Haji Freedom and Value

Freedom's Influence on Welfare and Worldly Value
1. Auflage 2008
ISBN: 978-1-4020-9077-6
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 21, 204 Seiten

Reihe: Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy

Freedom of the sort implicated in acting freely or with free will is important to the truth of different sorts of moral judgment, such as judgments of moral responsibility and those of moral obligation. Little thought, however, has been invested into whether appraisals of good or evil presuppose free will. This important topic has not commanded the attention it deserves owing to what is perhaps a prevalent assumption that freedom leaves judgments concerning good and evil largely unaffected. The central aim of this book is to dispute this assumption by arguing for the relevance of free will to the truth of two sorts of such judgment: welfare-ranking judgments or judgments of personal well-being (when is one's life intrinsically good for the one who lives it?), and world-ranking judgments (when is a possible world intrinsically better than another?). The book also examines free will’s impact on the truth of such judgments for central issues in moral obligation and in the free will debate. This book should be of interest to those working on intrinsic value, personal well-being, moral obligation, and free will.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Haji, Ishtiyaque

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgments;6
2;Contents;8
3;Introduction: On Welfare and Worldly Value;12
3.1;1.1 The Focus of Inquiry: The Freedom of Axiological Judgments;12
3.2;1.2 Synopsis;16
4;Attitudinal Hedonism;21
4.1;2.1 Simple Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism;21
4.2;2.2 Some Merits of Attitudinal Hedonism;25
5;Freedom-Sensitive Versions of Attitudinal Hedonism;30
5.1;3.1 The Freedom of Attitudes;30
5.2;3.2 Neo’s Case;32
5.3;3.3 In Support of Freedom-Sensitive Attitudinal Hedonism;34
5.4;3.4 Varieties of Freedom-Sensitive Attitudinal Hedonism;35
5.5;3.5 Freedom and Well-Being;40
5.6;3.6 Objections and Replies;42
6;Pleasure, Desert, and Welfare;50
6.1;4.1 Pleasure and Desert;50
6.2;4.2 Why Be Drawn to Subject’s Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism?;53
6.3;4.3 On the Value ofWorlds and Lives;55
6.4;4.4 The Freedom of Our Decisions;58
6.5;4.5 Authentic Springs of Action and Value;61
6.6;4.6 Freedom, Desert, and Value;63
6.7;4.7 Freedom and the Value of Action-Based Pleasures;66
7;Authentic Springs of Action;69
7.1;5.1 Authenticity andWelfare;69
7.2;5.2 A Comparison with Noggle’s Account;75
7.3;5.3 Some Objections and Responses;77
7.4;5.4 Authenticity and Well-Being: an Objection;80
7.5;5.5 Authenticity and Well-Being: Another Objection;81
8;Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, Desert, and Value;85
8.1;6.1 Subject’s Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, Lives, and Worlds;85
8.2;6.2 Some Source Incompatibilist Presuppositions;85
8.3;6.3 Some Principles;87
8.4;6.4 The Argument from Control;88
8.5;6.5 The Argument from Desert;89
8.6;6.6 The Argument from Authenticity;95
8.7;6.7 Compatibilism, Well-Being, and the Value of Worlds;96
8.8;6.8 Libertarianism, Well-Being, and the Value ofWorlds;97
9;Freedom, Obligation, and the Good;99
9.1;7.1 Obligation, Freedom, and the Value ofWorlds;99
9.2;7.2 Determinism, Alternative Possibilities, and Obligation;100
9.3;7.3 Ross’s Objection Revisited;102
9.4;7.4 A Remaining Problem Concerning Freedom with;102
9.5;7.5 Varieties of Freedom-SensitiveWorld-Ranking Axiologies;105
9.6;7.6 On the Value ofWorlds and Moral Obligation;107
9.7;7.7 The Value of Worlds and the Repugnant Conclusion;109
9.8;7.8 Inauthenticity and Obligation;113
9.9;7.9 Conclusion;116
10;Hard Incompatibilism’s Axiological Costs;118
10.1;8.1 The Issues;118
10.2;8.2 Hard Incompatibilism;118
10.3;8.3 First Cost: Hard Incompatibilism, Worldly Value, and the Repugnant Conclusion;120
10.4;8.4 Second Cost: Hard Incompatibilism and Moral Obligation;122
10.5;8.5 Compatibilism, Worldly Value, and the Repugnant Conclusion;123
10.6;8.6 Conclusion;124
11;Hard Incompatibilism, Practical Reason, and the Good;125
11.1;9.1 Introduction;125
11.2;9.2 Practical Reason and Alternative Possibilities;125
11.3;9.3 Practical Reason and Value;130
11.4;9.4 Practical Reason andWorldly Value;135
11.5;9.5 Practical Reason and Compatibilism;139
12;Value, Obligation, and Luck;140
12.1;10.1 The Issues: The Value of Worlds and Luck;140
12.2;10.2 The Libertarian Freedom Presupposition of Obligation;140
12.3;10.3 Event-Causal Libertarianism;141
12.4;10.4 Event-Causal Libertarianism and the Luck Objection;142
12.5;10.5 Obligation, Luck, and the Simple Theory;149
12.6;10.6 Unfreedom and Luck;149
12.7;10.7 Obligation, Luck, and;150
12.8;10.8 Well-Being and Luck;151
13;Freedom Presuppositions of Preferentism;153
13.1;11.1 An Alternative Axiology: Preferentism;153
13.2;11.2 Simple Preferentism;154
13.3;11.3 Subjective Preferentism;156
13.4;11.4 Truth-Sensitive Preferentism;158
13.5;11.5 Objections to an Authenticity Constraint and Replies;161
13.6;11.6 Source Incompatibilism andWell-Being;170
14;Freedom and Whole-Life Satisfaction Theories of Welfare;173
14.1;12.1 Introduction;173
14.2;12.2 An Outline of Sumner’s Theory;173
14.3;12.3 Some Comments on Sumner’s Theory;179
14.4;12.4 Hard Incompatibilism, Authenticity, and Whole-Life Satisfactionism;183
14.5;12.5 Overall Conclusion;184
15;Appendix A: On Determinism, Randomness, and Desert;188
15.1;A.1 Luck and Desert Principles;188
15.2;A.2 Evaluation of Latham’s Position;190
16;Appendix B: On the Creation of Worlds and Worldly Value;193
17;References;196
18;Index;201

