Kemp / Long / Shimomura Labour Unions and the Theory of International Trade

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9535-0
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 202, 292 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Contributions to Economic Analysis

This book provides a theory of trade between countries in at least one of which the pattern of competitive markets is disturbed by a powerful national labour union and in which, therefore, wage distortions are endogenous; the book then proceeds to re-examine the several comparative-equilibrium questions of conventional trade theory. In addition, several questions are confronted which can be posed only in the new framework.In Chapters II and III, two well-known models of production and trade are taken. In Chapter IV the analysis of Chapter II is reconsidered under the assumption that there is a strong labour union in each trading country. Chapters V-VII broaden the scope of analysis by allowing for capital accumulation and its interaction with union policies.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Kemp, M. C.

Long, N. van

Shimomura, K.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Labour Unions and the Theory of International Trade;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;10
5;Introduction to the Series;6
6;Preface;8
7;CHAPTER 1. A PROSPECTUS;12
7.1;FOOTNOTES;15
8;CHAPTER 2. THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN MODEL;16
8.1;1. PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTIONS;16
8.2;2. A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY: THE TWO TYPES OF EQUILIBRIUM;21
8.3;3. THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF SMALL-COUNTRY EQUILIBRIA (I);30
8.4;4. THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF SMALL-COUNTRY EQUILIBRIA (II);32
8.5;5. UNION-RIDDEN WORLD EQUILIBRIUM;41
8.6;6. WORLD EQUILIBRIUM: COMPARATIVE STATICS;57
8.7;7. INTERNATIONALLY-MOBILE CAPITAL;61
8.8;FOOTNOTES;69
9;CHAPTER 3. THE SPECIFIC-FACTORS MODEL;70
9.1;1. ASSUMPTIONS;70
9.2;2. EQUILIBRIUM OF A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY;71
9.3;3. THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF SMALL-COUNTRY EQUILIBRIA (I);74
9.4;4. THE COMPARARIVE STATICS OF SMALL-COUNTRY EQUILIBRIA (II);84
9.5;5. UNION-RIDDEN WORLD EQUILIBRIUM;91
9.6;6. WORLD EQUILIBRIUM: COMPARATIVE STATICS;104
9.7;7. INTERNATIONALLY-MOBILE SPECIFIC FACTORS;105
9.8;8. SHORT-RUN SPECIFICITY: AN ADJUSTMENT PROCESS;110
9.9;APPENDIX TO SECTION 8: CONSTRUCTION OF PHASE DIAGRAM;126
9.10;FOOTNOTES;164
10;CHAPTER 4. A LABOUR UNION IN EVERY COUNTRY;166
10.1;1. ASSUMPTIONS, DEFINITIONS, AND OTHER PRELIMINARIES;166
10.2;2. COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM: CAPITAL INTERNATIONALLY IMMOBILE;171
10.3;3. COMPARATIVE STATICS;182
10.4;4. COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM: CAPITAL INTERNATIONALLY MOBILE;185
10.5;5. COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM: TIONALLY MOBILE LABOUR INTERNA;187
10.6;APPENDIX: BERTRAND-NASH EQUILIBRIA;188
11;CHAPTER 5. UNION POWER IN THE LONG RUN1;192
11.1;1. INTRODUCTION;192
11.2;2. THE MODEL;193
11.3;3. PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL;197
11.4;4. ACCOMMODATING AN ECONOMIC MIDDLE CLASS;219
11.5;5. OPTIMAL SAVING BY CAPITALISTS;221
11.6;FOOTNOTES;223
11.7;APPENDIX PROOF THAT CURVE BC IN FIGURE 4 IS MONOTONE;224
12;CHAPTER 6. A DIFFERENTIAL GAME BETWEEN THE LABOUR UNIONS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES;226
12.1;1. INTRODUCTION;226
12.2;2. THE MODEL;226
12.3;3. ANALYSIS;232
13;CHAPTER 7. A DIFFERENTIAL GAME BETWEEN ORGANIZED LABOUR AND ORGANIZED CAPITAL;242
13.1;1. INTRODUCTION;242
13.2;2. ANALYSIS;244
13.3;3. POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS;276
13.4;APPENDIX 1 DIRECT PROOF THAT IF A FEEDBACK-NASH EQUILIBRIUM EXISTS THEN THE PAIR OF STRATEGIES (x(z,t) = min{z,x*}, s(z,t) = 0) IS A FEEDBACK-NASH EQUILIBRIUM;278
13.5;APPENDIX 2 THE IDENTITY OF THE FEEDBACK-NASH AND FEEDBACK-STACKELBERG SOLUTIONS WHEN THE LABOUR UNION LEADS;288
14;REFERENCES;290
15;INDEX;296