E-Book, Englisch, 206 Seiten, Web PDF
Kelly / Shell Arrow Impossibility Theorems
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7126-2
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
E-Book, Englisch, 206 Seiten, Web PDF
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7126-2
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
Arrow Impossibility Theorems is a 10-chapter text that describes existing impossibility theorems. This book explores a number of formalizations of ethical constraints of the theorems. After an introduction to the framework and notation for Arrow impossibility theorems, this book goes on discussing some concepts and an apparatus of relations among those concepts which are important for the theorems. Other chapters present some impossibility results that serve to point out serious difficulties in some plausible escape routes from the theorems of earlier chapters. The final chapter describes important areas of research that have arisen in the collective choice field in the transition away from studying the conditions of Arrow's theorem alone to the totality of all impossibility theorems. This book is intended primarily for economists.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Front Cover;1
2;Arrow Impossibility Theorems;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Dedication;6
6;PREFACE;10
7;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;12
8;INTRODUCTION;14
9;CHAPTER 1. FRAMEWORK;18
10;CHAPTER 2. DECISIVENESS;22
11;CHAPTER 3. SIMPLICITY: CONDITIONS;32
12;CHAPTER 4. SIMPLICITY: IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS;48
13;CHAPTER 5. CONDITIONAL DECISIVENESS;67
14;CHAPTER 6. STRATEGY-PROOFNESS;78
15;CHAPTER 7. DOMAIN: PART I;96
16;CHAPTER 8. DOMAIN: PART II;123
16.1;Cardinal Utility;131
16.2;Extended Preference;134
16.3;Exercises;151
17;CHAPTER 9. RIGHTS EXERCISING;153
17.1;Sequence Extensions;160
17.2;Refinements of the Sequence Concept;162
17.3;Correctable Miscalculations;164
18;CHAPTER 10. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS;170
18.1;Strategy-Proofness;170
18.2;Arrow's Theorem and the Justice Criterion;171
18.3;Variable Population Size;171
18.4;Impossibility Results without a Pareto Condition;171
18.5;Social Choice from Individual Choice;172
18.6;Evaluation of Conditions;172
19;MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX;175
19.1;A. Logic;175
19.2;B. Sets;176
19.3;C. Relations and Functions;177
19.4;D. Integers;180
19.5;E. Zorn's Lemma;180
19.6;F. Notation Note;180
20;SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES;182
21;AUTHOR INDEX;200
22;SUBJECT INDEX;204
