Buch, Englisch, 176 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 281 g
Buch, Englisch, 176 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 281 g
ISBN: 978-0-367-63250-2
Verlag: Routledge
Is torturing the innocent OK?
Just now something happened: it seemed to you that torturing the innocent is wrong. What kind of mental state were you in? What is its nature? Perhaps you now believe that torturing the innocent is wrong because it just seemed to you that it is. If so, that seems appropriate. But is it really, and if so, what could explain this?
In this book, Koksvik argues these mental states form a psychological kind called ‘intuition’, and that having an intuition indeed justifies you in believing what it says. What explains this, he argues, is how similar intuition is to perception. Through a detailed examination he shows that intuition, just like perception, is a conscious experience, and that the two experience types have important properties in common, in virtue of which they can both justify belief.
In sharp contrast to traditional thought, Koksvik argues that intuition is completely unrestricted in content: we have intuitions about morality and metaphysics, but also about all sorts of everyday things, like danger or trustworthiness, and in all cases they can justify. The use of intuition is thus not only a legitimate part of philosophical and scientific practice, it also plays a pervasive, important and legitimate role in all of our everyday rational lives.
Koksvik
Intuition as Conscious Experience jetzt bestellen!
Just now something happened: it seemed to you that torturing the innocent is wrong. What kind of mental state were you in? What is its nature? Perhaps you now believe that torturing the innocent is wrong because it just seemed to you that it is. If so, that seems appropriate. But is it really, and if so, what could explain this?
In this book, Koksvik argues these mental states form a psychological kind called ‘intuition’, and that having an intuition indeed justifies you in believing what it says. What explains this, he argues, is how similar intuition is to perception. Through a detailed examination he shows that intuition, just like perception, is a conscious experience, and that the two experience types have important properties in common, in virtue of which they can both justify belief.
In sharp contrast to traditional thought, Koksvik argues that intuition is completely unrestricted in content: we have intuitions about morality and metaphysics, but also about all sorts of everyday things, like danger or trustworthiness, and in all cases they can justify. The use of intuition is thus not only a legitimate part of philosophical and scientific practice, it also plays a pervasive, important and legitimate role in all of our everyday rational lives.
Zielgruppe
Postgraduate and Undergraduate Advanced
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction 2. Reduction? 3. The Shape of the View 4. Perceptual and Intuitional Experience 5. Phenomenalism 6. The FIFO Objection 7. Too Much Justification? 8. Final Thoughts Bibliography Index
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