The Admissible Contents of Experience

1. Auflage 2011
ISBN: 978-1-4443-3335-0
Verlag: Wiley

Buch, Englisch, 208 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 226 mm, Gewicht: 318 g

Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. - The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex  Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of Texas, Austin), Richard Price (All Souls College, Oxford) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)
- Essays address the central questions surrounding the content of perceptual experience
- Investigates how are we able to determine the admissible contents of experience
- Published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterly

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hawley, Katherine

Macpherson, Fiona

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction (Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow).
1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne, University of Oxford).

2.  Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven Butterfill, University of Warwick).

3. Experience And Content (Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

4. Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? (Tim Crane, University College London).

5. Conscious Reference (Alva Noë, University of California, Berkeley).

6. What Are The Contents Of Experiences? (Adam Pautz, University of Texas at Austin).

7. Aspect-Switching And Visual Phenomenal Character (Richard Price, University of Oxford).

8. The Visual Experience Of Causation (Susanna Siegel, Harvard University).

9. The Admissible Contents Of Visual Experience (Michael Tye, University  of Texas at Austin).

Index.

Über Autor(innen)

Katherine Hawley is Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews and Editorial Chair of the Philosophical Quarterly.  She has published articles in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of science, and is the author of How Things Persist (2001).
Fiona Macpherson is Senior Lecturer and Director of the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience, University of Glasgow. She has recently also been a Research Fellow at the Centre for Consciousness, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. She has published articles in philosophy of mind, psychology and perception and is a co-editor (with Adrian Haddock) of Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (2008).