Hassin Rational Queueing

Erscheinungsjahr 2016
ISBN: 978-1-4987-4528-4
Verlag: CRC Press
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 392 Seiten

Understand the Strategic Behavior in Queueing Systems

Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative manner.

The book first addresses observable queues and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses other types of information in queueing systems and compares observable and unobservable variations and incentives for information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant models for the maximization of individual utilities, social welfare, and profits.

After covering queueing networks, from simple parallel servers to general network structures, the author describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational agents.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hassin, Refael

Fachgebiete

• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Stochastik Bayesianische Inferenz
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Unternehmensforschung

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction

Rational queueing

Scope

Mode of description

Basic models and assumptions

Demand

Information

Social optimality

Useful concepts

Terminology conventions

Plan

Observable queues

Extensions and variations of Naor’s model

The dual approach

Allocation of heterogeneous items

Probabilistic joining

Server selection and capacity allocation

Dynamic control

Information

Queue-length-information heterogeneity

Quality-information heterogeneity and signaling

Processing-time information

Information acquisition

Information control

Environmental uncertainty

Delayed information and cheap talk

Ticket queues

Customer decisions

Temporal decisions

Joining, reneging, and jockeying

Benchmark effects

Priority purchasing, overtaking, and line-cutting

Duplicate orders

Choosing the arrival rate

Choosing the service duration

Social optimization and cooperation

Coordination by pricing

Positive network effects

Priorities

Strategies using memory

Decentralized systems

Systems with public and private service facilities

Cooperation in service systems

Efficiency and price of anarchy

Trading positions

Monopoly

Profit maximization in Naor’s model

Price and capacity

Expert systems

Subscriptions and nonlinear pricing

Providing substitute services

Priorities

Hoteling-type location models

Searching for customers

Competition

Competition when customers maximize utility

Competition with exogenous demand functions

Competition with limited cooperation

Multi-period competition

Hoteling-type models

Customer loyalty

Routing in queueing networks

Parallel servers

Queues with different regimes

Complementary services

Partial control

Routing with transportation costs

Braess-type paradoxes

The Downs–Thomson paradox

Supply chains, outsourcing, and contracting

Inventory supply chains

Service supply chains

Allocation of demand to suppliers

Competition

Internet service provision

Queueing games

Vacations

Strategic vacations

Forced vacations, breakdowns, and catastrophes

Clearing systems

Bounded rationality

Heuristic strategies

Quantal response and attraction demand functions

Quotation sensitivity
Joining and reneging

Bibliography

Subject index

Author index

Über Autor(innen)

Refael Hassin is a professor in the Department of Statistics and Operations Research at Tel Aviv University. A prominent international scholar, Dr. Hassin is well recognized for his contributions in the area of rational queueing. He has received four grants from the Israel Science Foundation to investigate strategic queueing systems. His research interests include discrete optimization and the economics of queues. He received his PhD in operations research (with distinction) from Yale University.