Ichiishi / Neyman / Tauman Game Theory and Applications

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9505-3
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 436 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics

Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions. - Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory - Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm - Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology - Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists

Autoren/Hrsg.

Ichiishi, Tatsuro

Neyman, Abraham

Tauman, Yair

Shell, Karl

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Game Theory and Applications;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;Contributors;9
6;Preface;12
7;Chapter 1.
Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas;16
7.1;1. INTRODUCTION;16
7.2;2. BACKWARD INDUCTION AND FORWARD INDUCTION;16
7.3;3. INFORMAL APPLICATIONS;22
7.4;4. THE PROBLEM OF INCONSISTENCY;24
7.5;5. THE EXISTENCE THEOREM: VERSION I;26
7.6;6. FORMAL APPLICATIONS;27
7.7;7. CONSISTENCY OF BELIEFS;33
7.8;8. ADMISSIBILITY;37
7.9;9. RESTRICTIONS ON OUT-OF-EQUILIBRIUM BELIEFS;42
7.10;10. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF "IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES";43
7.11;11. DEDUCTIONS BEYOND IIA;47
7.12;12. CONCLUDING REMARKS;52
7.13;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;53
7.14;APPENDIX A;53
7.15;APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 3;55
7.16;References;57
8;Chapter 2.
Supergames;59
8.1;1. NOTATION;59
8.2;2. VARIATIONS ON THE FOLK THEOREM;61
8.3;3. GAMES WITH SIGNALS;67
8.4;4. COOPERATION AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY;72
8.5;REFERENCES;75
9;Chapter 3.
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information;77
9.1;1. INTRODUCTION;77
9.2;2. MODEL OF INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION;78
9.3;3. NASH EQUILIBRIA;79
9.4;4. CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA;82
9.5;5. MORE GENERAL INFORMATION AND SIGNALLING STRUCTURES:
ZERO-SUM CASE;84
9.6;5.3 GAMES SOLVED BY NORMAL FORM METHODS;87
9.7;REFERENCES;88
10;Chapter 4.
Repeated Games;90
10.1;1. ORIGINS AND MOTIVATION OF THE PROBLEM;90
10.2;2. A QUICK (AND INCOMPLETE) GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE;99
10.3;3. SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE GENERAL MODEL;114
10.4;REFERENCES;138
11;Chapter 5.
Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games;144
11.1;1. INTRODUCTION;144
11.2;2. DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGIC GAMES;147
11.3;3. DESCRIPTION OF REPEATED GAMES;149
11.4;4. AUTOMATA AND COMPLEXITY MEASURES IN REPEATED GAMES;153
11.5;5. GAMES WITH RESTRICTED PLAYERS;157
11.6;6. COMPLEXITY CHOICES OF UNRESTRICTED PLAYERS;165
11.7;7. CONCLUDING REMARKS;167
11.8;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;167
11.9;BIBLIOGRAPHY;168
11.10;The Shapley Value;171
11.11;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;176
11.12;REFERENCES;176
12;Chapter 6.
Advances in Value Theory;179
12.1;1. FINITE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY;179
12.2;2. FINITE GAMES WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY;181
12.3;3. LARGE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY;183
12.4;4. LARGE GAMES WITH NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY;187
12.5;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;187
12.6;REFERENCES;187
13;Chapter 7.
Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel;189
13.1;1. COALITIONAL GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY;189
13.2;2. COALITIONAL GAMES WITHOUT SlDE PAYMENTS;193
13.3;REFERENCES;195
14;Chapter 8.
Consistency;196
14.1;REFERENCES;198
15;Chapter 9.
The Consistency Principle;200
15.1;1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION;200
15.2;2. THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE;201
15.3;3. APPLICATIONS;206
15.4;4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS;226
15.5;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;226
15.6;REFERENCES;226
16;Chapter 10.
Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity;229
16.1;1. INTRODUCTION;229
16.2;2. NOTATION;231
16.3;3. EXAMPLES;232
16.4;4. NONDEGENERACY AND HOMOGENEITY;235
16.5;6. THE WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CORE IN A TRANSFERABLE UTILITY MARKET
(TU MARKET);239
16.6;REFERENCES;244
17;Chapter 11.
Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence;245
17.1;1. INTRODUCTION;245
17.2;2. THE LABOR MARKET FOR AMERICAN MEDICAL INTERNS;246
17.3;3. A MODEL OF THE
HOSPITAL–INTERN MARKET;248
17.4;4. STABILITY AND STRATEGY;252
17.5;5. THE DETAILED STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF STABLE MATCHINGS;259
17.6;6. DISCUSSION;263
17.7;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;264
