Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour

Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality
2004. Auflage 2004
ISBN: 978-1-4039-4167-1
Verlag: Palgrave MacMillan UK

Buch, Englisch, 341 Seiten, Format (B × H): 143 mm x 216 mm, Gewicht: 540 g

This volume contains sixteen original articles documenting recent progress in understanding strategic behaviour. In their variety they reflect an entire spectrum of coexisting approaches: from orthodox game theory via behavioural game theory, bounded rationality and economic psychology to experimental economics. There are plenty of new models and insights but the book also illustrates the boundaries of what we know today and explains the frontiers of tomorrow. The articles were written in honour of Werner Güth.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Huck, S.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Boundedly Rational Qualitative Reasoning in Comparative Statics; R.Selten Complexity Constraints and Adaptive Learning: An Example; T.Börgers & A.J.Morales Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups; D.Friedman & N.Singh Network Formation and Coordination Games; S.K.Berninghaus & B.Vogt Specific Skills, Imperfect Information and Job Rationing; H.Bester Testing Game Theory; J.Weibull A Dialogue Concerning the Nature of Rationality; H. Kliemt & Axel Ockenfels Behavioral Game Theory: Thinking, Learning, and Teaching; C. F.Camerer, T-H.Ho & J.Kuan Chong Double Auction Markets with Stochastic Supply and Demand Schedules: Call Markets and Continuous Auction Trading Mechanisms; J.H.Kagel Multistage Sealed-bid K-double Auctions: An Experimental Study of Bilateral Bargaining; J.E.Parco, A.Rapoport, D. A.Seale, W.E.Stein & R.Zwick The Role of Arbitration in Bargaining; G.E.Bolton & E.Katok Communication and Cooperation in a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma: A Field Experiment; J-C.Cardenas, T.K.Ahn & E.Ostrom Price Competition: The Role of Gender and Education; M.Dufwenberg, U.Gneezy & A.Rustichini Parity, Sympathy, and Reciprocity; W.Güth & M.E.Yaari Fairness and Greed in Stackelberg Games; S.Huck, M.Königstein & W.Müller Learning from (and in) the Ultimatum Game: An Interview with Alvin E. Roth; S.Huck

Über Autor(innen)

T. K. AHN Florida State University, USA
HELMUT BESTER Free University of Berlin, Germany
SIEGFRIED K. BERNINGHAUS University of Karlsruhe, Germany
GARY BOLTON Penn State University, USA
TILMAN BÖRGERS University College London, UK
COLIN F. CAMERER California Institute of Technology, USA
JUAN-CAMILO CARDENAS Universidad de Los Andes, Bogota
MARTIN DUFWENBERG University of Arizona, USA
DANIEL FRIEDMAN University of California Santa Cruz, USA
URI GNEEZY University of Chicago, USA
WERNER GÜTH Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Germany
TECK-HUA HO University of California Berkeley, USA
JOHN H. KAGEL Ohio State University, USA
ELENA KATOK Penn State University, USA
HARTMUT KLIEMT Gerhard Mercator University, Duisburg, Germany
MANFRED KÖNIGSTEIN University of Erfurt, Germany
JUIN KUAN CHONG National University of Singapore, Singapore
ANTONIO J. MORALES University of Malaga, Spain
WIELAND MÜLLER Tilburg University, The Netherlands
AXEL OCKENFELS University of Cologne, Germany
EILINOR OSTROM Indiana University, USA
JAMES E. PARCO United States Air Force Academy, USA
AMNON RAPOPORT University of Arizona, USA
ALVIN E. ROTH Harvard University, USA
ALDO RUSTICHINI University of Minnesota, USA
DARRYL A. SEALE University of Nevada, USA
REINHARD SELTEN University of Bonn, Germany
NIRVIKAR SINGH University of California Santa Cruz, USA
WILLIAM E. STEIN Texas A&M University, USA
BODO VOGT University of Magdeburg, Germany
JÖRGEN WEIBULLBoston University, USA
MENAHEM E. YAARI Hebrew University, Israel
RAMI ZWICK Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong