Laurens / Arnone / Segalotto Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency

A Global Perspective
1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-0-230-28212-4
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 290 Seiten

Reihe: Procyclicality of Financial Systems in Asia

This book explores three key areas of central banking and governance - autonomy, accountability and transparency. It looks at links between the areas, as well as assessing the impact of central bank autonomy on macroeconomic performance. The issues are approached from theoretical and empirical perspectives.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Laurens, B.

Arnone, M.

Segalotto, J.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2;Half Title;2
3;Title Page;4
4;Copyright Page;5
5;Table of Contents;6
6;List of Figures;11
7;List of Tables;12
8;Notes on the Contributors;14
9;Foreword;16
10;Preface;18
11;Acknowledgements;20
12;Introduction;21
13;1 Survey of Models and Indicators of Independence;26
13.1;Introduction;26
13.2;Base indicators of independence;27
13.2.1;First indicator of de jure independence: Bade and Parkin (1977);28
13.2.2;Alesina’s political response (1988, 1989);30
13.2.3;Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991);32
13.2.4;Two of the most widely used indicators: Cukierman (1992);36
13.2.5;Aggregation of two legal measures: Alesina and Summers (1993);38
13.2.6;A new legal indicator: Eijffinger and Schaling (1993);40
13.2.7;Political vulnerability of central banks: Cukierman and Webb (1995);40
13.3;Subsequent literature and empirical studies on base indicators;45
13.3.1;Theoretical and empirical clarifications on central bank independence;45
13.3.2;Endogenizing the inflation bias;49
13.3.3;Robustness of independence measures;52
13.3.4;Causality of hypotheses on central bank independence;55
13.3.5;Robustness and sensitivity of results, and search for new measures;61
13.3.6;Independence, credibility, and costs of deflation;71
13.4;Conclusions;79
13.5;Appendices:;83
13.5.1;I. Variables in Cukierman’s LVAU-LVAW indices;83
13.5.2;II. Variables in Cukierman’s QVAU-QVAW;87
13.5.3;III. Summary of base indicators of de jure independence;89
13.5.4;IV. Summary of base indicators of de facto independence;97
13.5.5;V. Summary of empirical studies on de jure independence;101
13.5.6;VI. Summary of empirical studies on de facto independence;108
14;2 Survey of Models and Indicators of Accountability;110
14.1;Responsibility and accountability;110
14.1.1;Responsibility;111
14.1.2;Accountability;111
14.2;The concept of accountability in the literature;113
14.2.1;Briault, Haldane, and King (1996): de jure and de facto accountability;113
14.2.2;Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2000): ex ante and ex post accountability;114
14.2.3;de Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger (1998): three main features;115
14.2.4;Castellani (2002);117
14.2.5;Siklos (2002);117
14.3;Time inconsistency and accountability;118
14.3.1;Delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank;118
14.3.2;Override;118
14.3.3;Contractual solution;119
14.4;Indicators and measures of accountability;119
14.4.1;Briault, Haldane, and King (1996);119
14.4.2;de Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger (1998);120
14.4.3;Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2000 and 2001);122
14.4.4;Stasavage (2003);124
14.4.5;Siklos (2002);124
14.5;Accountability indices: comparison of empirical results;125
15;3 Survey of Models and Indicators of Transparency;127
15.1;Introduction;127
15.2;Rationales for transparency;128
15.2.1;Boost central bank credibility;128
15.2.2;Influence expectations;128
15.2.3;Protect central bank independence;129
15.2.4;Strengthen the understanding of monetary policy;129
15.2.5;Reduce informational asymmetries and uncertainty in financial markets;130
15.2.6;Enhance market efficiency;131
15.2.7;Eliminate government uncertainty on the performance of monetary policy;131
15.2.8;Enhance fiscal and monetary policy coordination;131
15.3;The concept of transparency in the literature;131
15.3.1;Transparency and accountability;131
15.3.2;Characteristics of transparency;132
15.3.3;Aspects of transparency in the policy-making process;134
15.4;Indicators and measures in the literature;136
15.4.1;General observations;136
15.4.2;Siklos (2002);137
15.4.3;Eijffinger and Geraats (2004);137
15.4.4;Stasavage (2003);138
15.4.5;de Haan and Amtenbrink (2003);140
15.4.6;Comparison between measures;141
15.5;Conclusions;142
16;4 Indicators of Independence, Accountability, and Transparency;144
16.1;Methodology for assessing central bank independence;144
16.1.1;General considerations;144
16.1.2;The GMT (1991) index;144
16.1.3;The Cukierman (1992) index;146
16.1.4;Assessment procedure and sampling;147
16.2;Methodology for assessing central bank accountability and transparency;147
16.2.1;General considerations;152
16.2.2;Detailed index of accountability;156
16.2.3;Detailed index of transparency;165
17;5 Global Trends in Central Bank Governance;171
17.1;Global trends in central bank independence;171
17.1.1;Central bank independence in the late 1980s;172
17.1.2;Central bank independence as of end-2003;172
17.1.3;Developments in central bank independence over time;179
17.2;Global trends in central bank accountability and transparency;183
17.2.1;Accountability scores;183
17.2.2;Transparency scores;187
17.3;Relationships between independence, accountability, and transparency;190
17.3.1;Accountability and transparency;190
17.3.2;Accountability and independence;193
17.3.3;Transparency and independence;9
17.3.4;Additional considerations;198
17.3.5;Conclusions;198
17.4;Global trends in central bank governance;199
17.4.1;Trends by stages of economic development and regions;199
17.4.2;Relative deficit of accountability;199
17.4.3;Relative deficit of transparency;202
17.5;Appendices:;207
17.5.1;I. Independence: country sample;207
17.5.2;II. Independence: political scores for advanced economies (2003);210
17.5.3;III. Independence: political scores for emerging markets (2003);212
17.5.4;IV. Independence: political scores for developing countries (2003);214
17.5.5;V. Independence: economic scores for advanced economies (2003);218
17.5.6;VI. Independence: economic scores for emerging markets (2003);220
17.5.7;VII. Independence: economic scores for developing countries (2003);222
17.5.8;VIII. Independence: evolution for GMT sample (late 1980s–2003);222
17.5.9;IX. Independence: evolution for Cukierman sample (late 1980s–2003);228
17.5.10;X. Independence: summary indices (late 1980s–2003);233
17.5.11;XI. Accountability database (2006);240
17.5.12;XII. Transparency database (2006);244
17.5.13;XIII. Detailed governance scores;248
18;6 Independence and Inflation Performance: New Empirical Evidence;252
19;7 Policy Lessons from Global Trends;257
19.1;Overview;257
19.2;Relationships between the pillars of central bank governance;258
19.3;Consensus views;261
19.3.1;Principle 1: set price stability as one of the primary objectives of monetary policy;262
19.3.2;Principle 2: curtail direct lending to governments;262
19.3.3;Principle 3: ensure full independence for setting the policy rate;263
19.3.4;Principle 4: ensure no government involvement in policy formulation;263
19.3.5;Principle 5: ensure that accountability corresponds to the level of independence;264
19.3.6;Principle 6: ensure that transparency corresponds to the level of accountability and financial market deepening;264
19.4;Role of central banks in financial supervision;265
19.4.1;Theoretical considerations;265
19.4.2;Survey of practices;267
19.4.3;The way forward;269
19.5;Sequencing of reforms;271
19.5.1;Stage 1: clarify objectives and establish basic instrument independence;272
19.5.2;Stage 2: establish the building block of accountability;274
19.5.3;Stage 3: strengthen further political independence, accountability, and transparency;275
20;References;276
21;Index;284