17.8;REFERENCES;264
18;Chapter 12.
Strategie Market Game Models of Exchange Economies;265
18.1;1. INTRODUCTION;265
18.2;2. MARKETS WITH A SINGLE MONEY;266
18.3;3. MARKETS WITH MANY MONIES;275
18.4;4. AXIOMATIZATIONS OF TRADE WITH MARKETS AND MONEY;281
18.5;5. FURTHER DIRECTIONS;282
18.6;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;283
18.7;REFERENCES;283
19;Chapter 13.
Information Transmission;286
19.1;1. INTRODUCTION;286
19.2;2. THE BASIC DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS;287
19.3;3. INFORMATION ABOUT CHANCE MOVES;289
19.4;REFERENCES;294
20;Chapter 14.
Monotonie Surplus Sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources;295
20.1;1. INTRODUCTION;295
20.2;2. PARAMETRIC SURPLUS SHARING PROBLEMS;296
20.3;3. THE SOLIDARITY AXIOM;299
20.4;4. THE MONOTONICITY AXIOM;300
20.5;5. THE CASE OF LATTICE HOMOMORPHISMS;303
20.6;6. THE EXISTENCE OF A MONOTONIC SOLUTION: THE GENERAL CASE;306
20.7;7. THE DEFICIT SHARING PROBLEM;308
20.8;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;311
20.9;REFERENCES;311
21;Chapter 15.
Developments in Stable Set Theory;313
21.1;1. INTRODUCTION;313
21.2;2. THE vN&M
MODEL;314
21.3;3. FINITE AND DISCRIMINATORY STABLE SETS;316
21.4;4. SYMMETRIC STABLE SETS;317
21.5;6. VARIANTS OF STABLE SETS;325
21.6;REFERENCES;328
22;Chapter
16. Game Theoretic Models of Voting in Multidimensional Issue Spaces;330
22.1;1. INTRODUCTION;330
22.2;2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS;331
22.3;3. EXISTENCE OF A CORE;333
22.4;4. EXTENT OF INTRANSITIVITIES;337
22.5;5. GENERICITY RESULTS;339
22.6;6. INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION;342
22.7;REFERENCES;347
23;Chapter 17.
Israel and the PLO: A Game with Differential Information;349
23.1;1. PREFACE;349
23.2;2. GAMES WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION;351
23.3;3. POLICIES;353
23.4;4. OUTCOMES AND OUTCOME FUNCTION;356
23.5;5. PLAYERS'
TYPES AND THE PAYOFF FUNCTION ;360
23.6;6. COMPUTATION OF THE EQUILIBRIA;365
23.7;7. INTERPRETATION;367
23.8;NOTE ADDED IN PROOF;369
23.9;REFERENCES;369
24;Chapter 18. A Survey of Some Results
Closely Related to the Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz Theorem;371
24.1;1. INTRODUCTION;371
24.2;2. COVERING THEOREMS OF SIMPLEXES;371
24.3;3. Two CONSEQUENCES OF A GENERALIZED KKM THEOREM;374
24.4;4. MATCHING MINIMUM THEOREM AND ITS APPLICATIONS;376
24.5;5. INTERCONNECTIONS;380
24.6;REFERENCES;381
25;Chapter 19.
Selected Abstracts from the Proceedings of the 1987 International Conference, Ohio State University;384
26;Chapter 20. On the Core of the Assignment Game;386
26.1;REFERENCES;387
27;Chapter 21.
The Second Welfare Theorem in Nonconvex Economies;388
27.1;REFERENCES;388
28;Chapter 22.
An Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Risk-Taking;390
29;Chapter 23.
Values of Nonatomic Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?;393
30;Chapter 24.
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Discrete and Continuous Games: Does Discretization Matter?;394
30.1;REFERENCE;395
31;Chapter 25.
To Vote or Not to Vote: What Is the Quota?;396
32;Chapter 26.
Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues;397
33;Chapter 27.
Comparative Cooperative Game Theory;398
33.1;RESULTS ON SIDE-PAYMENT GAMES;398
33.2;RESULTS ON NON-SIDE-PAYMENT GAMES;399
33.3;ADDENDUM;400
34;Chapter 28.
Escalation and Cooperation in International Conflicts: The Dollar-Auction Revisited;401
34.1;REFERENCES;402
35;Chapter 29.
An Axiomatization of the Nonsymmetric, Nontransferable Utility Value;403
36;Chapter 30.
A Milnor Condition for Nonatomic Lipschitz Games and Its Applications;405
36.1;REFERENCES;405
37;Chapter 31. Zero-Sum Nonstationary Stochastic Games
with General State Space;406
37.1;1. INTRODUCTION;406
37.2;2. GAMES WITH STANDARD INFORMATION PATTERN;406
37.3;3. GAMES WITH LACK OF INFORMATION ON BOTH SIDES;408
37.4;REFERENCES;409
38;Chapter 32.
Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination;411
39;Chapter 33.
A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long Term Contracts;414
40;Chapter 34.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences;417
40.1;REFERENCES;419
41;Chapter 35.
The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study;420
42;Chapter 36. Rate of Convergence to Full Efficiency in the Buyers' Bid Double Auction
as the Market Becomes Large;421
43;Chapter 37.
Stationary Strategies in Deterministic Games;422
43.1;REFERENCES;422
44;Chapter 38.
Big Boss Games, Clan Games, and Information Market Games;423
44.1;REFERENCES;425
45;Chapter 39.
Large Games and Economies with Near-Exhaustion of Gainsto Coalition Formation;426
45.1;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;428
45.2;REFERENCES;428
46;Chapter 40.
Values of Large Finite Games;429
46.1;REFERENCES;430
47;Index;432