Lavergne / Shell The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs

An Empirical Analysis
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7123-1
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 224 Seiten, Web PDF

The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis provides information pertinent to the political economy of trade barriers. This book discusses the cross-sectional regression analysis across industries to understand why some industries have been more privileged than others. Organized into seven chapters, this book begins with an overview of the structure of protection and identifies the primary actors or principles that condition the formation of trade policy more generally. This text then evaluates the institutional and theoretical reasons why political leverage should not be expected to play a significant role in explaining tariffs. Other chapters consider the notion that the structure of protection at any point in time represents some sort of equilibrium. This book discusses as well the distinction between nominal and effective tariffs. The final chapter deals with individual regressors and groups of regressors. This book is a valuable resource for economists and specialists in quantitative analysis.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Lavergne, Réal P.

Shell, Karl

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;Preface;8
6;Chapter 1. Introduction;14
6.1;I. INTEREST AND NATURE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER;14
6.2;II. PREVIOUS WORK;19
7;Chapter 2. Theoretical and Institutional Aspects of Tariff Policy;24
7.1;I. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING BY POLITICIANS;24
7.2;II. THE ROLE OF PRESSURE GROUPS;29
7.3;III. RESPONSE TO PRESSURE;33
7.4;IV. REMAINING PRESSURE POINTS;40
7.5;V. CONCLUSION;44
7.6;APPENDIX: THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM;45
8;Chapter 3. Equilibrium, Continuity, and Change in the Tariff Structure;48
8.1;I. INTRODUCTION;48
8.2;II. THE EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH;49
8.3;III. PROBLEMS WITH THE EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH;53
8.4;IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH;59
9;Chapter 4. Measures of Protection;62
9.1;I. NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE TARIFFS;62
9.2;II. POSSIBLE USE OF INPUT DUTIES AS A REGRESSOR;65
9.3;III. NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE TARIFFS: A COROLLARY;67
9.4;IV. NONTARIFF BARRIERS;68
9.5;V. SUMMARY;74
9.6;DATA APPENDIX: SOURCES AND DETAILS OF TARIFF AND NTB DATA;75
10;Chapter 5. The Comparative Disadvantage Variables;80
10.1;I. INTRODUCTION;80
10.2;II. HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TARIFFS AND COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE;81
10.3;III. PREVIOUS WORK;87
10.4;IV. MEASUREMENT;96
10.5;V. SUMMARY;100
10.6;APPENDIX: TARIFFS, RENTS, AND QUASI-RENTS;101
11;Chapter 6. Other Hypotheses and Variables;104
11.1;I. TARIFFS AND PRESSURE GROUPS;104
11.2;II. DISPLACEMENT COSTS;120
11.3;III. TARIFFS AS A PRODUCT OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION;130
11.4;IV. TARIFF STRUCTURE AS A REMNANT FROM THE PAST;142
11.5;V. TARIFFS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST;145
11.6;VI. SUMMARY OF VARIABLES;148
11.7;DATA APPENDIX: SOURCES AND DETAILS OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES;152
12;Chapter 7. Empirical Results;160
12.1;I. INTRODUCTION;160
12.2;II. THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE MODEL;163
12.3;III. INTEREST GROUPS;165
12.4;IV. DISPLACEMENT COSTS;169
12.5;V. COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE;173
12.6;VI. HISTORICAL CONTINUITY;177
12.7;VII. BARGAINING;179
12.8;VIII. MISCELLANY;181
12.9;APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTS PERFORMED;185
13;Chapter 8. Conclusion;196
14;References;202
15;Index;218