Lessambo Mergers in the Global Markets

A Comparative Approach to the Competition and National Security Laws among the US, EU, and China
1. Auflage 2020
ISBN: 978-3-030-43558-5
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 199 Seiten

Reihe: Progress in Mathematics

International mergers and acquisitions play a vital role behind the growth of a company. This book explores the hurdles involved and how to navigate through the review processes set up by national regulatory agencies such as the US Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS), the EU Commission, and the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of State Administration of Market Regulation of China (AMB). This book is unique and showcases how to anticipate, develop, and implement successful strategies to support mergers and acquisitions activities, particularly of interest to finance and law students, researchers, and academics.

Felix I. Lessambo is an Associate Professor at Central Connecticut State University's School of Business where he teaches Financial Statements Analysis and Global Financial Reporting. He has practiced international tax, transfer pricing, and in alternative investment management groups where he structured and advised on hedge funds and private equity cross-border transactions. He is the author of several books in finance, including The International Banking System, The International Corporate Governance System, International Financial Institutions and Their Challenges, International Aspects of the US Taxation System, Audit-Assurance Services & Forensics,  Financial Statements: Analysis and Reporting, and The U.S. Banking System.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Lessambo, Felix I.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1; Acknowledgements;5
2; Contents;6
3; Abbreviations;12
4; List of Figures;13
5; List of Cited Cases;1
6;Part I Mergers and Acquisitions Policies and Approaches;16
7;1 Overview of Mergers and Acquisitions;17
7.1;1.1 General;17
7.2;1.2 Methods of Business Combination;18
7.3;1.3 Motives for Acquisitions;21
7.4;1.4 Acquisitions and Growth;23
7.5;1.5 Financial Analysis;24
7.6;1.6 Accounting for Mergers;25
7.7;1.7 Merger Negotiation and Due Diligence;26
7.8;1.8 Financing the Deal;27
7.9;1.9 Post-merger Integration;28
7.10;1.10 Cultural Issues in Cross-Border M&A;28
8;2 Economic Effects of Antitrust Laws on Mergers and Acquisitions;30
8.1;2.1 General;30
8.2;2.2 Antitrust Law Objectives;31
8.3;2.3 Competition Laws and Market Efficiency;31
8.3.1;2.3.1 Efficiency Assessment in the European Union;31
8.3.2;2.3.2 Competition and Market Efficiency in the United States;32
8.3.3;2.3.3 Competition and Market Efficiency in China;33
8.4;2.4 Competition Laws and Consumer Welfare;33
8.4.1;2.4.1 Competition Laws and Consumer Welfare in the EU;33
8.4.2;2.4.2 Competition Laws and Consumer Welfare in the United States;34
8.4.3;2.4.3 Competition Laws and Consumer Welfare in China;36
8.5;2.5 The Economic Effects of Competition on Mergers and Acquisitions;36
8.5.1;2.5.1 Decline in Enforcement;37
8.5.2;2.5.2 The Reasons for the Decline;38
8.5.3;2.5.3 The Pursuit of an Uncertain Goal;39
8.5.4;2.5.4 The Unfitness of the Welfare Protection Standard;40
8.6;2.6 The Harmfulness of Some Currently Approved M&A;41
8.7;2.7 Raise of Concentration;42
9;Part II The Competition and National Security Reviews;44
10;3 M&A Policies Review Under the Competition and National Security Laws in the United States;45
10.1;3.1 General;45
10.1.1;3.1.1 The Sherman Act of 1890;45
10.1.2;3.1.2 The Clayton Act of 1914;46
10.1.3;3.1.3 The Cellar–Kefauver Act of 1950;47
10.1.4;3.1.4 The Scott–Hard–Rodino Improvement Act of 1982;47
10.1.5;3.1.5 The Federal Trade Commission Act;48
10.1.6;3.1.6 The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act;49
10.1.7;3.1.7 The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Enforcement Unit;50
10.2;3.2 FTC–DOJ Procedure;52
10.3;3.3 Remedies;59
10.4;3.4 M&A Review Under National Security Laws in the United States;59
10.4.1;3.4.1 The National Defense Act of 1950 (as Amended);59
10.4.2;3.4.2 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States;60
10.4.3;3.4.3 The Exon–Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act;60
10.4.4;3.4.4 The Homeland Security Act of 2002;60
10.4.5;3.4.5 The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007;61
10.4.6;3.4.6 The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA);62
10.5;3.5 CFIUS Composition and Mandates;64
10.6;3.6 CFIUS Review and Investigation;65
10.7;3.7 Appealing the CFIUS Review Process;68
