Imbeau Do They Walk Like They Talk?

Speech and Action in Policy Processes
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-0-387-89672-4
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 15, 306 Seiten

Reihe: Studies in Public Choice

George Bush's 1988 campaign pledge, 'Read my lips: no new taxes,' has become a mantra for those who distrust politicians and bureaucrats. The gulf between what political leaders say and do seems to be widening, and in democratic societies around the world, contributing to an atmosphere of cynicism and apathy among the citizenry. Understanding the characteristics and functions of speech in policy processes is a requirement for trying to overcome this problem; indeed, politicians and bureaucrats spend a good proportion of their time and resources discoursing, i.e., writing, speaking, and publishing. However, there has been scant analysis of political discourse; the aim of this book is to fill this analytical gap, by exploring political speech from a variety of perspectives, including normative, epistemological, and empirical. Incorporating insights from economics, political science, philosophy, and law, and evidence from the United States, Canada, France, Italy, Turkey, and the EU, the book addresses a wide variety of timely issues, including:. Fiscal discipline in speeches vs budget balance: Is an improvement (deterioration) of the budget balance preceded by a more (less) fiscally disciplined discourse? Revenues and spending forecasted in budget speeches vs realised budget outcomes: Is there a systematic bias? If so, how can we explain it? Electoral pledges vs actual realisations: Do governments follow up on their electoral pledges? Ideological stance in party publications vs spending and revenues of party governments: Do parties of the right and the left speak different languages? How can we validly classify a government as of the left or of the right? Is there a systematic difference between governments of the right and of the left in terms of their policy? Speeches by central bank officers vs monetary policy: Can changes in monetary policy be predicted by official speeches? The political business cycle: How can taking into consideration the speech-action relationship strengthen (or threaten) our knowledge about electoral and partisan cycles in public spending? Other questions explored include: Should policy makers always tell the truth and all the truth? What are the benefits and the costs of transparency? How can we resolve the apparent contradiction between the democratic demand for transparency and the efficiency requirement of secrecy in many policy areas (budget preparation, monetary policy, foreign policy, security, etc.)? Under which conditions is secrecy acceptable in a democratic society? To what extent may deception and lies lead to a breach of trust or to power abuse? What are the most efficient institutional mechanisms to prevent such abuse? Collectively, the authors present new insights for understanding political process and government activity, and suggest avenues for further research.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Imbeau, Louis M.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Foreword;5
1.1;The Language of Democracy Between Words and Facts;5
1.2;References;8
2;Acknowledgments;9
3;Contents;10
4;Contributors;12
5;Introduction;14
5.1;Dissonance in Policy Processes: An Introduction;15
5.1.1;1.1 Policy Dissonance in the Political Economic Literature;16
5.1.2;1.2 Approaches to Policy Dissonance;19
5.1.3;1.3 Anatomy of the Book;21
5.1.4;References;26
6;Disciplinary Perspectives;28
6.1;The Power of Words: A Philosophical Perspective;29
6.1.1;2.1 Mindlessness;30
6.1.2;2.2 A Case for Culture;34
6.1.3;References;38
6.2;Information Shrouding and the Governmental Supply of Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective;40
6.2.1;3.1 Introduction;40
6.2.2;3.2 A Simple Hypothesis;43
6.2.3;3.3 Shrouding in the Marketplace Illustrated;44
6.2.3.1;3.3.1 False Labeling: Wild Salmon;44
6.2.3.2;3.3.2 Glossing: Extended Warranties;45
