Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 575 g
Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 575 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-976429-7
Verlag: ACADEMIC
Since the late 1970's, the main research program for understanding intentionality - the mind's ability to direct itself onto the world - has been based on the attempt naturalize intentionality, in the sense of making it intelligible how intentionality can occur in a perfectly natural, indeed entirely physical, world. Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness - the subjective feel of conscious experience - has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role missing in the naturalization program. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complementary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research program.
With twelve new essays by philosophers at the forefront of the field, this volume is designed to launch this research program in a more self-conscious way, by exploring some of the fundamental claims and themes of relevance to this program.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
- Chapter 1: The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program
- Uriah Kriegel
- Chapter 2: The Access Problem
- Michelle Montague
- Chapter 3: Indexical Thought
- David Pitt
- Chapter 4: Phenomenal Presence
- Christopher Frey
- Chapter 5: Consciousness and Synthesis
- Colin McGinn
- Chapter 6: Constructing a World for the Senses
- Katalin Farkas
- Chapter 7: Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian Account
- Farid Masrour
- Chapter 8: Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects
- Frederick Kroon
- Chapter 9: Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought
- Tim Crane
- Chapter 10: Intellectual Gestalts
- Elijah Chudnoff
- Chapter 11: Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?
- Adam Pautz
- Chapter 12: Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness
- Charles Siewert




