The Criminal Law’s Person

Erscheinungsjahr 2024
ISBN: 978-1-5099-5644-9
Verlag: Hart Publishing

Buch, Englisch, 216 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 232 mm, Gewicht: 680 g

The state's use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law's burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of 'blameworthiness' needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law's person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law's person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new 'knowledge', and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law's person as 'theirs'? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law's person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Lernestedt, Claes

Matravers, Matt

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Strafrecht

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction: The Criminal Law's Person

Claes Lernestedt, Stockholm University, Sweden and Matt Matravers, University of York, UK
I. Criminal Justice: Political Not Metaphysical

II. The Criminal Law and the Criminal Law's Person(s)

III. Contested Sources, Contested Purposes

IV. Outline of the Volume

2. The Criminal Law's Various Persons

Matt Matravers, University of York, UK

I. Introduction

II. Ex Ante: Criminalisation, Policing and Prosecution

III. Ex Post: Conviction and Sentencing

IV. 'Science' and the Criminal Law's Various Persons

3. The Criminal Law's Person and Normative Elements in the Legal Definition of Excusing Circumstances

Kai Hamdorf, Federal Court of Justice, Germany
I. Introduction

II. The Presumption of Guilt in the Normative Concept of the Criminal Law's Person

III. The Presumption of Guilt and Excusing Circumstances in Criminal Law

IV. Conclusions
4. Standard-Setting versus Tracking 'Profound' Blameworthiness: What should be the Role of the Rules for Ascription of Responsibility?

Claes Lernestedt, Stockholm University, Sweden

I. Introduction

II. Criminal Law Backwards and Forwards

III. What if? A Flexible within

IV. A Few Examples

V. Closing Comments: The Criminal Law and Everyday People

5. Attributability and Accountability in the Criminal Law

Robin Zheng, University of Glasgow, UK
I. Two Concepts of Responsibility

II. Two Routes to Criminal Responsibility: The Attributability Route

III. Two Routes to Criminal Responsibility: The Accountability Route

IV. Two Persons of Criminal Responsibility

V. Attributability versus Accountability

6. In Search of Criminal Law's Person

Malcolm Thorburn, University of Toronto, Canada
I. Introduction

II. Legal Personality

III. Responsible Agency in Criminal Law

IV. Conclusion

7. Victims Who Victimise: Guilt in Political Theory and Moral Psychology

Alan Norrie, Warwick University, UK
I. The Problem of Perpetrators as Victims Who Victimise

II. Normative Political Theory: The Problem of the Ideal and the Actual

III. The Moral Psychology of Guilt: Towards a Moral Grammar

IV. The Guilt of Perpetrators as Victims Who Victimise

8. Responsibility Beyond Blame: Unfree Agency and the Moral Psychology of Criminal Law's Persons

Craig Reeves, Birkbeck, University of London, UK
I. Introduction

II. Blame and Blameworthiness

III. The Tyranny of the Past

IV. Unfree Agency

V. The Moral Psychology of Heteronomy

VI. The Antinomy of Responsibility

VII. Responsibility, Reification and Respect

VIII. The Grammar of Taking Responsibility

9. Implicit Bias, Self-Defence and the Reasonable Person
Jules Holroyd, University of Sheffield, UK and Federico Picinali, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
I. Introduction

II. Unreasonable Persons and Biased Beliefs

III. Racism and Self-Defence

IV. US Law and the 'Reasonable-Belief Rule'

V. Evaluating the Reasonable Person Standards

VI. English and Welsh Law and the Genuine Belief Rule

VII. A Palliative Solution

VIII. Concluding Remarks

Über Autor(innen)

Matravers, Matt
Matt Matravers is Professor of Politics at the University of York, UK. His previous publications include Justice and Punishment (OUP, 2000) and Responsibility Within Justice (CUP, 2006).

Lernestedt, Claes
Claes Lernestedt is Professor of Criminal Law at Stockholm University, Sweden.

Claes Lernestedt is Professor of Criminal Law at Stockholm University.
Matt Matravers is Director of the Morrell Centre for Toleration at the University of York.