10.8;3.8 CFIUS Case Study;71
10.8.1;3.8.1 Mamco Manufacturing;71
10.8.2;3.8.2 CNOOC and Unocal;71
10.8.3;3.8.3 The German–US Aixtron Case;75
11;4 M&A Policies Review Under the Competition Laws in the European Union;79
11.1;4.1 General;79
11.2;4.2 EU Core Competition Laws;81
11.3;4.3 The Notification Procedure;83
11.3.1;4.3.1 Breach of the Standstill Obligation;85
11.3.2;4.3.2 Exception to the Standstill Obligation;86
11.4;4.4 Commission Examination;87
11.4.1;4.4.1 Relevant Geographic Market;87
11.4.2;4.4.2 Countervailing Buyer Power;90
11.4.3;4.4.3 Efficiencies;91
11.4.4;4.4.4 Entry;93
11.4.5;4.4.5 Failing Firm;93
11.5;4.5 Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers;94
11.5.1;4.5.1 Vertical Mergers;95
11.5.2;4.5.2 Conglomerate Mergers;95
11.6;4.6 Remedies;97
11.7;4.7 M&A Review Under National Security Laws in the EU;98
11.7.1;4.7.1 EUMR Approved Cases Under the National Security Concerns;99
11.7.2;4.7.2 National Security Interests in the UK;101
11.7.2.1;4.7.2.1 Types of National Interests;102
11.7.2.2;4.7.2.2 Procedures in National Interests;105
11.7.2.3;4.7.2.3 Decision of the Secretary of State;105
11.7.3;4.7.3 National Security in Germany;106
11.7.3.1;4.7.3.1 The Review Process;107
11.7.4;4.7.4 National Security in France;107
11.7.4.1;4.7.4.1 The Review Process;109
11.7.5;4.7.5 National Security in Italy;109
11.7.5.1;4.7.5.1 Procedure;109
11.7.5.2;4.7.5.2 Case Study: 50/50 Joint Venture (H3G) Between CK Hutchison Holdings (a Listed Hong Kong-Based Conglomerate) and VimpelCom Ltd.;110
11.7.6;4.7.6 National Security in the Netherlands;111
11.7.6.1;4.7.6.1 Procedure;111
11.8;4.8 Europe and the UK Case Study: BAE and Finmeccanica;112
12;5 M&A Policies Review Under the Competition and National Security Laws in China;114
12.1;5.1 General;114
12.2;5.2 Anti-competitive Monopoly;115
12.2.1;5.2.1 Exemption to Prohibitions;116
12.3;5.3 Abuse of Dominant Position;117
12.3.1;5.3.1 The Chlorpheniramine API Case;118
12.3.2;5.3.2 The Qualcomm Case;122
12.3.3;5.3.3 The Mercedes-Benz and Dongfeng Nissan Case;124
12.4;5.4 Concentration of Undertakings;124
12.5;5.5 Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition;126
12.6;5.6 Investigation into Suspected Monopolistic Conducts;126
12.7;5.7 The Simplified Procedure;128
12.8;5.8 Notification Threshold;128
12.9;5.9 Gun-Jumping/Failure to Notify;129
12.10;5.10 Legal Liabilities;129
12.10.1;5.10.1 General Liabilities;129
12.10.2;5.10.2 Specific Remedies;132
12.11;5.11 M&A Review Under the National Security Laws in China;133
12.11.1;5.11.1 National Security Concept in China;133
12.11.2;5.11.2 The Review Process;136
12.11.3;5.11.3 Blocked Deals in China;138
13;Part III Global Enforcement and Co-operation;142
14;6 Extraterritorial Competence of the United States, the EU, and China Competition Laws;143
14.1;6.1 General;143
14.2;6.2 Extraterritorial Competence of the U.S. Competition Laws;143
14.2.1;6.2.1 The Assertion of U.S. Extraterritorial Effects Over Time;145
14.2.2;6.2.2 U.S. Guidelines Under the U.S. Antitrust Laws;147
14.2.3;6.2.3 U.S. Extraterritorial Cases;151
14.2.3.1;6.2.3.1 The Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz Case;151
14.2.3.2;6.2.3.2 The Motorola Mobility LLC Case;152
14.3;6.3 Extraterritorial Competence of the EU Competition Laws;152
14.3.1;6.3.1 The Enforcement Tools of Extraterritoriality;154
14.3.2;6.3.2 EU Extraterritorial Cases;154
14.3.2.1;6.3.2.1 The Chemical Industries Case;154
14.3.2.2;6.3.2.2 The Wood Pulp Case;155
14.3.2.3;6.3.2.3 Gencor Ltd. v. Commission;156
14.3.2.4;6.3.2.4 Boeing McDonnell Douglas;157
14.3.2.5;6.3.2.5 Google/Motorola;157
14.3.2.6;6.3.2.6 General Electric/Honeywell;162
14.4;6.4 Extraterritorial Competence of China’s AML;165
14.4.1;6.4.1 The Enforcement Tools of Extraterritoriality;166
14.4.2;6.4.2 China Extraterritorial Cases;166
14.4.2.1;6.4.2.1 The Silvinit/Uralkali Case;166
14.4.2.2;6.4.2.2 The Savio Macchine Tessili S.P.A Case;168
14.4.2.3;6.4.2.3 The GE–Shenhua Case;169
14.4.2.4;6.4.2.4 The Seagate/Samsung Case;171
15;7 Cooperation Among the Three Jurisdictions;176
15.1;7.1 General;176
15.2;7.2 Reasons of the Disagreements;177
15.3;7.3 International Anti-Trust Cooperation;178
15.3.1;7.3.1 Bilateral Cooperation;178
15.3.2;7.3.2 The Exchange of Information;184
15.3.3;7.3.3 Enforcement of International Comity;185
15.4;7.4 The Search for an International Institution;188
15.4.1;7.4.1 The OECD;188
15.4.2;7.4.2 The WTO;188
15.4.3;7.4.3 The UNCTDA;189
15.4.4;7.4.4 The International Competition Network;190
16; Glossary;191
17;Bibliography;191
18;Index;198