Game-Theoretic Solutions
E-Book, Englisch, 347 Seiten
Reihe: ISSN
ISBN: 978-1-934078-11-2
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Such a shift is justified for the following reasons: First, the hegemonic model has a dismal track record of success in Africa and elsewhere. Second, the hegemonic model exacerbates linguistic conflicts in many countries. Consequently, policy makers shun it for fear of jeopardizing the fragile social fabric in their respective countries. Last, a shift away from the hegemonic model is recommended because it is too costly to implement. The "democratic model" is undergirded by the Strategic Game Theory proposed by David Laitin. It forecasts a 3±1 language outcome for most African countries. This outcome supports the "three language formula" now called for by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
Zielgruppe
For academics in the field of language planning and policy, non-governmental organizations involved in literacy work, policy makers in charge of language planning and policy, students taking an introductory course in language planning and policy.
Autoren/Hrsg.
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Weitere Infos & Material
1;Acknowledgments;8
2;Preface;10
3;Abbreviations;20
4;Contents;14
5;1 Ten deadly impediments to language planning in Africa Introduction;22
5.1;1.1 Excessive theorization;23
5.2;1.2 The glorification of the LWC mode;25
5.3;1.3 Faulty assessment of ethnolinguistic loyalty;27
5.4;1.4 Elite hypocrisy;32
5.5;1.5 Unaddressed parental concerns;35
5.6;1.6 The low marketability of African languages;37
5.7;1.7 The “dependency” syndrome;41
5.8;1.8 The rigidity of mother-tongue acquisition models;43
5.9;1.9 The alleged prohibitive cost;48
5.10;1.10 “Manisfesto syndrome” and the language plan of action for Africa;50
5.11;1.11 Summary;54
6;2 The strategic Game theory and 3±1 language outcome;56
6.1;Introduction;56
6.2;2.1 Correcting some misconceptions about the Game theory;57
6.3;2.2 The universality of games;58
6.4;2.3 Modern Game theory;60
6.5;2.4 The working parables of the Game theory;74
6.6;2.5 Introducing the Predictioneer's Model;79
6.7;2.6 Summary;94
7;3 A Game-theoretic assessment of language of education policies in French and Portuguese colonies;96
8;Introduction;96
8.1;3.1 The Game theory and colonialism studies;97
8.2;3.2 The rationales for colonialism;98
8.3;3.3 Overview of French colonialism;108
8.4;3.4 A Game-theoretic analysis of players' preference;117
8.5;3.5 Overview of Portuguese colonialism;118
8.6;3.6 Implications for language planning in French and Portuguese colonies;125
8.7;3.7 Summary;127
9;4 A Game-theoretic assessment of language of education policies in Belgian, British, and German colonies;130
10;Introduction;130
10.1;4.1 The legacy of the pluralistic language ideology;130
10.2;4.2 Overview of British colonialism;131
10.3;4.3 Overview of Belgian colonies: Congo, Burundi, Rwanda;151
10.4;4.4 Overview of German colonies;158
10.5;4.5 Summary;167
11;5 Case study: Rethinking mother-tongue education in Cote d'Ivoire;168
11.1;Introduction;168
11.2;5.1 Sociolinguistic survey of Cote d'Ivoire;168
11.3;5.2 The co-habitation of French and indigenous Ivorian languages;174
11.4;5.3 Experimentation with TIM;180
11.5;5.4 Workable models of language of education;192
11.6;5.5 MM and the 3±1 language outcome;195
11.7;5.6 Personnel planning;197
11.8;5.7 Potential obstacles;198
11.9;5.8 Summary;200
12;6 Game-theoretic assessment of language of education policies in African megacities;202
12.1;Introduction;202
12.2;6.1 Urbanization in Africa: Historical overview;202
12.3;6.2 Colonial and post-colonial urbanization;205
12.4;6.3 Rationale of the unprecedented urban growth;209
12.5;6.4 Unemployment, underemployment and urbanization;210
12.6;6.5 Assessing ethnolinguistic loyalty;211
12.7;6.6 The ethnolinguistic profile of African megacities;214
12.8;6.7 The ethnolinguistic occupation of urban spaces;215
12.9;6.8 Urbanization and social network analysis;217
12.10;6.9 Social network analysis in megacities;219
12.11;6.10 Language of education policy in megacities with linguistic homogeneity;222
12.12;6.11 Language of education policy in megacities with ethnolinguistic dominance;223
12.13;6.12 Language of education policy in megacities with ethnolinguistic dominance;225
12.14;6.13 Language planning in cities with ethnolinguistic equilibrium;226
12.15;6.14 Abidjan as a case study;227
12.16;6.15 The implementation of MM in Abidjan;228
12.17;6.16 Language endangerment in African megacities;230
12.18;6.17 Summary;230
13;7 Framework and rationale for literacy planning in rural Africa;232
13.1;Introduction;232
13.2;7.1 The state of adult literacy in Sub-Saharan Africa;232
13.3;7.2 A framework for literacy planning;235
13.4;7.3 How;244
13.5;7.4 Why;254
13.6;7.5 The quest for an optimal model of literacy planning;263
13.7;7.6 Summary;271
14;8 Planning multiple languages on a shoestring budget for profit Introduction;272
14.1;8.1 An overview of the economics of language;273
14.2;8.2 Paradigm shift in language planning;276
14.3;8.3 Application to Cote d'Ivoire;280
14.4;8.4 A quick overview of MM;289
14.5;8.5 Overall cost comparisons and cost-benefit analyses;295
14.6;8.6 Language planning for all;301
14.7;8.7 Summary;304
15;9 Individual efforts in language planning;306
15.1;Introduction;306
15.2;9.1 Genre, organization, and selection;307
15.3;9.2 St. Stefan of Perm;308
15.4;9.3 Eliezer Ben Yehuda;311
15.5;9.4 The Reformation interlude;314
15.6;9.5 Samuel Ajayi Crowther;316
15.7;9.6 Europeans missionaries' language planning strategies in Africa;321
15.8;9.7 A comparison of the past and the present;326
15.9;9.8 Summary;330
16;References;332
17;Index;346
