Krügel Explaining Resistance to Change

Some Experimental Evidence and Implications
1. Auflage 2017
ISBN: 978-3-8452-8457-6
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 155 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Many organisational changes fail because of resistance to change by employees. Changes require new ways of thinking, and the general uncertainty that surrounds them tends to make people uncomfortable. Jan Philipp Krügel examines the circumstances under which employees are more accepting of change with a laboratory experiment. His findings suggest that if employees are treated well by their employer in the first place, they are also more willing to help implement changes. The general uncertainty about the outcome of change, however, does not necessarily lead to strong resistance.
Jan Philipp Krügel is currently working as a research assistant for the chair of behavioural economics at Helmut-Schmidt-University in Hamburg. His research focuses on experimental economics, game theory and behavioural economics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Krügel, Jan Philipp

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologische Disziplinen Wirtschafts-, Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Verhaltensökonomik
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Management Change Management
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Organisationstheorie, Organisationssoziologie, Organisationspsychologie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2;Chapter 1: Introduction;16
3;I State of the Art;22
3.1;Chapter 2: Resistance to Change: A Survey;24
3.1.1;1 Definitions;24
3.1.2;2 Causes;28
3.1.2.1;2.1 Social Psychology;28
3.1.2.2;2.2 Management Science;30
3.1.2.3;2.3 Political Economy;31
3.1.3;3 Relevance;34
3.1.4;4 Overcoming Resistance;35
3.2;Chapter 3: Theoretical Background;40
3.2.1;1 Threshold Contribution Games;40
3.2.2;2 Voter Participation Games;46
3.2.3;3 Efficiency Wages;49
3.2.3.1;3.1 The Shirking Model;49
3.2.3.2;3.2 Empirical Studies;52
3.2.3.3;3.3 The Fair-Wage Effort Hypothesis;53
3.2.4;4 The Gift Exchange Game;54
3.2.5;5 Upshot;56
4;II Resistance to Change: An Experimental Study;58
4.1;Chapter 4: Theory and Hypotheses;60
4.1.1;1 A Model with Self-Regarding Preferences;60
4.1.1.1;1.1 Assumptions;61
4.1.1.2;1.2 Nash-Equilibria;63
4.1.1.3;1.3 Equilibrium Selection;64
4.1.2;2 Incorporating Reciprocity;66
4.1.2.1;2.1 Basic Design;66
4.1.2.2;2.2 Equilibrium Analysis;69
4.1.3;3 Alternative Specifications;70
4.1.3.1;3.1 Social Preferences;70
4.1.3.2;3.2 Beliefs and Risk Aversion;72
4.2;Chapter 5: Methodology;76
4.2.1;1 Overview;76
4.2.2;2 Mechanism and Procedures;78
4.2.3;3 Limitations;80
4.3;Chapter 6: Experimental Design;84
4.3.1;1 The Baseline Treatment;84
4.3.2;2 Treatment Variations;89
4.3.3;3 Elicitation of Social Preferences and Risk Attitudes;92
4.3.4;4 Procedure;95
4.4;Chapter 7: Results;98
4.4.1;1 Descriptive Statistics;98
4.4.2;2 Group Outcomes;106
4.4.2.1;2.1 Reciprocity and Efficiency;107
4.4.2.2;2.2 Coordination;108
4.4.2.3;2.3 Free Riding;112
4.4.3;3 Individual Outcomes;113
4.5;Chapter 8: Implications;120
5; Bibliography;124
6; Appendix;138
6.1;A. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria;140
6.2;B. Additional Regressions;144
6.3;C. Instructions;148