3.2;2 HISTORICAL COMPARISONS;711
14.3.3;3 DEBTOR COUNTRY ADJUSTMENT;715
14.3.4;4 INCREASED CAPITAL FLOWS VERSUS DEBT RELIEF;720
14.3.5;5 CONCLUSION;725
14.3.6;Notes;725
14.3.7;References;726
14.3.8;Reactions of Debtor Countries;728
15;Part IX:
International Payments;732
15.1;CHAPTER 30.
THE MEANING OF "INTERNAL BALANCE;734
15.1.1;I;734
15.1.2;II;734
15.1.3;Ill;738
15.1.4;IV;741
15.1.5;V;745
15.1.6;REFERENCES;746
15.2;CHAPTER 31.
MONEY, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS THEORY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY PROBLEM;747
15.2.1;Money and the Balance of Payments;749
15.2.2;The International Monetary Problem;760
15.2.3;References;772
15.3;CHAPTER 32.
CURRENCY DEVALUATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;773
15.3.1;I. A SUMMARY OF THE THEORY OF DEVALUATION;774
15.3.2;II. MODIFICATION IN THE ANALYSIS FOR DEVALUATION IN MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;780
15.3.3;III. SOME EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF DEVALUATION;790
15.3.4;IV. CONCLUSIONS;799
15.4;CHAPTER 33.
CONTEMPORARY EXCHANGE RATE ECONOMICS;802
15.4.1;I. THE US EXPERIENCE WITH FLOATING RATES;802
15.4.2;II. PERSISTENCE EFFECTS;810
15.4.3;III. EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICING;814
15.4.4;IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OVERVALUATION;818
15.4.5;V. EXCESS CAPITAL MOBILITY AND POLICY RESPONSES;819
15.4.6;REFERENCES;822
15.5;CHAPTER 34.
MONETARY AND PORTFOLIO-BALANCE MODELS OF EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION;824
15.5.1;Abstract;824
15.5.2;Monetary and Portfolio-BalanceModels of Exchange Rate Determination;825
15.5.3;The Asset-Market View of Exchange Rates;825
15.5.4;References;851
15.5.5;UPDATE;857
15.5.6;FURTHER REFERENCES;861
15.6;CHAPTER 35.
THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM;864
15.6.1;1.
Introduction;865
15.6.2;2. The Rules Governing the EMS;866
15.6.3;3. Economic Effects of the EMS: Exchange Rates;872
15.6.4;4.
Economic Effects of the EMS: Inflation Rates;875
15.6.5;5.
The Role of Capital Controls;889
15.6.6;6. Concluding Observations;893
15.6.7;References;895
15.6.8;APPENDIX I;898
15.7;CHAPTER 36.
CAN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY COOPERATION BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?;905
15.7.1;1. Introduction;905
15.7.2;2. Domestic and foreign social objective functions;907
15.7.3;3. The conflict between wage setters and the central banks;908
15.7.4;4. The macro model and the linkages between the two central bank objective functions;909
15.7.5;5. Cooperation can be counterproductive;910
15.7.6;6. Equilibrium when central banks do not cooperate;911
15.7.7;7. Equilibrium when central banks cooperate to achieve their stabilization
objectives;914
15.7.8;8. Institutional designs for superior cooperative regimes;916
15.7.9;9. Conclusions;917
15.7.10;Appendix A: The underlying two-country macroeconomic model;917
15.7.11;Appendix B: Relative shifts in demand;921
15.7.12;References;922
15.8;Chapter 37.
Floating Exchange Rates and the Need for Surveillance;924
15.8.1;Introduction;924
15.8.2;Issues Related to the Short-Run Variability of Exchange Rates;926
15.8.3;The Role of Exchange Rates in Eliminating Payments Disequilibria;940
15.8.4;Assessing Exchange-Rate Policies;948
15.8.5;References;957
15.8.6;FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND THE NEED FOR SURVEILLANCE;958
15.9;CHAPTER 38.
HOW THE IMF PROVIDES FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO MEET MEMBER COUNTRIES' NEEDS;963
15.9.1;Concessional Facilities Assist Poorer Countries;972
15.9.2;Overdue Financial Obligations Affect IMF Operations;979
15.9.3;Table 1.
Fund Provides Financial AssistanceTo Overcome Balance of Payments Difficulties;983
15.9.4;Table 2.
Potential Cumulative Disbursements Under Arrangements and Facilities;984
15.9.5;Table 3.
Stand-By, Extended, Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)Arrangements as of June 30;985
15.9.6;Table IV.
Exchange Arrangements of Fund Members 1/(as of March 30, 1990;986
15.9.7;Table 5.
Exchange Rates and Exchange Arrangements, March 30,1990;988
15.9.8;Table 6.
Current and Proposed Fund Quotas;989
15.9.9;Appendix :
IMF Board of Governors Adopts Resolutions On Quota Increase and Third Amendment;991
16;Part X:
Perspectives and Implications;994
16.1;CHAPTER 39.
SOME ECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR THE 1980's;996
16.1.1;BASE CASE - UNITED STATES;996
16.1.2;BASE CASE-THE WORLD ECONOMY4;1002
16.1.3;POSSIBLE DISTURBANCES;1013
16.1.4;AN OPTIMISTIC CASE;1015
16.1.5;UPDATE;1018
17;ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMETRICS, AND MATHEM ATICAL ECONOMICS;1020