Leseproben

"
4.1 Pleasure and Desert

So far, I have been developing the view that freedom affects the intrinsic value of life atoms, it affects the value of episodes of intrinsic pleasure and displeasure, the sum of these values being a measure of how good in itself a life is for the person who lives that life. With a freedom-sensitive attitudinal hedonism as the relevant axiology, on the view that I favor, free intrinsic attitudinal pleasures are better than otherwise similar unfree pleasures, and free intrinsic displeasures are not as bad as otherwise similar unfree displeasures. In this chapter, I want to lay the groundwork for a slightly different route to the more cautious conclusion that freedom may have a bearing on welfare.

In roughly hewn strokes, the idea is this: deserved pleasures are better than otherwise similar pleasures that are not deserved. Deserved displeasures are not as bad as otherwise similar displeasures that are not deserved. Freedom affects desert, so freedom affects the intrinsic value of pleasures and displeasures. Suppose the value of episodes of pleasures and displeasures are adjusted to reflect the extent to which they are deserved, and suppose that aptly specified atoms of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure whose values have been so adjusted are indeed life atoms - they are the fundamental ""determinants"" of welfare, then, once again, we will have shown that freedom can affect welfare.

Starting with some observations about desert, there are many different desert bases, there are, that is, many different factors that affect the extent to which a given person deserves a certain pleasure or displeasure: excessive or deficient past receipt, moral worthiness or virtue, legitimate claims, established character, etc. (see, e.g., Rescher 1966, pp. 73–83). Consider virtue (or viciousness). Among other things, a virtuous person is a person who habitually acts ""from"" virtue, similarly, a vicious person habitually acts ""out of"" vice. You may be deserving of pleasure if your acts exemplify virtue - you perform virtuous deeds, you may be deserving of displeasure if your acts express vice - you perform vicious deeds. Then it seems that in this fashion, virtuous and vicious deeds (actions or intentional omissions) are ""desert bases."" One’s actions, though, need not express virtue for it to be true that, because of these deeds, one deserves pleasure. You may give alms to the poor in the belief that, in so doing, you do what is morally obligatory. You may well be deserving of moral praise for your deed even if this act does not spring from virtue, equally, you may be deserving of pleasure.

A person can deserve pleasure for many reasons: she may have performed many morally good deeds, she is innocent and maybe innocent people deserve pleasure in virtue of their innocence, she has been deprived of food and she deserves the pleasures of a good meal, and so on. Analogously, a person may deserve displeasure for many different reasons. Needless to say, a person may, at a time, deserve pleasure for some reasons and may also, at that time, deserve displeasure for other reasons or may receive pleasure or displeasure that is undeserved. "