Buch, Englisch, 284 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 436 g
Buch, Englisch, 284 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 436 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-928698-0
Verlag: OUP Oxford
Is the world hierarchically arranged, incorporating 'levels' of reality? What is the nature of objects and properties? What does 'realism' about ordinary objects or states of mind demand? When an assertion is true, what makes it true? Are natural properties best regarded as qualities or powers or some combination of these? What are colours? What explains the 'projective' character of intentionality? What is the nature of consciousness, and what relation do conscious
experiences bear to material states and processes?
From an Ontological Point of View endeavours to provide answers to such questions through an examination of ground-floor issues in ontology. The result is an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us and an application of this account to problems dominating recent work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
The book, written in an accessible, non-technical style, is intended for non-specialists as well as seasoned
Zielgruppe
Scholars and students of philosophy, particularly of metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- ONTOLOGY
- 2 Levels of Reality
- 3 Predicates and Properties
- 4 Difficulties for the Levels Conception
- 5 Abandoning Levels
- 6 Philosophical Analysis
- 7 Truth Making
- 8 Powers
- 9 Dispositional and Categorical Properties
- 10 Properties as Pure Powers
- 11 The Identity Theory
- 12 Universals
- 13 Modes
- 14 Imperfect Similarity
- 15 Objects
- 16 Substantial Identity
- APPLICATIONS
- 17 Colour
- 18 Intentionality
- 19 Conscious Experience
- 20 Zombies