6.2.3.3;3.3.3 Deception: Airline Travel;46
6.2.4;3.4 The Simple Hypothesis Enlarged;47
6.2.5;3.5 Shrouding in the Public Sector Illustrated;49
6.2.5.1;3.5.1 Explicit Shrouding;49
6.2.5.2;3.5.2 Implicit Shrouding;55
6.2.6;3.6 Conclusion;58
6.2.7;References;59
6.3;Party Rhetoric and Practice: A Normative Perspective from Political Science;61
6.3.1;4.1 Why Should We Look at Political Parties?;62
6.3.2;4.2 The Functions of Rhetoric in Relation to a Political Party’s Practice;63
6.3.2.1;4.2.1 The Function of Displaying;63
6.3.2.2;4.2.2 The Function of Concealing;64
6.3.2.3;4.2.3 The Function of Legitimization;65
6.3.2.4;4.2.4 The Function of Contestation;66
6.3.2.5;4.2.5 The Function of Contradiction Processing;67
6.3.3;4.3 Reconciling Rhetoric and Practice;68
6.3.3.1;4.3.1 The Measures Needed to Correct the Gaps Related to Displaying;69
6.3.3.2;4.3.2 The Measures Needed to Correct the Gaps Related to Concealing;69
6.3.3.3;4.3.3 The Measures Needed to Correct the Gaps Related to Legitimization;70
6.3.3.4;4.3.4 Measures Needed to Correct the Gaps Related to Contestation;70
6.3.3.5;4.3.5 Measures Needed to Correct the Problem of Highlighting Discrepancies;71
6.3.4;4.4 Conclusion;71
6.3.5;References;72
6.4;Measuring How Political Parties Keep Their Promises: A Positive Perspective from Political Science;73
6.4.1;5.1 Introduction;73
6.4.2;5.2 Theory: Why Should We Expect Political Parties to Keep Their Election Promises?;74
6.4.3;5.3 Method: How to Test Whether Campaign Pledges are Redeemed;76
6.4.4;5.4 Analysis;78
6.4.5;5.5 Conclusion and Discussion;85
6.4.6;References;87
7;Empirical Studies;89
7.1;Measuring US Presidents’ Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline Between 1920 and 2008;90
7.1.1;6.1 Why and How to Measure Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline?;90
7.1.2;6.2 Building up a Matrix of Analysis of Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline;93
7.1.3;6.3 The Index of Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline;99
7.1.4;6.4 US Presidents’ Political Attitude Toward Deficits, 1920–2008 ;100
7.1.4.1;6.4.1 Statements Identified;100
7.1.4.2;6.4.2 The Index of Fiscal Discipline;103
7.1.4.3;6.4.3 The Structure of the Political Discourse;105
7.1.5;6.5 Conclusions;111
7.1.6;References;112
7.2;Would You Trust an Italian Politician? Evidence from Italian Regional Politics;115
7.2.1;7.1 Goals of the Analysis;115
7.2.2;7.2 A Brief Description of the Italian Regional Politics;118
7.2.3;7.3 Methodology;119
7.2.4;7.4 Content Analysis;120
7.2.5;7.5 Evaluation of Political Accountability;122
7.2.6;7.6 Erosion of Accountability and Financial Constraints;127
7.2.7;7.7 Conclusion;131
7.2.8;Appendix A: Data Sources;132
7.2.8.1;VII Legislature;132
7.2.8.2;VIII Legislature;133
7.2.9;Appendix B: List of Abbreviations and Type of Statute of the Italian Regions;134
7.2.10;References;134
7.3;General Policy Speech of Prime Ministers and Fiscal Choices in France: ‘‘ Preach Water and Drink Wine!’’;136
7.3.1;8.1 Introduction;137
7.3.2;8.2 General Policy Speeches of French Prime Ministers: Framework, Stakes, and Shape;138
7.3.2.1;8.2.1 The Role of the Prime Minister in the Fifth Republic;138
7.3.2.2;8.2.2 The Importance of General Policy Inauguration Address;139
7.3.2.3;8.2.3 The Political Aspect of the General Policy Inauguration Address;140
7.3.3;8.3 The General Policy Inaugural Address and Budget Action: The Expected Consequences;140
7.3.4;8.4 Data and Estimation Strategy;142
7.3.4.1;8.4.1 The Description of Focused Governments;142
7.3.4.2;8.4.2 The General Policy Inauguration Address of the French Prime Ministers;144
7.3.4.3;8.4.3 The Prerogatives of the Central Government;150
7.3.5;8.5 Estimation and Results;150
7.3.5.1;8.5.1 Selection of an Estimator;151
7.3.5.2;8.5.2 Definition of Variables;152
7.3.5.3;8.5.3 Results;153
7.3.6;8.6 Conclusion;156
7.3.7;Appendix1: The Stationarity of Data;157
7.3.8;References;158
7.4;Do Governments Manipulate Their Revenue Forecasts? Budget Speech and Budget Outcomes in the Canadian Provinces;160
7.4.1;9.1 Introduction;160
7.4.2;9.2 The Sources of Revenue Forecast Errors;161
7.4.3;9.3 Literature Review;162
7.4.4;9.4 Revenue Forecast Errors in the Canadian Provinces 1986–2004;164
7.4.5;9.5 Conclusion;169
7.4.6;Appendix: Variable Definitions and Data Sources;170
7.4.7;References;171
7.5;Dissonance in Fiscal Policy: A Power Approach;172
7.5.1;10.1 Introduction;172
7.5.2;10.2 Power Relations in Fiscal Policy: A Conceptual Framework ;173
7.5.2.1;10.2.1 A General Model of Power Relations in the Policy Process;173
7.5.2.2;10.2.2 Power Relations and Budget Balance: The Use of Coercion and Exchange;175
7.5.2.3;10.2.3 The Use of Persuasion;176
7.5.2.4;10.2.4 Fiscal Policy Dissonance;179
7.5.3;10.3 An Empirical Application of the Model;181
7.5.3.1;10.3.1 Fiscal Discipline in Action: The Evolution of Budget Balance in Four Canadian Provinces;181
7.5.3.2;10.3.2 Conservatism in Inaugural Speeches;183
7.5.3.3;10.3.3 The Discrepancy Between Speech and Action: Measuring Dissonance;186
7.5.4;10.4 Conclusion;188
7.5.5;References;189
7.6;Speeches and Legislative Extremism in the U. S. Senate;190
7.6.1;11.1 Introduction;190
7.6.2;11.2 The Determinants of Legislative Speech;192
7.6.3;11.3 Research Design;195
7.6.4;11.4 Analysis and Results;201
7.6.5;11.5 Discussion and Conclusion;207
7.6.6;References;209
7.7;Do Parties Matter? A Qualitative Answer with Numbers;211
7.7.1;12.1 Introduction;211
7.7.2;12.2 Inaugural Speeches and Party Platform in Quebec: 1960–2006;212
7.7.2.1;12.2.1 Defining Left and Right;213
7.7.2.2;12.2.2 Policies;213
7.7.2.3;12.2.3 Coding the Speeches;214
7.7.3;12.3 Results ;215
7.7.3.1;12.3.1 The Policies;215
7.7.3.2;12.3.2 The Ideology in the Party Platform;217
7.7.3.3;12.3.3 Party Labels as Surrogates for Ideology;218
7.7.3.4;12.3.4 Governments;220
7.7.4;12.4 Discussion and Conclusion;221
7.7.5;References;224
7.8;Talking Like a Tax Collector or a Social Guardian? The Use of Administrative Discourse by U. S. State Lottery Agencies;226
7.8.1;13.1 Introduction;226
7.8.2;13.2 State Lotteries in Perspective;227
7.8.2.1;13.2.1 What is a Lottery?;227
7.8.2.2;13.2.2 Is Lottery Regressive?;228
7.8.2.3;13.2.3 Is There a Substitution Effect?;229
7.8.2.4;13.2.4 Why are There State Lotteries?;229
7.8.3;13.3 Tax Collector or Social Guardian? An Empirical Exploration;232
7.8.3.1;13.3.1 Content Analyzing Administrative Discourse;232
7.8.3.2;13.3.2 Explaining the Variation in Lottery Visions;236
7.8.4;13.4 Conclusion;240
7.8.5;References;241
7.9;The Early European ‘‘Federalism’’: Ambiguities of Talks About How to Walk Toward a Political Union;244
7.9.1;14.1 Introduction;244
7.9.2;14.2 Consensual Speeches and the First Steps Toward a Political Agency Contract;248
7.9.3;14.3 Trying to Go Further (with More Talk and Writing);250
7.9.4;14.4 The Ambiguities of the Discourse on the Nature of the Political Union;252
7.9.5;14.5 Conclusion;255
7.9.6;References;257
7.9.7;Other Bibliographical Sources;258
7.10;A Semiotic Network Comparison of Technocratic and Populist Discourses in Turkey;259
7.10.1;15.1 Introduction;259
7.10.2;15.2 Discourse, Knowledge, and Action: The Constitution of Semiotic Communities;261
7.10.3;15.3 Semiotic Analysis: Decoding the Logic of Discourses;263
7.10.4;15.4 Map Analysis;264
7.10.5;15.5 Methodology;265
7.10.5.1;15.5.1 Sampling;266
7.10.5.2;15.5.2 Data Collection: Context and Instruments;267
7.10.5.3;15.5.3 Context;268
7.10.5.4;15.5.4 Instrument;268
7.10.5.5;15.5.5 Data Analysis;269
7.10.6;15.6 Findings and Discussion;270
7.10.6.1;15.6.1 Convergence of Technocratic and Populist Discourses;270
7.10.6.2;15.6.2 Semiotic Maps;271
7.10.7;15.7 Conclusion;275
7.10.8;References;275
8;Conclusion;278
8.1;Do They Walk Like They Talk? A Conclusion;279
8.1.1;16.1 Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Conclusions;280
8.1.1.1;16.1.1 Normative Theoretical Conclusions;280
8.1.1.2;16.1.2 Positive Theoretical Conclusions;280
8.1.1.3;16.1.3 Empirical Conclusions;282
8.1.2;16.2 Three Models of Policy Speech and Action;283
8.1.3;16.3 Concluding Remark: Is Dissonance Pathological?;288
8.1.4;References;290
8.2;About the Contributors;291
8.3;Index;298